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Summary 
 
Digital media allows us to expand our interactions to new types of environments. 
However, due to the impossibility of us being physically present, we exist in these 
environments in a way that lacks consistency. That is, each website or platform that we use 
represents us in a specific way which is unrelated to how we may be represented in other 
digital environments. Stimuli that we associate to ourselves and which serve as self-
representations are relevant in information processing. They reduce cognitive load by 
prioritizing the stimuli that signal being directly relevant to us. Indeed, self-representations, 
such as our own name and face, and other familiar self-associated stimuli have been found to 
impact various stages of information processing, including affect and behavior (Bola et al., 
2020; Gebauer et al., 2008; Oeberst & Matschke, 2017; Tajfel, 1970; Wood & Cowan, 1995). 
However, it is unclear whether such effects transfer to newly established self-representations 
like the numerous ones that we encounter in digital environments. Research has 
demonstrated that newly self-associated stimuli may indeed impact information processing 
(Janczyk et al., 2019; Schäfer et al., 2015; Sui et al., 2012), though maybe not as widely as 
familiar stimuli (Siebold et al., 2015; Stein et al., 2016). This dissertation investigated the role 
of familiarity in the impact of self-representations. 
Across the three manuscripts that constitute the chapters of this dissertation, the role 
of familiarity in the attentional impact of self- and stranger-representations was tested. In 
each of the studies, a matching task was used in order to induce the association of neutral 
geometric shapes to the self and a stranger (Sui et al. 2012). Followingly, their attentional 
impact was comparatively measured in a dot-probe task as observed by a cuing effect 
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(Chapter 2) and inhibition of return (Chapter 3). Based on the types of stimuli used in prior 
literature, the studies in Chapters 2 and 3 both used word-labels as familiar representations 
and geometric shapes and new representations. In order to address this potential confound, 
a final study tested the attentional impact of self and stranger-representations when letter 
combinations were used for both familiar representations (word-labels) and new 
representations (nonwords; Chapter 4). Overall, results demonstrated that new self-
representations impacted performance in the matching task but attentional prioritization of 
self-representations (vs. stranger-representations) was only observed when familiar 
representations were used.  
It therefore seems that, although new stimuli may be tagged to the self, familiarity is 
a prerequisite for self-representations to capture attention. Hence, whether new self-
representations become integrated into the self-concept and consequently impact 
information processing is rather dependent on its particular characteristics and the 
interactions with these representations. However, it does not occur immediately. In sum, this 
dissertation shows that self-association alone is insufficient to yield changes in the self-
concept. 
  
 v 
Zusammenfassung 
 
Die digitalen Medien ermöglichen es uns, unsere Interaktionen auf neue Arten von 
Umgebungen auszudehnen. Da unsere physische Anwesenheit in diesen Umgebungen jedoch 
nicht möglich ist, fehlt unserer Darstellung in diesen Bereichen ein gewisses Maß an 
Konsistenz. Das bedeutet, jede Website oder Plattform, die wir nutzen, repräsentiert uns auf 
eine bestimmte Art und Weise, die nichts mit der Art und Weise zu tun haben muss, in 
welcher  wir in anderen digitalen Umgebungen dargestellt werden. Stimuli, die wir mit uns 
selbst assoziieren und die uns als Selbstdarstellung dienen, sind bei der 
Informationsverarbeitung relevant. Sie reduzieren die kognitive Belastung, indem sie 
denjenigen Signalen Priorität einräumen, die für uns direkt von Bedeutung sind. Tatsächlich 
hat sich gezeigt, dass Selbstdarstellungen, wie unser eigener Name und unser eigenes 
Gesicht, und andere vertraute, mit uns selbst verbundene Reize verschiedene Stadien der 
Informationsverarbeitung beeinflussen, einschließlich Affekt und Verhalten (Bola et al., 2020; 
Gebauer et al., 2008; Oeberst & Matschke, 2017; Tajfel, 1970; Wood & Cowan, 1995). Es ist 
jedoch unklar, ob solche Effekte auf neu etablierte Selbstdarstellungen wie jene, die uns in 
digitalen Umgebungen begegnen, übertragen werden. Studien haben gezeigt, dass neue 
selbstassoziierte Stimuli die Informationsverarbeitung tatsächlich beeinflussen können 
(Janczyk et al., 2019; Schäfer et al., 2015; Sui et al., 2012), wenn auch vielleicht nicht so stark 
wie bekannte Stimuli (Siebold et al., 2015; Stein et al., 2016). Diese Dissertation untersuchte 
die Rolle von Vertrautheit bei der Wirkung von Selbstdarstellungen. 
In den drei Manuskripten, die den Kapiteln dieser Dissertation entsprechen, wurde die 
Rolle der Vertrautheit bei der Aufmerksamkeitswirkung von Selbst- und 
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Fremdrepräsentationen getestet. In jeder der Studien wurde ein Matching Task verwendet, 
um die Assoziation von neutralen geometrischen Formen mit dem Selbst und einer fremden 
Person zu induzieren (Sui et al. 2012). Anschließend wurde ihre Aufmerksamkeitswirkung in 
einem Dot-Probe Task vergleichend gemessen, welche sich durch einen Cuing-Effekt (Kapitel 
2) und eine Inhibition of Return (Kapitel 3) zeigte. Basierend auf den in der bisherigen Literatur 
verwendeten Stimuli, wurden in den Studien in Kapitel 2 und 3 sowohl Wörter und bekannte 
Darstellungen als auch geometrische Formen und neue Darstellungen verwendet. Um einer 
möglichen Konfundierung entgegenzuwirken, testete eine abschließende Studie die 
Aufmerksamkeitswirkung von Selbst- und Fremddarstellungen, wenn 
Buchstabenkombinationen sowohl für bekannte Darstellungen (Wörter) als auch für neue 
Darstellungen (Nicht-Wörter; Kapitel 4) verwendet wurden. Insgesamt zeigten die Ergebnisse, 
dass neue Selbstdarstellungen die Leistung innerhalb eines Matching Tasks beeinflussten, 
aber eine aufmerksamkeitsstarke Priorisierung von Selbstdarstellungen (im Vergleich zu 
fremden Darstellungen) wurde nur beobachtet, wenn vertraute Darstellungen verwendet 
wurden.  
Es scheint daher, dass obwohl neue Stimuli in das Selbst integriert werden können, 
dennoch deren Vertrautheit eine Voraussetzung dafür ist, dass sich Selbstdarstellungen auf 
unsere Aufmerksamkeit auswirken. Ob neue Selbstdarstellungen in das Selbstkonzept 
integriert werden und sich folglich auf die Informationsverarbeitung auswirken, hängt also 
eher von deren besonderen Eigenschaften und ihren Interaktionen mit dem Selbst ab. 
Zusammenfassend zeigt diese Dissertation, dass Selbstassoziation allein nicht ausreicht, um 
Veränderungen des Selbstkonzepts herbeizuführen.  
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 General Introduction 
 
It is difficult to imagine a non-digital life. The current COVID-19 pandemic has reflected 
the extent to which the internet now sustains our everyday lives – allowing us to work, study, 
socialize, and somewhat continue our activities while quarantined in our homes. The internet 
has expanded our world by allowing us to interact with people and places far away, and 
people and places otherwise nonexistent. However, anyone who spent weeks stuck at home 
can confirm that it is by no means a replacement for the real world. Digital media presents 
instead a new type of environment and allows for the possibility to change from one 
environment to the other in a matter of seconds, or to be simultaneously present in multiple 
environments. Each of these digital environments (e.g., your online bank, social media 
accounts, service applications, videogames) represents us as users in its own specific way like 
a username, avatar, or photograph. Prior research has demonstrated that representations of 
the self such as one’s own name (Arnell et al., 1999; Wood & Cowan, 1995) or face (Brédart 
et al., 2006; Liu et al., 2016) and other self-associated stimuli can impact cognitive information 
processing (Bargh, 1982; Bola et al., 2020; Brédart, 2016), attitudes (Beggan, 1992; Greenwald 
& Farnham, 2000), and behavior (Oeberst & Matschke, 2017; Tajfel, 1970). However, it is 
uncertain whether this applies to all self-representations, regardless of whether they are 
familiar, like our face and name, or newly established; as would be the case with an avatar. A 
growing body of research has demonstrated that newly established self-representations can 
have some impact on information processing (e.g., Dalmaso et al., 2019; Janczyk et al., 2019; 
Schäfer et al., 2015; Sui et al., 2012). However, results are not yet clear in specifying the stage 
at which they impact information processing, and whether or not it is comparable to the 
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effects produced by familiar self-representations. This dissertation provides further insight 
into the role played by familiarity in the processing of self-representations. 
We exist in a dynamic environment which is constantly changing; producing sounds, 
smells, and other sensations. In fact, the environment produces so much stimulation that the 
brain is unable to process it all at once (Franconeri et al., 2013; Kleiss & Lane, 1986; Shaw & 
Shaw, 1977). In order to manage the excessive amount of information that it receives, the 
mind relies on filters that reduce cognitive load by selectively allocating cognitive resources 
towards the processing of specific stimuli (Hafter et al., 2007; Wark et al., 2007). For example, 
a loud and unexpected sound can easily catch our attention, while we may not be constantly 
aware of our clothes being in contact with our skin. Thus, when processing information, 
specific characteristics of stimuli are used as signals that indicate their relevance in order to 
prioritize what is most important for us to respond to. 
One particular filter which directs information processing is the self-concept, resulting 
in the prioritization of information that is associated to our self (Cunningham & Turk, 2017; 
Markus, 1977; Smith, 1996; Woźniak, 2018). This prioritization is reflected in common 
incidents of daily life, such as how we can easily hear our name being called out within the 
noise of a busy room (the so-called “cocktail party effect”; Moray, 1959), or how easily we 
can find ourselves in a group picture in comparison to when we try to identify someone else. 
As information that refers to us is more likely to be relevant and require a response from us, 
it is only natural that we are biased towards attending it. The impact of self-association can 
even go beyond cognitive information processing, affecting our attitudes and behavior. This 
can be reflected, for instance, in how we feel more positively towards belongings that have 
sentimental value in comparison to similar objects that may be in better condition, and how 
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we can be extra friendly to a fellow compatriot who we randomly meet in a foreign country. 
Consequently, information and elements that we interact with – such as our personal 
characteristics (Bargh, 1982; Moray, 1959; Tacikowski & Nowicka, 2010), social relationships 
(Brewer, 1979; Zickfeld & Schubert, 2016), and possessions (Muñoz et al., 2020; Van Dyne & 
Pierce, 2004) – are categorized in the cognitive system by our relationship to them in order 
to form a hierarchy of sorts which is based on the degree to which these elements are 
associated to the self and integrated into the self-concept (Woźniak, 2018).  
In the present day, however, our interactions are not solely bound to the physical 
world. With the ubiquitous use of the internet and digital media, we now also interact with 
people, characters, objects, and ideas in an ever-growing number of virtual environments. 
Consequently, the number of elements which we associate to ourselves has grown 
exponentially. Consider the number of online accounts that you use, the applications on your 
smartphone, and the transactions you complete online. All websites, platforms, and 
applications present a new environment in which we, as a user, are represented in a specific 
way. Some of these representations may be familiar to us – such as our real name or a 
photograph of ourselves – but some of these are completely new. New representations may 
include avatars, usernames that differ from our real name, or symbols such as the ones used 
to represent our location on a navigator. In some cases, we are not represented at all. Thus, 
the question is raised whether these new representations of the self, which have only recently 
become associated to the self, have the potential to impact information processing in a way 
that is similar to that of familiar representations. For example, it is common to see people 
who are playing a videogame refer to their avatars as themselves, saying things like “I” 
achieved a goal, “I” went to a certain location, or even complaining about the damage they 
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were caused. What does this reflect? Are the avatars cognitively evaluated as an equivalent 
of, say, a photograph of one’s self? 
In the last decade, a growing body of research has focused on studying the impact of 
recently established self-representations (Janczyk et al., 2019; Macrae et al., 2017; Schäfer et 
al., 2015; Siebold et al., 2015; Sui et al., 2012). However, it is not yet clear whether the effects 
of familiar and new self-representations on cognitive processing are comparable. The aim of 
this dissertation is to contribute to this body literature by exploring the process of associating 
new representations to the self, the cognitive impact of these new self-representations, and 
how their impact compares to the effects yielded by familiar self-representations. Specifically, 
I will present a set of three manuscripts describing the attentional impact of self-association 
when using familiar and new representations for the self and a stranger. 
The self-concept: Context and definition 
The study of the self in Western culture spans a long history dating back to the ancient 
Greeks, but it wasn’t until the end of the 19th century when it was first conceptualized 
scientifically by William James (Barresi & Martin, 2011). James (1890) considered that the self 
is constituted by multiple dimensions which refer to the different spheres in which a person 
develops: the physical, social, and spiritual – all of which could potentially be further 
subdivided. In addition, he theorized that the self can be regarded as both subject (nominative 
self) and object (empirical self; James, 1890). Namely, “self as subject” refers to the subjective 
experience of consciousness. In other words, it refers to one’s own interpretation of events 
as experienced in the first-person. In contrast, “self as object” refers to an understanding of 
one’s self as an object that exists in the world and consists of specific properties associated 
to it (Lougheed, 2014). In this case, it alludes to the mental image I hold of myself in the third 
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person: a woman named Gabriela, of Guatemalan nationality, with a specific hair color, 
height, and so on. Although research has since moved on from James’ conceptualization in 
various aspects, the distinction of “self as subject” and “self as object” is still relevant to how 
researchers frame their work today (e.g., Christoff et al., 2011; Sui & Gu, 2017; Truong et al., 
2017), as it defines their theoretical and research approach towards studying the self. 
In this dissertation, I refer to the self-concept within the consideration of “self as 
object”, which is the common approach in cognitive psychology. In detail, cognitive 
psychology posits the self-concept as a cognitive structure made up of information about the 
self (Sui & Gu, 2017). That is, when talking about the self-concept, I am referring to the set of 
properties which someone associates with themselves and which constitute their own mental 
representation of themselves. The information units that constitute this structure result from 
different cognitive and social processes and therefore vary in type (Carlston & Smith, 1996; 
Markus, 1977). They can be, for example, social relationships (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; 
Zickfeld & Schubert, 2016), possessions (Muñoz et al., 2020; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004), and 
personal goals (Burkley et al., 2015). Such units of information are interconnected and 
perceived as one integrated concept of the self (Carlston & Smith, 1996; Markus, 1977). 
Furthermore, within the perspective of “self as object”, it is considered that the concept of 
self can be operationalized, empirically manipulated, and measured (Sui & Gu, 2017). This 
means that the properties of the self are inferred from quantitative measures that assess bias 
towards self-associated stimuli. In this case, self-association is a gradual measure on a scale 
that reflects the strength of a stimulus’ relationship to the self (Woźniak, 2018) and can be 
used to evaluate its categorical and gradual integration into the self-concept (i.e., whether it 
has been integrated into the self-concept or not, and to which degree.)  
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Current neurological views of the self mirror the conceptualization of the self-concept 
as a mechanism which influences information processing and provides a general framework 
to make judgments and decisions (Markus, 1977; Smith, 1996; Woźniak, 2018). Specifically, 
research demonstrates that self-related processing activates several neural regions (rather 
than one localized area of the brain), and that the activation patterns of these regions may 
not be exclusive to self-related processing (Y.-A. Chen & Huang, 2017; Murray et al., 2012, 
2015; Sui & Gu, 2017). Deriving from this, researchers have suggested that the self is 
composed by the interaction of multiple neural regions (Murray et al., 2015; Sui & Gu, 2017; 
Vogeley & Gallagher, 2011) and that it fulfills an integrative role that facilitates different 
stages of cognitive information processing (Humphreys & Sui, 2015; Sui et al., 2013; Sui & Gu, 
2017; Sui & Rotshtein, 2019). That is, the self-concept provides a criterion by which 
information can be categorized, thus establishing self-association as one of the filters by 
which information can be selected and prioritized in the allocation of cognitive resources. 
The way in which the cognitive structure of the self-concept first develops is not yet 
fully understood. However, research suggest that humans already express a “minimal self” at 
birth (Rochat, 2011, 2019). Newborns are believed to hold a basic, innate perception of their 
own body as a distinct and integrated object, and they can also differentiate non-self entities 
as distinct and integrated objects (Rochat, 2011). This view is based on the fact that infants’ 
basic body coordination reflects the integration of their different body parts, such as opening 
their mouths before inserting their hand (Blass et al., 1989; J. S. Watson, 1995). Additionally, 
their movements are motivated and responsive to environmental stimuli (Rochat, 2011). In 
other words, we are born with a basic sense of self which is grounded on the bodily 
experience. During the first two years of life, the cognitive development of infants traverses 
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various stages in their capacity to recognize themselves in mirrors and visual media, which is 
generally accepted as a reflection of self-perception and which is the basic foundation of the 
self-concept (Butterworth, 1992). Referring back to the perspective of self as object, it could 
be said that this perspective develops by first recognizing the self as an object (the body) in 
infancy and is later developed by defining the properties associated to it – namely, the self-
concept. 
Due to the broad range of information that constitutes the self, researchers have 
generally echoed James’ (1890) conceptualization of a multi-dimensional self. Different 
disciplines have focused on specific facets of the self-concept such as the cognitive self, the 
ecological self, the extended self, and the social self, to name a few (Barresi & Martin, 2011; 
Strawson, 1999; Sui & Gu, 2017). Gallagher (2013) suggested organizing the interdisciplinary 
approach to the self via a “pattern theory of self”. Namely, he proposed that the self is a 
cluster concept made up of numerous elements which can only make up a self once a 
sufficient number of them are combined, but which cannot individually constitute a self.  
Furthermore, he posed that each of these elements are in themselves pattern systems as 
well. Admitting the complexity of producing a comprehensive categorization, he tentatively 
proposed eight general categories that conform the self, which include biological and 
ecological aspects that guide the differentiation between the self and not self, intersubjective 
elements involved in social relationships and the differentiation of self and others, and 
cognitive elements relating to the conceptual understanding of the self as object (note the 
parallel of these categories with the previously mentioned facets studied by different 
disciplines). In summary, the self-concept is a cognitive structure which consists of units of 
information pertaining to multiple categories that can be independently identified but are 
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inherently interrelated. This dissertation will focus on the cognitive and social aspects of the 
self by exploring the integration of new self-representations into the cognitive 
conceptualization of the self, the differential processing of information related to the self and 
others, and its observable effects on cognition, affect, and behavior.  
Inclusion of stimuli in the self-concept 
As a construct that encompasses one’s relationships with individual elements in the 
environment, the self-concept is dynamic, complex, and can be altered by different cognitive, 
emotional, and social-behavioral processes (Deaux, 1996). In other words, the self-concept is 
dynamically constructed by the interactions between different environmental elements and 
the individual. This implies a constant balancing between external forces and internal, self-
driven forces. Acknowledging this dynamic interplay, Brewer and Gardner (1996) 
conceptualized the following three dimensions in which the self-concept functions, and which 
range from the individual to the (socially) external: the personal self-concept is constituted 
by the individual traits of a person, the relational self-concept consists of the different roles 
that a person plays in interpersonal relationships, and the collective self-concept is defined 
by social identities which refer to group memberships. Thus, it is assumed that the 
environment does hold the potential to impact an individual’s self-concept by presenting a 
new representation of the self, although many other factors may also come into play. 
Indeed, theorists have proposed that changes in the external environment can have 
an important impact on different aspects of the individual conceptualization of the self (Amiot 
et al., 2007; Breakwell, 2015; Deaux, 1996). In detail, external circumstances can yield short-
term and long-term change in the self-concept (Deaux, 1996). Short-term change refers to 
fluctuations in how a specific identity is expressed, and it is based on contextual demands and 
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the way in which the self-concept is structured. Long-term change in the self-concept consists 
of a permanent alteration that requires reorganizing the self-concept as a whole in order to 
integrate, eliminate, or re-define a specific element (Amiot et al., 2007; Deaux, 1996). The 
ways in which the environment can influence the self-concept are by ascribing roles, defining 
role categories, and by presenting repetitive behavior patterns which strengthen the 
association of a specific element to the self (Deaux, 1996; Markus, 1977). Hence, familiarity 
may indeed play a role on the impact of a self-representation on information processing. This 
also means that the self-concept can develop certain stability and resistance to threatening 
information which contradicts it, but it is always vulnerable to environmental influence that 
may cause it to change (Markus, 1977). That is, in order to adapt to the fluctuating nature of 
the environment and relationships with others, and to assimilate the information it receives, 
the self-concept must remain flexible (Tajfel, 1981).  
According to Deaux (1966), there are two main requirements to integrate an element 
into the self-concept. The first requirement is to associate a specific element to the self. This 
is absolutely necessary and, in some cases, sufficient for the element to become integrated 
to the self-concept (Deaux, 1996). Such is the case observed, for example, when the arbitrary 
categorization into a group immediately yields identification with the group and behaviors 
associated to group identification (Brewer, 1979). This is also the case regarding observed 
effects of playing a specific role in a videogame, by which players identify a role they played 
in a videogame as more congruent with themselves in comparison to other roles (Klimmt et 
al., 2009, 2010). This labelling process may be regarded as relevant in inducing (at least) short-
term change. By this account, then, the presentation of new representations of the self in 
digital environments should have some impact on the self-concept, at least for a limited 
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period of time. The second requirement involves a process of analyzing and consciously 
accepting the element that has been integrated into the self-concept (Deaux, 1996). This 
process refers to an acknowledgment and understanding of the characteristics associated to 
the integrated element and has the final end of facilitating the processing of future 
information which may be contradicting and threatening to the self-concept. That is, the 
requirement of analyzing a self-associated element is one that strengthens the self-
association and allows the self-concept to remain stable in the long term, even when 
presented with conflicting information that could threaten the self-concept.  
Nevertheless, the self-concept is not only modified by the influence of the 
environment, as an individual may also choose to integrate or eliminate elements from their 
self-concept (Deaux, 1996). Likewise, an individual may choose not to endorse a role that has 
been ascribed by the social environment (Deaux, 1996). There are different motivations 
behind the personal decision to integrate, eliminate, or re-define an element of the self-
concept. To begin with, there is a general drive to maintain consistency and preserve social 
integrity (Becker & Tausch, 2014; Tajfel, 1981). Therefore, the self-concept can be repeatedly 
re-evaluated and adapted – for example, increasing the relevance of a particular element – in 
order to perceive the self-concept as congruent. Additionally, individuals constantly strive to 
find a balance between individual differentiation and social inclusion (Brewer, 1991, 1993). In 
other words, we strive to accept the associations imposed by the environment in order to feel 
accepted while still feeling distinct, which may result in the re-interpretation of generic roles. 
Instrumental motivations also influence self-driven modifications of the self-concept. 
Individuals hold an implicit inclination to acquire resources that enhance their ability to 
achieve specific goals (Aron et al., 1991; Deaux, 1996). When an element is integrated to the 
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self-concept, the characteristics and resources of that element are perceived to become 
accessible to the self as well. Thus, an individual may be motivated to associate specific 
elements to their self-concept when such elements are characterized by features that the 
individual finds valuable. From this, then, different types of new self-representations can also 
vary in their potential impact due to the ideas associated to them based on their 
characteristics and the particular digital context in which they are presented. 
Considering the breadth of the self-concept – encompassing numerous dimensions 
and including multiple elements – the judgements made based on the self-concept must 
occur contextually. Following the way in which Brewer and Gardner (1996) proposed that the 
self-concept can be structured in levels that range from the individual to the collective, self-
categorization theory describes how individuals can perceive themselves at different levels of 
abstraction – ranging from the individual to the collective – and how the level of abstraction 
at which the individual perceives themselves in a given moment will depend on 
environmental conditions that activate specific elements of these identifications (Turner & 
Onorato, 1999). In other words, the expression of different self-associated elements will vary 
according to the specific situation and what is considered relevant to that particular situation 
(Humphreys & Sui, 2015). For example, one’s profession and academic title may be salient in 
a work context, but different to what is salient in a family context where family roles are more 
salient, and one may be referred to by a nickname. As elements are categorized by their 
relationship to the self, or their degree of self-association, differentiation of the self and not-
self can both be viewed as gradual or categorical, based on the context. Consider the way in 
which one may think of a spouse as both a part of one’s self-concept in some contexts (e.g., 
someone introducing themselves as someone else’s spouse at a party hosted by said spouse’s 
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friends) yet is able to make a categorical difference that the two are separate individuals (e.g., 
the same person will have a discussion with their spouse referring to each of them individually 
as “you” and “I”). Similarly, a circle may be an efficient representation of myself when its 
presented in a navigator, but not in any other context. Thus, self-association of elements is 
gradual, but categorical differentiations of self and other occur at the physical level, grounded 
on the body. That is, though I may integrate external elements such as an avatar into my self-
concept and feel somehow represented by them, I can also clearly differentiate between 
myself and these elements as separate, discrete entities.  
To summarize, the self-concept is flexible and is dynamically shaped by the impact of 
external influences and internal motivations. Thus, although the environment does indeed 
hold the potential to impact the self-concept in the short and long-term, its impact will 
depend on various characteristics. These characteristics include the individual’s perception of 
an element as desirable and congruent to their self-concept, and the consistency and 
frequency of interactions with the element, among many others. Therefore, new self-
representations presented in digital media will vary in their potential to impact the self-
concept based on its characteristics and the specific environment in which it is presented. 
The impact of self-association 
As previously mentioned, the self-concept functions as a mechanism that selects, 
structures, and manages incoming information based on its relationship to the self. That is, 
the self-concept influences information processing by directing cognitive resources towards 
self-associated stimuli; consequently affecting cognition, attitudes, and behavior. The 
purpose of this is to reduce cognitive load by directing cognitive resources to what is 
specifically relevant to the self. Thus, it facilitates interactions with the environment. It should 
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therefore follow that measurable observations can be made about the impact of individual 
self-associated stimuli. These measures can then be interpreted as evidence that a specific 
stimulus is in fact associated to the self, and to which degree it is so. In other words, the 
degree to which a stimulus is associated to the self can be interpreted from its measurable 
impact on cognition, attitudes and behavior.  
Considering that a broad range of elements can be included in the self-concept, it is 
unsurprising that a wide variety of self-associated stimuli have been shown to impact 
information processing. So far, such evidence has been observed for stimuli that directly 
reference the self by functioning as its representation, such as one’s own name (Alexopoulos 
et al., 2012; Cherry, 1953; Höller et al., 2011; Koole et al., 2001; Moray, 1959; Tacikowski & 
Ehrsson, 2016; Tacikowski & Nowicka, 2010; Wood & Cowan, 1995; Yamada et al., 2012; Yang 
et al., 2013), and one’s face (Bola et al., 2020; Bortolon & Raffard, 2018; Liu et al., 2016; 
Tacikowski et al., 2011; Tacikowski & Nowicka, 2010; Tong & Nakayama, 1999; Wójcik et al., 
2018). It has even been observed for the individual letters and numbers included in one’s own 
personal name, one’s own birthdate (Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997; Koole et al., 2001; Nuttin, 
1985; Tacikowski & Ehrsson, 2016), one’s nationality (Tacikowski & Ehrsson, 2016) and 
arbitrary visual stimuli that have only recently been associated to the self, such as geometric 
shapes (Sui et al., 2012) and completely unfamiliar avatars (Woźniak & Knoblich, 2019). Thus, 
both familiar and new self-representations in digital environments – such as a profile 
photograph and an avatar – have the potential to impact information processing. 
Additionally, it has been demonstrated that such effects are not exclusive to stimuli 
that actually serve as representations of ourselves, but they are also extended to 
environmental elements that we associate to ourselves. For example, there is evidence 
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demonstrating an impact of people and objects such as close others (Smith et al., 1999; Smith 
& Henry, 1996; Zickfeld & Schubert, 2016), groups (Brewer, 1979; Tropp & Wright, 2001), and 
possessions (Constable et al., 2018; Muñoz et al., 2020; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004) on 
information processing, attitudes, and behavior. Finally, abstract concepts such as goals, ideas 
(Hatvany et al., 2018) and roles (Klimmt et al., 2010) have also been observed to have an 
impact on information processing. This can be the case, for example, with people who define 
themselves by their religious beliefs, and researchers who feel represented by the theories 
they have authored.  
In other words, the dynamic nature of the self-concept involves interactions with 
numerous environmental elements. These elements entail diverse cognitive, affective, and 
behavioral processes which have the potential to yield different cognitive, affective, and 
behavioral consequences (Deaux, 1996). Followingly, I will describe some of the main effects 
that have been reported to be induced by the listed self-associated stimuli. 
Cognitive impact of self-association 
The self-concept is considered to be, by nature, a cognitive structure (Markus, 1977; 
Sui & Gu, 2017). Therefore, the integration of elements into the self-concept is an action 
which already impacts cognition by modifying the mental schema of the self. When 
associating another person to the self, for example, characteristics of that person can become 
integrated into the self-concept and recognized as one’s own (Aron et al., 1991; Smith et al., 
1999; Smith & Henry, 1996). The overlap of mental representations of the self and the 
elements associated to the self have been measured and observed via explicit measures in 
which individuals represent their relationships by drawing overlapping circles (Aron et al., 
2004; Tropp & Wright, 2001), via implicit cognitive measures (Hatvany et al., 2018), as well as 
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by neurological data (Y.-A. Chen & Huang, 2017; Murray et al., 2012, 2015; Sui & Gu, 2017; 
Vogeley & Gallagher, 2011). That is, the self-concept is restructured in order to integrate a 
new element. 
Furthermore, the self-concept fulfills the purpose of facilitating information 
processing (Markus, 1977; Sui & Gu, 2017). Therefore, the impact of self-association has been 
observed at different stages of information processing such as perception (Pannese & Hirsch, 
2011), attentional capture (Brédart et al., 2006), and memory (Kim et al., 2018).  
Self-associated stimuli can access awareness and guide attention more easily than 
stimuli associated to others. For example, words that relate to the self – such as personal 
names and surname – and characteristics directly attributed to the self – such as nationality 
and birthday date – can preferentially access awareness in comparison to the same type of 
stimuli when they refer to someone else (Cunningham & Turk, 2017; Rathbone & Moulin, 
2010). Specifically, self-associated stimuli yield a stronger priming effect than stimuli 
associated to others and are thus posteriorly categorized as relating to the self with greater 
ease than stimuli associated to others being categorized as relating to others (Tacikowski & 
Ehrsson, 2016). The same is true for the effect of seeing one’s own face than someone else´s 
face, which even facilitates the perception of subliminal stimuli consisting of (non-visible) 
faces of the same gender (Pannese & Hirsch, 2011). Self-association also captures and holds 
attention. For example, one’s own name captures attention more easily than other names 
(Alexopoulos et al., 2012) and one’s own face captures attention more easily than other faces 
(Bortolon & Raffard, 2018). One’s own face also acts as a distractor that interferes with the 
identification of stimuli that are related to others (Brédart et al., 2006).  
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Although some evidence suggests that conscious awareness is a necessary 
precondition to observe prioritization effects of self-associated stimuli in information 
processing (Kim et al., 2018), there is substantial evidence indicating that this may not 
necessarily be so. For example, even if not attending an auditory channel, one´s own name 
can still be perceived while other unattended content is not perceived (Bargh, 1982; Wood & 
Cowan, 1995). Research also shows that attention can be captured by subliminal 
presentations of one’s own face (Bola et al., 2020). Remarkably, evidence even demonstrates 
that one’s own name yields stronger neurological responses than other names during natural 
states of unconsciousness in sleep (Blume et al., 2017).  
Memory is also impacted by self-association. In detail, it is easier to remember names 
of people who share one’s own name in comparison to the names of people who do not 
match one’s own (Brédart, 2016). Additionally, the presentation of one’s own name in 
conjunction to other stimuli yields an effect of enhanced memory for the accompanied 
content in comparison to content that are not accompanied by self-associated stimuli (Bower 
& Gilligan, 1979; Kim et al., 2018).  
Beyond one’s own name and face, which are pretty much stable and less likely to 
change through time, some elements that are integrated into the self-concept are more 
dynamic and thus have a more active role in providing “feedback” for the self-concept to 
adapt accordingly to the way the element changes. Such is the case with goals, which can be 
integrated in the self-concept but are prone to change with time and can be categorically 
defined as having been accomplished or failed. In fact, as the goal is part of the self-concept, 
its outcome can either strengthen the self-concept by providing congruent information that 
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confirms it or diminish a person’s clarity of their self-concept when failure to achieve the goal 
presents incongruent information that threatens the self-concept (Burkley et al., 2015).  
Taken together, there is an overwhelming amount of evidence establishing that self-
association impacts cognition at all stages. In particular, an overwhelming amount of this 
evidence is derived from the processing of one’s own name and face, reflecting the usefulness 
and cognitive impact of using profile photos and users’ own names as their representations 
in digital environments. The evidence about the cognitive impact of self-association is 
congruent with the supposition of the self-concept as a mechanism that facilitates 
information processing. Furthermore, it also provides an explanatory basis for more complex 
effects induced by self-association in affect and behavior. Followingly, I will briefly describe 
the results observed in studies testing the affective effects of self-association. 
Affective impact of self-association 
A particularity of the dynamics of the self is the tendency to evaluate the self more 
positively than would objectively be done (Brown, 1986). By proxy, self-associated stimuli are 
generally evaluated more positively when compared to stimuli that are not associated to the 
self (Beggan, 1992). Therefore, self-association yields an impact on affect – such as influencing 
implicit attitudes. Implicit attitudes refer to evaluative associations that are held by someone 
without them necessarily advocating them or being aware of them (Greenwald & Banaji, 
1995). By comparing the degree of association of two distinct categories (e.g., me and not 
me) and two affective categories (e.g., pleasant and unpleasant). That is, the degree of 
congruency perceived between the combination of categories (me-pleasant and not me-
unpleasant in comparison to not me-pleasant and me-unpleasant) denotes a bias towards 
evaluating one category (self or other) as positive. In the case of evaluative judgements such 
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as “pleasant” and “unpleasant”, there is indeed a tendency to judge the “pleasant” judgement 
as more congruent with “me” than “not me”, and the “unpleasant” judgement as less 
congruent with “me” than “not me” (Boucher et al., 2009; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). 
However, positive evaluations are not limited the implicit. Research has demonstrated a 
tendency towards explicit positive evaluations of self-associated stimuli, such as letters 
included in one’s own name and numbers related to one’s own birthday date, in comparison 
to non-self-associated stimuli (Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997; Koole et al., 2001). One´s own 
possessions are also valued more highly than other objects solely because of being associated 
to the self (Beggan, 1992).  
In addition to direct valence evaluations of the objects included in the self-concept, 
self-association can impact attitudes towards the relationship with such elements. For 
example, including a group into the self-concept increases in-group bias expressed as in-group 
favoritism (in which in-group refers to a group in which one is included) and a higher level of 
commitment (Brewer, 1979). Specifically, in-group bias and in-group favoritism refer to a 
pattern of presenting attitudes (and, consequently, behaviors) that benefit the group to 
which one holds a membership for the sole reason that one is a member of said group. 
Furthermore, integrating an organization into the self-concept leads to greater organizational 
satisfaction (Knapp et al., 2014). 
To summarize, self-association enhances positive attitudes towards self-associated 
elements themselves and towards the relationship individuals have with that element. Thus, 
digital self-representations can be relevant in influencing attitudes towards the use of specific 
digital services or platforms. Considering the affective and cognitive impact of self-association 
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in combination, these logically give way to facilitate the behavioral effects of self-association 
which have been previously observed, which I will describe in the following section.   
Behavioral impact of self-association 
Building on the cognitive and affective effects previously described, self-association 
has been observed to impact behavior in ways that echo the biases listed above. Specifically, 
interaction with elements associated to the self yields behaviors that favor and prioritize self-
associated elements in comparison to elements that are not associated to the self.  
For example, self-association is linked to behaviors that favor the self-associated 
object by prioritizing it and by assigning or investing more resources towards the self-
associated object (Burkley et al., 2015; Oeberst & Matschke, 2017; Tajfel, 1970). This effect 
can commonly be observed in the context of group behaviors, especially in situations of 
conflict or competition. An example of this is the incidence of the “me-first” rule (Cooper & 
Ross, 1975) – a semantic principle describing the tendency to mention self-related things first 
when listing items – when referring to group conflicts. Oeberst and Matschke (2017) found 
that, in names of historical conflicts which (1) involve two groups who speak different 
languages and (2) refer to both groups in the name, there is a tendency name the in-group 
first. For example, one conflict has the French name “French-German War” (Guerre franco-
allemande) and the German name “German-French War” (Deutsch-Französischer Krieg). 
Furthermore, when asked to spontaneously come up with a name that refers to a fictitious 
conflict, there is a tendency to name the in-group first; even if the assignment to the in-group 
is recent and arbitrary. Moreover, when asking participants to rate groups mentioned in the 
names of group conflicts, the group that was mentioned first was generally rated as more 
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powerful and important (Oeberst & Matschke, 2017). Thus, the “me-first” rule reflects a bias 
regarding the perceived importance of the in-group as greater than another group.  
Behavioral bias is also observable in resource allocation. For example, when dividing 
resources between the in-group and another group, or between a close other and a stranger, 
there is a tendency towards strategies that maximize the profit of the self-associated social 
entity (be it group or individual)  and create the greatest possible difference between the 
profits of the in-group and the out-group (Aron et al., 1991; Tajfel, 1970). This is also occurs 
even if groups have been assigned arbitrarily (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel et al., 1971). A similar 
behavioral bias has also been observed in relation to goals. In detail, the consideration of a 
goal as part of the self-concept leads to a greater investment of resources, such as time, 
effort, and money, towards achieving the self-associated goal. Furthermore, the degree to 
which a goal is associated to the self can predict goal achievement (Burkley et al., 2015). 
To summarize, the consequences of self-association are observable throughout 
various stages of information processing as well as in attitudes and behavior. This reflects the 
role of the self-concept as a cognitive structure that guides information processing and 
cognitively structures specific elements on the basis of their association to the self. Thus, it 
also highlights the importance of understanding the impact of the self-representations in 
digital environments, as they can greatly influence the use of digital media.  
Integrating new stimuli into the self-concept: Self-prioritization effect 
The majority of the stimuli used in the studies presented so far entail different 
confounds. For example, stimuli such as one’s own name are characterized by a high level of 
exposure. Others, such as goals, carry a specific meaning of personal value. Even studies 
involving the arbitrary categorization into groups involve an element of competition against 
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the other group. Thus, it is difficult to evaluate the extent to which such effects are due to 
self-association itself, rather than these aggregated elements. Considering that many of the 
self-representations in digital media are entirely new (as well as the environments in which 
they are presented) it is necessary to understand the extent to which the effects presented 
in the literature are due to self-association alone, in absence of familiarity or other additional 
elements. 
Within the last decade, a growing body of literature has focused on testing the impact 
of self-association in absence of familiarity (Janczyk et al., 2019; Macrae et al., 2017; Schäfer 
et al., 2015; Siebold et al., 2015; Sui et al., 2012). This has been done by inducing self-
association of a neutral stimulus and then testing its impact in a cognitive task. The 
established paradigm used to induce self-association was established by Sui, He, and 
Humphreys (2012) and proceeds in the following way: Participants are first asked to associate 
three geometric shapes to themselves, a close other (e.g. friend or mother), and a stranger 
or neutral object (e.g. chair). The instructions are followed by a matching task, which consists 
of the presentation of random pairings of the geometric shapes and word-labels referring the 
associated entities (i.e. “self”, “friend”, “stranger”). Participants are tasked with responding 
whether the presented combinations are matching (both representing the same entity) or 
non-matching (each representing different entities) as per the original instructions. The 
analysis of performance in the matching task focuses only on trials presenting matching pairs. 
What results show is that confirmation of the matching self-associated shape-label is pair is 
significantly faster and more accurate than any other combination. Furthermore, the 
confirmation of the matching friend-associated pair is faster than that of the stranger-
associated pair (Schäfer et al., 2015; Sui et al., 2012). Thus, the SPE has been interpreted as 
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evidence that simple and arbitrary stimuli can become tagged to the self and consequently 
impact information processing. 
Studies have replicated the SPE by using various stimuli in different sensory 
modalities. The original study reporting the SPE used geometric shapes (Sui et al., 2012) and 
numerous other studies have replicated this observation by using the same stimuli (Macrae 
et al., 2017; Schäfer et al., 2015). However, the SPE has also been replicated using other 
pictorial stimuli, including diagonal lines (S. Payne et al., 2017; Siebold et al., 2015), Gabor 
patches (Stein et al., 2016) and new faces which are either illustrated (Zhao et al., 2015) or 
photographed (S. Payne et al., 2017; Woźniak et al., 2018). Even characteristics of pictorial 
stimuli, such as color, have been observed to yield the SPE (Sui et al., 2009). However, beyond 
the visual dimension, studies have replicated the SPE with auditory stimuli such as tones 
(Schäfer, Wesslein, et al., 2016) and voices (B. Payne et al., 2019), as well as tactile stimuli 
such as vibration patterns (Schäfer, Wesslein, et al., 2016). As a whole, the results from these 
studies demonstrate that different types of stimuli can become tagged to the self and that 
the SPE is highly robust. 
Later studies have followingly expanded research on the SPE, testing what yields self-
association and specifying how it impacts cognition. Generally, results are mixed and further 
research is necessary in order to fully understand the SPE and how it compares to the 
cognitive impact yielded by familiar self-associated stimuli. However, the research that has 
been done so far provides already some insights about recently established self-associations 
and how its impact compares to that yielded by familiar self-association. In the original report 
of the SPE, Sui and her colleagues (2012) described the SPE as a perceptive effect due to the 
impact of self-association vs. other-association in categorizing low-contrast stimuli in the SPE 
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matching task. That is, self-association facilitated perception of low-contrast stimuli. In 
related studies, the use of compound stimuli using both socially salient (i.e., shapes associated 
to self or others) and perceptually salient elements (i.e., color) reflected an interaction of both 
social salience and perceptual salience. However, claims about the perceptive nature of the 
SPE have been disputed by later studies. For example, when using a continuous flash 
suppression paradigm – in which a high contrast mask presented in one eye temporarily 
interferes in the perception of a stimulus presented in the other eye – no difference was 
observed regarding the breakthrough to perception of self-associated and other-associated 
stimuli. That is, neither seemed to be privileged into awareness (Stein et al., 2016). The 
research that has followed has thus hinted at the other possible mechanisms at play in 
yielding the SPE. 
The SPE has been demonstrated to occur at a conceptual level – implicating stages of 
information processing that occur later than perception (Schäfer, Wesslein, et al., 2016). That 
is, rather than tagging a specific stimulus to the self, the association tags a concept. When 
presenting different stimuli that belong to the same concept – such as images and sounds 
representing the same instrument – results still reflected a significant SPE. Thus, the evidence 
suggests that the SPE may not solely depend on perception. This is further supported by the 
use of the SPE matching task when assigning the self and other labels to stimuli that are 
described by multiple features (e.g. “blue” and “triangle”; Schäfer, Frings, et al., 2016). In this 
case, partial matches (i.e., those in which the presented stimulus complies with only one of 
the assigned features) did not interfere with results. That is, the SPE was observed specifically 
for stimuli that complied with both assigned features (Schäfer, Frings, et al., 2016). The effect 
demonstrates that the features are integrated into one single reference object – a 
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characteristic observed in later stages of information processing rather than earlier stages 
(such as perception). Indeed, self-associated stimuli can yield redundancy gains (Humphreys 
& Sui, 2015). When presenting multiple self-associated stimuli that are conceptually related 
can increase the SPE. Such results echo the supposition that dynamics observed in later stages 
of information processing are at play.  
Additionally, evidence suggests that self-association yields similar results to positive 
valence and reward. That is, positive stimuli and reward stimuli can both yield result patterns 
similar to the SPE (Stolte et al., 2017; Sui & Humphreys, 2015a, 2015b; Yankouskaya et al., 
2018). However, positive stimuli do not affect the size of the SPE (Stolte et al., 2017), and 
reward stimuli do not yield redundancy gains (Sui & Humphreys, 2015a). Thus, it seems like 
positive valence and reward may play some role in the SPE, yet they have independent 
impacts as well.  
Although the paradigm established by Sui and her colleagues (2012) is consistently 
used in the literature as a manipulation to induce self-association of generic stimuli, the task 
presents limitations in specifying effects in information processing and at which stage they 
occur. One of the limitations of the matching task used in the SPE paradigm is that the recently 
self-associated shapes are always presented alongside labels that are familiar, have a 
semantic meaning, and are socially salient. Thus, the SPE cannot be entirely attributed to the 
recently self-associated shape. For this reason, researchers have opted for combining the SPE 
paradigm with established cognitive tasks in order to specify the dynamics that come into 
play in yielding the SPE. However, the methodologies used have not yet been standardized. 
Therefore, multiple tasks and stimuli have been used to explore similar effects. This has so far 
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yielded mixed results regarding the impact of newly established self-association from which 
diverse theories have been developed to explain the SPE. 
In regard to attentional capture by newly self-associated shapes alone (i.e., in absence 
of a label), mixed evidence has been obtained by researchers using the same cognitive tasks. 
One of these tasks is visual search, in which a target stimulus must be located from within a 
group of distractor stimuli. Target stimuli varying in salience (e.g., self-associated and other-
associated) are used and response time and accuracy are measured. Faster and more 
accurate response towards a particular stimulus are considered an advantage in attentional 
capture. When presenting self-associated and stranger-associated diagonal lines within set of 
parallel lines, there was no advantage towards locating the self-associated line (Siebold et al., 
2015). However, in a similar task presenting self- and stranger-associated shapes amongst 
sets of distractor shapes, an advantage was observed in regards to the speed of locating the 
self-associated shape in comparison to the speed at which the stranger-associated shape was 
located (Wade & Vickery, 2018).  
In parallel, some studies have used variations of Posner’s cuing task (1980) in order to 
measure attention (Sui et al., 2009; Zhao et al., 2015). The task consists of identifying the 
location of a target that may appear on one of two opposite locations (e.g., left and right). 
Before the target is presented, one of two cues varying in salience – in this case, self-
associated and other-associated – is shown either orienting towards the location where the 
target will appear (congruent trials), or towards the opposite direction (incongruent trials). 
Response times and accuracy are measured to estimate attentional capture. It is expected 
that stimuli that capture attention will facilitate responses towards the cue in congruent trials 
and interfere with responses in incongruent trials. One study using this task had participants 
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associate colors to themselves and a friend. Later, an arrow in either one of the two colors 
was presented in the center of the screen, before the target appeared. Results observed that 
arrows presented in the self-associated color facilitated responses in comparison to arrows 
presented in the friend-associated color (Sui et al., 2009). A similar study which presented 
illustrated faces that gazed to the right or left before presenting auditory targets that were 
heard to the right or left. Namely, the auditory target was manipulated and presented as 
either a tone or a voice. The use of a voice target significantly impacted the size of the 
attentional effect (Zhao et al., 2015). Taken together, these studies demonstrate that, while 
self-associated stimuli do hold the potential to orient attention, there may be limitations to 
this effect.  
Newly established self-association has also been observed to impact the control of 
oculomotor responses. In one task, participants were asked to complete the SPE matching 
task by responding with pro-saccades when non-matching shape-label pairs were presented 
at either side of the screen and responding with anti-saccades when matching shape-label 
pairs were presented at either side of the screen. Results showed that anti-saccades from 
matching self-associated shape-label pairs were initiated later than anti-saccades from 
matching friend-associated shape-label pairs (Yankouskaya et al., 2018). That is, self-
associated stimuli held attention and interrupted responses in comparison to friend-
associated stimuli – denoting an attentional impact of self-association. In a similar task, 
participants were asked to perform anti-saccades away from self- and stranger-associated 
shapes presented at the center of the screen, towards a target presented at either side of the 
screen. Results again demonstrated that antisaccades were initiated later when self-
associated shapes were presented at the center of the screen than when stranger-associated 
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shapes were presented (Dalmaso et al., 2019). That is, self-association, in comparison to 
stranger-association, impacts attention by holding the gaze. 
There is some evidence suggesting that the SPE occurs in memory rather than in 
perception or attention. In detail, result patterns similar to that of the SPE can also be induced 
by memory differences (Reuther & Chakravarthi, 2017). When pairing geometric shapes to 
non-words (instead of labels referring to social entities) and manipulating the number of 
times in which the shape-label pairs were presented in the practice trials (low exposure, 
medium exposure, and high exposure), memory differences accounted for a pattern similar 
to that of the SPE. Although this effect could be interpreted as evidence that the SPE 
originates in memory rather than perception, introducing the same memory differences to 
the original SPE paradigm which uses labels referring to social entities, the SPE was 
unaffected. This results evidence that the SPE may not be solely explained as an effect in 
perception, and that the matching task alone may be insufficient to identify specific effects in 
different stages of cognitive information processing. 
Further evidence for the involvement of memory in the SPE was obtained by using a 
process refractory period paradigm. The paradigm consists of having participants 
simultaneously perform two tasks which require distinct responses. Because it is necessary 
to have available cognitive resources in order to perform a task, the stage in which an event 
occurs in information processing can be assumed by manipulating the timing in the task (that 
is, the period of time in between the presentation of the two stimuli requiring a response) 
and observing when the response to one task interferes with the ability to respond to the 
second task. Namely, events can be catalogued as occurring in an early perceptual stage, a 
central stage, or motor stage. Thus, participants were asked to perform the SPE matching task 
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while simultaneously performing an auditory discrimination task. Response patterns excluded 
the possibility that the task was being performed at the earlier or later stages. Namely, results 
suggest that cognitive prioritization of recently self-associated stimuli occurs in memory. This 
is supported by the observation of self-association on memory in a working memory task (Yin 
et al., 2019). Specifically, in a task requiring the memorization of multi-color visual patterns 
and then confirm the location of the items conforming it, working memory performance was 
enhanced for items presented in the self-associated color than items presented in colors 
associated to others. Thus, strong evidence also exists to substantiate the claim that 
prioritization of newly self-associated stimuli involves memory processes. 
Altogether, research regarding newly established self-association has not yet clarified 
how exactly it impacts cognition. So far, there is mixed evidence as to what stage of 
information processing is impacted by newly established self-association. Adding to this, the 
SPE methodology typically used in the study of newly established self-association presents a 
confound which hinders the interpretation of its effects as being generated by the new self-
representation. Specifically, its presentation of the newly self-associated shape along with the 
familiar label referring to the self does not allow for the SPE to be interpreted as an effect of 
the new self-representation only. Finally, the use of pictorial stimuli as new self-
representations in the overwhelming majority of studies – while pictorial stimuli are not used 
in studies testing the effects of familiar self-representations – presents a potential confound 
which thwarts the comparison of the effects yielded by new self-representations to the 
effects yielded by familiar self-representations. Thus, it cannot be said whether new self-
representations in digital media, such as symbols or avatars, have the potential to impact 
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information processing in a way similar to familiar self-representations like one’s own name 
or a profile photo of one’s self.  
Overview 
In order to elucidate how different self-representations in digital media can affect 
information processing, the manuscripts that constitute the chapters of this dissertation will 
test the role of familiarity in the impact of self-association. Specifically, the aim of this set of 
manuscripts is to directly compare the attentional impact of newly established self-
association to that of familiar self-association in order to provide further insights on how (and 
which) stimuli are integrated into the self-concept and consequently impact information 
processing.  
The focus of Chapters 2 and 3 is on the attentional impact of newly established self-
association and its comparison to familiar self-association. Specifically, Chapter 2 aims to 
measure whether a representation of the self can immediately capture attention with greater 
ease than the representation of a stranger, as reflected in a cuing effect. Furthermore, 
familiar, new, and paired (combining both familiar and new) representations are used in order 
to compare whether the familiarity of the representation has an impact on the size of the 
effect of attentional prioritization of the self over a stranger. Following the method of the 
prior literature, the words “self” and “stranger” are used as familiar representations, and 
geometric shapes were used as new representations.  
Chapter 3 consists of two studies that replicate and extend the results from the studies 
in Chapter 2. First, the potential of the self and stranger representations to capture attention 
are compared when these are represented by familiar, new, and paired representations. 
Secondly, the attentional task is manipulated in order to observe whether such 
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representations yield another common attentional effect; namely, inhibition of return 
(Posner et al., 1985). Again, the words “self” and “stranger” are used as familiar 
representations, and geometric shapes are used as new representations. The paired 
representations used in the first two manuscripts fulfill the purpose of comparing their impact 
to that of the shape and label alone in order to disentangle the effects of both elements and 
clarify the role they play in producing the SPE as observed in the matching task. 
Chapter 4 approaches the use of different stimuli modalities as familiar and new 
representations (namely, words and pictorial stimuli) as a potential confound. Familiar words 
and word-like letter combinations are used to compare the attentional capture of familiar 
and new representations of the self, when both types of representations use the same 
stimulus modality. 
Finally, Chapter 5 will summarize the empirical results presented in Chapter 2 – 4. 
Their theoretical and practical implications will then be jointly discussed. Finally, the strengths 
and limitations of the presented studies will be considered, as well as possible directions for 
future research.  
Note that the manuscripts conforming the following chapters have been written with 
co-authors for publication. Thus, there are content overlaps regarding explanations of the 
theory substantiating the reported studies. 
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 Attentional Capture of Self-Representations 
(When) Do self-associated stimuli lead to attention holding? 
Huge amounts of input arouse our senses at every waking moment, so our cognitive 
system needs to filter the incoming environmental information in order to select what is most 
relevant to direct our behaviour. A large body of research shows that stimuli referring to one's 
self are likely to guide this process of selective attention. In other words, self-associated 
stimuli such as one's own name (Alexopoulos et al., 2012; Moray, 1959; Yang et al., 2013) and 
one’s own face (Brédart et al., 2006; Wójcik et al., 2018) have been demonstrated to have a 
greater capacity to capture attention than non-self-associated stimuli. In the last years, it has 
been suggested that stimuli may benefit from prioritized attention even when they have only 
recently become self-associated (Dalmaso et al., 2019; Sui et al., 2009; Wade & Vickery, 2018). 
However, limitations of this effect have already been identified (Zhao et al., 2015), and some 
studies even failed to observe attentional prioritization of recently established self- as 
opposed to other-associated stimuli (Siebold et al., 2015). It is therefore unclear whether self-
associated stimuli impact attention, and, furthermore, whether such an impact is generated 
by both familiar and newly self-associated stimuli. The purpose of the current study is to 
specifically compare the impact of self-association on attention for both recently established 
vs. highly familiar self-associated stimuli. Therefore, this paper will have two foci: (1) 
demonstrating how self-association specifically impacts attention by the use of two different 
methods that can be interpreted as attention holding, and; (2) the comparison of the 
attentional impact of familiar vs. newly self-associated stimuli. 
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Research gaps and purposes 
Familiar self-associated stimuli have consistently been found to impact the 
distribution of attention in a variety of ways (see Sui & Rotshtein, 2019). For example, one’s 
own name or a picture of one’s own face have been found to capture attention more easily 
than others’ names or faces (Alexopoulos et al., 2012; Moray, 1959; Wójcik et al., 2018; Yang 
et al., 2013). That is, responses towards one’s own name as compared to others’ names are 
facilitated (Arnell et al., 1999). Similarly, one’s name and face are harder to ignore than those 
of others (Wójcik et al., 2018; Wood & Cowan, 1995). For one’s own name, such attentional 
effects are maintained whether names are presented in the visual (Alexopoulos et al., 2012; 
Yang et al., 2013) or auditory sensory modality (Moray, 1959; Wood & Cowan, 1995). 
Moreover, targets that follow self-associated stimuli (i.e., occurring at a location that had 
previously been occupied by a self-associated stimulus) elicit faster responses than targets 
that follow other-associated stimuli (Alexopoulos et al., 2012). This indicates that the 
attentional focus remains at the location of the self-associated stimulus even after the 
stimulus has disappeared (Wójcik et al., 2018), reflecting attention holding. With directional 
stimuli like faces as oriented towards a specific location, responses are faster for targets at 
the location towards which one’s own face orients as compared to targets at a distractor 
location – yet, this does not hold for a friend’s vs. a stranger’s face (Liu et al., 2016), indicating 
that directional self-associated cues serve to orient attention more efficiently that other-
associated cues. In summary, familiar self-associated stimuli can efficiently guide attention as 
well as eliciting attentional capture and attention holding with greater ease than other-
associated stimuli. 
Notably, a growing body of literature has also observed prioritization effects for 
stimuli that have only recently become self-associated (e.g., Schäfer et al., 2016; Sui et al., 
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2012; Truong et al., 2017). This means that effects of self-related stimuli like one’s name or 
face are not (or at least not merely) attributable to familiarity. The established method used 
to experimentally induce self-association consists of associating neutral stimuli – such as 
geometric shapes – to the self, a close other (i.e., mother or a friend) and a stranger or neutral 
object (i.e., a chair). Participants are then asked to complete a response time (RT) matching 
task comprising random combinations of the geometric shapes and the instances presented 
as word-labels (e.g., “I”, “mother”, “friend”). They are instructed to indicate whether the 
presented combinations are correct or incorrect according to the initial association. 
Interestingly, responses are typically fastest when confirming the correct self-associated 
shape-label pair. The advantage in verifying the self-associated shape-label pair in comparison 
to any other-associated shape-label combination is what has been called the self-
prioritization effect (SPE; Sui et al., 2012). 
Two points concerning the interpretation of the SPE – the evidence of which will be 
reviewed in the following sections - motivated the current research and will serve as the foci 
of this paper. First, the SPE has been interpreted to reflect (among other mechanisms) 
attentional prioritization of the self- as compared to other-associated shape-label pairs 
(Falbén et al., 2019; Humphreys & Sui, 2015). Still, the stage of information processing at 
which prioritization takes place cannot be clearly interpreted from the matching task alone; 
although stimuli have been manipulated to assume such information (Schäfer et al., 2015; Sui 
et al., 2012), the matching task is not an established paradigm to directly measure attention. 
It is therefore unclear whether or how attentional distribution is impacted by self-association. 
The matching task thus has to be combined with paradigms that serve as more specific 
measures of attention in order to test this assumption. Secondly, the SPE has been 
Attentional Capture of Self-Representations | 47 
interpreted to show that a short association of some (previously arbitrary) stimulus to the self 
changes the way in which it is subsequently processed, implying that the stimulus which had 
previously been neutral is now prioritized due to its newly established association with the 
self. Along these lines, it has been assumed from the SPE that the association of a geometric 
shape to the self increases the likelihood of this shape to guide attention. However, only few 
published studies have investigated whether the self-associated shape alone can elicit 
prioritization effects – and, to the best of our knowledge, evidence for a prioritization of the 
shape alone is quite scarce. The current study therefore aims to (1) combine the matching 
task with an established cuing paradigm to specifically measure attention holding of self-
associated stimuli, and (2) to compare prioritization effects for a newly established self- vs. 
other-associated shape alone and highly familiar self- vs. other-associated stimuli.  
Attentional prioritization of self-associated vs. other-associated stimuli 
In cognitive psychology, cuing paradigms represent a highly established tool to test 
the potential of specific stimuli to impact attention (Frischen et al., 2007; Hawkins et al., 1990; 
Posner, 1980; Verghese, 2001). In cuing tasks, stimuli varying in category/degree of saliency 
(namely, the cues) are presented to signal or distract from a target that requires a response. 
Targets are presented after the cue, either at the location that had previously been occupied 
or indicated by the cue (valid trials) or at a different location (invalid trials). Results typically 
show faster and more accurate responses on valid compared to invalid trials – an effect which 
is enhanced by the salience of cue (Ehrman et al., 2002; MacMahon et al., 2006). Previously, 
the impact of self-association on the distribution of attention has been concluded from the 
finding that a participant’s own face or own name elicits faster RTs and a higher accuracy than 
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other’s faces and names in classical cuing paradigms such as the dot-probe task (Wójcik et al., 
2018), the peripheral cuing task and the antisaccades task (Alexopoulos et al., 2012). 
As explained, recent studies have used a matching task to measure the impact of 
recently established self- and other-association to previously arbitrary stimuli (Janczyk et al., 
2019). Participants are asked to associate three geometric shapes to themselves, a close 
other, and a stranger or neutral object. They are later presented with random combinations 
of the shapes and word-labels referring to each of the entities, and participants must indicate 
whether they are correctly matched or not. The shapes and word-labels are simultaneously 
presented, and are thus referred to as shape-label pairs (Schäfer, Wesslein, et al., 2016; Sui 
et al., 2012). When presented with matching shape-label pairs, participants have been 
consistently faster at confirming that the self-associated shape-label pair is correct (see 
Humphreys & Sui, 2015; Janczyk et al., 2019; Sui et al., 2012). Such results have been 
interpreted by some as attentional effect (Humphreys & Sui, 2015; Sui & Rotshtein, 2019). 
However, the matching task alone is insufficient to confirm that the SPE represents (in part) 
an attentional effect. 
Notably, the matching task has previously been combined with other established 
paradigms to investigate whether self-prioritization occurs at the perceptual level (Sui et al., 
2012; see Macrae et al., 2017) or at a later stage of information processing (see Janczyk et al., 
2019; Siebold et al., 2015; Stein et al., 2016). It has, however, not yet been combined with 
established paradigms that can be interpreted as attention holding. We therefore combine 
the matching task with an established cuing paradigm – namely, the dot-probe task – to 
measure attention holding of self-associated stimuli. Specifically, we will use the dot-probe 
task as a target discrimination task in which the target following the self- and other-associated 
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cues will randomly vary in being presented as either a “q” or “p” which participants must 
identify (Imhoff et al., 2019).  
Comparison of the attentional impact of familiar and recently-established self-
associated stimuli 
As already mentioned, cuing paradigms have only scarcely been used with recently 
established self-associated stimuli. In one study using a version of the Posner cuing task 
(1980), for example, recently established self-associated cues were found to guide visual 
attention more effectively than friend-associated cues (Sui et al., 2009). In detail, Sui et al. 
(2009) asked participants to associate themselves and a friend with distinctly coloured arrows 
(i.e., red vs. green). These stimuli were then used as central cues in a task with two possible 
target locations, one to each side of the cue. The cues preceded the target and they either 
pointed towards (valid) or away (invalid) from the location where the target would 
subsequently occur. The size of the cuing effect (RT on invalid trials minus RT on valid trials) 
was larger for self-associated cues than friend-associated cues. This has been interpreted to 
reflect that self-associated cues cause faster shifting of attention to cued locations than 
friend-associated cues. In other words, these results indicate that, similar to highly familiar 
self-associated cues (Liu et al., 2016), recently established self-associated cues that are 
directional also serve to orient attention more efficiently than recently established other-
associated cues (Sui et al., 2009). Yet, limitations of this effect have also been identified: Using 
auditory targets, the effect of self-associated vs. other-associated arrows was only observed 
with voice-targets but not tone-targets; the same was true when generic faces gazing to the 
right vs. to the left were used as cues (instead of arrows; see Zhao et al., 2015). Taken together 
the evidence from these cuing studies, it remains unclear whether recently established self-
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associated stimuli alone elicit attentional prioritization as effectively as highly familiar self-
associated cues.  
In regard to attention holding in particular, evidence regarding the potential of 
recently established self-associated stimuli to impact attention comes from target-detection 
tasks. In an oculomotor task, for example, participants initiated saccades away from self-
associated geometric shapes more slowly than saccades away from stranger-associated 
geometric shapes – an observation interpreted as an increased difficulty to steer attention 
away from self-associated as opposed to stranger-associated shapes (Dalmaso et al., 2019). 
This suggests that –like highly familiar self-associated stimuli (Wójcik et al., 2018) – recently 
established self-associated stimuli may hold attention. However, Dalmaso et al. (2019) 
observed the effect only in one of two experiments (namely, only when the self/other 
distinction was task-relevant). Hence, the current study aims to corroborate this result by 
specifically comparing the potential of recently established vs. highly familiar self-associated 
stimuli to capture and hold attention.  
Note that the evidence from target-detection tasks suggesting the potential for 
recently established self-associated stimuli to hold attention has consistently used setups 
consisting of the self- and other-associated being displayed individually. That is, the recently 
established self- and other-associated stimuli are not presented simultaneously. In visual 
search, the experimentally-induced association of a shape to the self vs. another person has 
also been found to enhance the detection of the self-associated shape but not of the other-
associated shape, again indicating that newly-learned self-associations hold the potential to 
capture attention (Wade & Vickery, 2018). However, this effect was observed only when the 
self- or other-associated shape were presented amongst a set of unfamiliar stimuli. In 
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contrast, latencies of visual search saccades towards self- vs. stranger-associated geometric 
shapes did not differ significantly when the self- and stranger-associated shapes were 
presented on the same display (Siebold et al., 2015). Notably, in the matching task, responses 
towards self- vs. other-associated shapes are also compared across trials; self- and other-
related information is not presented simultaneously in this paradigm. The same holds for the 
studies that provided evidence for attentional prioritization of recently established self-
associated stimuli; the self- vs. other-associated cues were presented in isolation in these 
studies (Dalmaso et al., 2019; Sui et al., 2009). Since this strays from the reality of our 
environment in which various stimuli simultaneously compete for our attention, we test 
whether the established finding that self-relevance causes attentional prioritization actually 
holds in a context in which two socially salient stimuli – one self-relevant, one other-relevant 
– are presented simultaneously and thus compete for attentional resources.  
The dot-probe task represents a classical cuing paradigm meeting this requirement. In 
this task, as opposed to the Posner cuing task and the oculomotor task used by Dalmaso et 
al. (2019), self- and other-related information is presented simultaneously. Hence, the 
current study will investigate whether recently established vs. highly familiar self-associations 
capture and hold attention under conditions of competition for attentional resources among 
different stimuli.  
The use of the dot-probe task will allow us to test whether self-associated stimuli 
themselves capture attention and hold it when competing with other-associated stimuli for 
attentional resources. Studies have observed that familiar self-associated stimuli such as 
one’s own name and face can impact attention with greater ease than others’ names and 
faces in cuing tasks (Alexopoulos et al., 2012; Wójcik et al., 2018; Yang et al., 2013), but this 
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has not yet been demonstrated for recently established self-associated stimuli. It therefore 
remains an open issue whether recently established self-associated stimuli, as compared to 
other-associated stimuli, also function differently as cues in a dot-probe task. The findings 
from the study using Posner’s cuing task in this context (Sui et al., 2009) demonstrated that 
directional self-associated stimuli can more easily be used to orient attention towards a target 
in a different location than directional other-associated cues. Additionally, the findings from 
the study tracking saccades away from centrally-presented geometric shapes (Dalmaso et al., 
2019) demonstrated that self-associated stimuli can hold attention for longer than stranger-
associated stimuli when such stimuli are presented individually. In the current study, we thus 
specifically test whether self-associated cues are more efficient in capturing and holding 
attention than stranger-associated cues. To this end, pairs of newly associated self- and 
stranger-associated cues will be presented to the participants, followed by the presentation 
of a to-be-located probe target randomly occurring either at the location previously occupied 
by the self- or stranger-associated cue. 
In the currents study, the elements typically used as self- and other-representations 
in the matching task will be used as stimuli in the dot-probe task in order to combine both 
paradigms within this experiment. As previously mentioned, in the matching task, 
performance in stimulus verification is enhanced for matching self-associated shape-label 
pairs compared to matching other-associated shape-label pairs (SPE). Often, the words “I”, 
“friend” and “stranger” have been used as labels here (Janczyk et al., 2019; Macrae et al., 
2017; Reuther & Chakravarthi, 2017; Sui et al., 2012; Sui & Humphreys, 2015b). These labels 
are highly familiar and should thus be strongly associated to the respective instances. In 
comparison, shapes (e.g., a triangle, a circle) become only shortly associated to the instances 
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in the course of the experiment. In the current study, participants will first associate 
geometric shapes to the labels “I” and “stranger”. Then we will implement either the familiar 
labels, the recently learned shapes or shape-label pairs as cues in the dot-probe task in order 
to compare their effectiveness. If recently established self-associations have the same 
potential to guide attention as highly learned self-associations, then the magnitude of the 
effectiveness of the cues should not differ as a function of their representation format (shapes 
vs. labels vs. pairs). If, however, familiarity plays a role for prioritization under conditions of 
attentional competition, then the size of the cuing effect should be larger for the labels/pairs 
compared to the shapes. We acknowledge that there is compelling evidence indicating an 
advantage for the information processing of self-associated labels such as one’s own name 
and own personality traits as opposed to other-associated labels (Alexopoulos et al., 2012; 
Bargh, 1982; Yang et al., 2013), whereas the evidence indicating a potential advantage for the 
information processing of recently self-associated shapes is mixed (Dalmaso et al., 2019; 
Siebold et al., 2015; Sui et al., 2009; Wade & Vickery, 2018; Zhao et al., 2015). Thus, we 
assume that the attentional benefit of the self- compared to the stranger-associated cues in 
the dot-probe task is more pronounced when the labels (“I” and “stranger”) are presented 
compared to when the self and the stranger are represented by the shapes. In other words, 
we predict an interaction effect of representation familiarity (label vs. shape), by which 
prioritized responding toward self- vs. stranger-associated stimuli will be enhanced by 
familiar representations in comparison to new representations.  
Interestingly, the size of the SPE increases when two self-associated shapes are 
presented on matching self-associated shape-label trials compared to when one self-
associated shape is presented (Sui & Humphreys, 2015b). Similarly, the simultaneous 
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presentation of both the self-associated shape and the self-associated label might lead to a 
greater processing advantage compared to the presentation of only the self-associated shape 
or only the self-associated label (see Lockhead, 1966, for the general concept of redundancy 
gains). In the dot-probe task, self-associated shape-label pairs might thus be more efficient in 
capturing attention than the self-associated shape or the self-associated label only. In other 
words, we expect a compound effect of self-association, where two self-associated stimuli 
(regardless of whether these are familiar or newly associated) will hold impact attention more 
than one stimulus alone. 
In summary, in this study we will use the dot-probe task as a measure of attentional 
capture and attention holding capacity. After using the typical SPE manipulation consisting of 
associating geometric shapes to the self and a stranger, we will present stimuli representing 
both instances as cues in a dot-probe task in order to measure the attentional capture of self-
associated vs. stranger-associated stimuli. We expect that identification of a target (“p” or 
“q”) will be faster when it occurs at the location previously occupied by self-associated stimuli 
as opposed to that previously occupied by stranger-associated stimuli. In addition, we will 
manipulate the way in which the self and stranger are represented (shape vs. label vs. shape-
label pair), expecting the beneficial effect of self vs. stranger-associated cues to be more 
pronounced when the label is present than when it is not. Moreover, we will test (1) whether 
attentional capture and attention holding of self-associated information is also observed 
when only the self- vs. stranger-associated shapes (as established during the preceding 
association phase of the experiment) are used as cues and (2) whether the attentional benefit 
of self-associated compared to stranger-associated information is stronger for shape-label 
pairs than for the label only. The results of our study will provide insights on the potential of 
Attentional Capture of Self-Representations | 55 
recently established as compared to highly familiar self- vs. other-associations to impact the 
distribution of attention under conditions of attentional competition. 
Method 
Participants. A total of 34 participants (25 female, Mage = 23, SDage = 3.5) completed 
the study. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were able to 
complete the study in German. Data from four participants were excluded due to the average 
of their RTs falling within Tukey’s (1977) definition of an outlier when compared to the sample 
distribution of all participants. The study was carried out according to the principles of the 
Declaration of Helsinki, on the basis of informed consent. 
A priori power calculations were made to establish a minimum sample size. In previous 
studies, the SPE has been reported as medium to large in effect size (dz > 0.81 in Sui et al., 
2012 and dz ≥ 0.58 in Schäfer et al., 2016) and previous studies using own face and other-face 
stimuli in a dot-probe task to measure attentional capture reported a large effect size for 
congruency between target location and self-associated stimuli (ηp2 = .19 in Wójcik et al., 
2018). Based on this, we expected a medium effect size of f = .25 (Cohen, 1988) for the effect 
of self-prioritization in the dot-probe task. For a repeated-measures ANOVA of mean RTs with 
one group, 6 measurements (2 [target position: self vs stranger] × 3 [type of representation: 
shape vs. label vs. pair]), α = .05, correlation among the measures = .50, and nonsphericity 
correction ε = 1, a minimum sample size of N = 28 is needed to detect an effect with a power 
effect of 1 – β = .99 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). A total of 34 participants were 
tested to allow for dropouts and exclusion of outlier responses. 
Design. The study consisted of a 2 (target position: self vs. stranger) × 3 (type of 
representation: shape vs. label vs. pair) within-participants design. The assignment of shapes 
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to labels was randomized and balanced throughout participants, and the target position was 
randomized and balanced throughout trials. 
Apparatus and Materials. The experiment was conducted on Acer Aspire E15 35-
573G-54SK 15.6” laptops using standard computer mice, and it was run by E-Prime 2.0. 
All stimuli were presented in white colour against black background and at a viewing 
distance of 50 cm. The visual geometric shapes were presented at a visual angle of 
approximately 5° × 5°. All verbal stimuli were represented in Courier New font size 18 at a 
visual angle of about 0.7°. 
Procedure. Participants were greeted by an experimenter who shortly provided an 
overview of the study structure. All specific instructions that followed were presented on the 
computer screen. 
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were asked to associate geometric 
shapes (triangle and square) to the labels "I" and "stranger" (“Ich” and “Fremder” in German) 
with the following instructions presented: “You are a [shape 1] and a stranger will be 
represented by a [shape 2]”. The images of the shapes were not presented during this 
association phase. Participants were to press any key to continue with the experiment after 
familiarizing themselves with the instructions. 
Following, participants completed the dot-probe task (see Figure 2.1). They first 
completed 24 practice trials in which they received feedback if their response was incorrect 
or exceeded 1, 500 ms (“incorrect”, “please respond faster”). Afterwards, they completed 240 
experimental trials in which they did not receive feedback on their performance. Each trial 
began with a fixation cross in the centre of the screen (500 ms), followed by the stimuli 
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representing the self and a stranger on opposite sides of the screen (left and right, located on 
25% and 75% of the horizontal line of the screen and on 50% of the vertical line of the screen, 
200 ms). Representations were a label, a geometric shape, or a matching shape-label pair – 
with the order of presentation being randomized. Then, a target consisting of either a “q” or 
“p” was presented on either the left or right side of the screen (on 25% or 75% of the 
horizontal line of the screen, respectively, and on 50% of the vertical line of the screen) until 
participants responded “q” or “p” to indicate which target was presented. The target (q or p) 
and the location of the target (left or right) were randomized between trials. A 1000 ms pause, 
consisting of a black screen, proceeded before the next trial started.  
Finally, the matching task was presented. Each trial began with a black screen (500 
ms) followed by a fixation cross (500 ms). A pair consisting of a shape and a label underneath 
it was then presented and remained on screen until the participant responded, or for a 
maximum of 1,500 ms. There were two possible responses: Participants had to press “d” to 
indicate that the shape-label pair matched the mapping learned during the association phase 
and “k” to indicate that it did not match the learned mapping. Participants received feedback 
if their response was incorrect or exceeded 1,500 ms (“incorrect”, “please respond faster”). 
Initially, four trials were administered as a practice phase, followed by 128 trials of the 
matching task to measure of the SPE as established in the literature (Sui et al., 2012). 
Participants were then thanked, debriefed, and compensated with 6 euros. Students 
of the Department of Psychology at the University of Tübingen could opt to receive class 
credit.  
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Figure 2.1. Schematic depiction of one trial of the dot-probe task (upper figure) and example 
displays demonstrating how the display differed as a function of the type of representation 
(familiar vs. new vs. pair; lower figure). 
 
Results 
For all statistical analyses, a significance level of α = .05 was specified. For RT analyses, 
only correct responses with RTs above 100 ms and below three interquartile ranges above 
the third quartile of the overall individual RT distribution were used (see Tukey, 1977). 
Exclusions of trials were performed separately for the matching task and the dot-probe task. 
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Matching Task 
As a manipulation check, we first analysed performance in the matching task. 
Average RTs. The RT data (see Figure 2.2 for a summary depiction) were subjected to 
a 2 (shape: self-associated vs. stranger-associated) × 2 (trial type: matching vs. non-matching) 
within-participants MANOVA (see O'Brien and Kaiser, 1985, for the use of MANOVA to 
analyse repeated-measure designs). The main effects of shape, F(1, 29) = 101.99, p < .001, ηp2 
= .78, and trial type, F(1, 29) = 36.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .56, were both significant. The interaction 
of shape and trial type, F(1, 29) = 60.22, p < .001, ηp2 = .68, was also significant. To follow up 
on this interaction effect, RTs from matching trials were submitted to a one-factorial (shape: 
self-associated vs. stranger-associated) within-participants MANOVA to specifically analyse 
the SPE. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of shape, F(1, 29) = 125.56, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .81, indicating a significant SPE in the RT data. That is, responses were faster for matching 
self-associated shape-label pairs than for matching stranger-associated shape-label pairs. The 
RTs from non-matching trials were submitted to the same analysis, again revealing a 
significant main effect of shape, F(1, 29) = 5.96, p = .021, ηp2 = .17. Namely, responses were 
faster for trials presenting the self-associated shape with the label “stranger” than trials 
presenting the stranger-associated shape with the label “self”.  
Sensitivity measure d’. Mean error rates are presented in Table 2.1. Signal detection 
sensitivity indices (d’) for each shape condition were used to analyse error rates (Schäfer et 
al., 2015; Schäfer, Wesslein, et al., 2016; Sui et al., 2012). To this end, we defined responses 
in the following way: in matching trials, correct responses were considered hits and incorrect 
responses were considered misses; in non-matching trials, correct responses were considered 
correct rejections, and incorrect responses were considered false alarms. The loglinear 
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approach was used to account for cases with 100% hits or 0% false alarms, meaning that 0.5 
was added to the number of hits and the number of false alarms, and 1 was added to the 
number of signal trials and the number of noise trials before calculating the rates for hits and 
false alarms (see Hautus, 1995; Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). The sensitivity measures were 
submitted to a one-factorial (shape: self-associated vs. stranger-associated) MANOVA. A 
significant main effect of shape was observed, F(1, 29) = 40.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .58, indicating 
a higher sensitivity for self- than for stranger-associated shapes (i.e., a significant SPE in d’). 
 
Figure 2.2  Mean response time in the matching task as a function of shape (self-associated 
vs. stranger-associated) and trial type (matching vs. non-matching). Error bars represent 
standard errors. *** p < .001. 
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Table 2.1  Mean error rates as a function of trial type and shape in the matching task  
Trial type Shape Error rates (%) 
Matching Self-associated 0.9 (1.5) 
 Stranger-associated 4.8 (3.7) 
Non-matching Self-associated 2.1 (2.6) 
 Stranger-associated 2.1 (1.9) 
Note. Standard deviation presented within parentheses. 
Dot-probe task 
Average RTs. Average RTs in the dot-probe task (see Figure 2.3) were subjected to a 2 
(target location: self vs. stranger) × 3 (type of representation: shape vs. label vs. shape-label 
pair) within-participants MANOVA. A significant main effect of target location was observed, 
F(1, 29) = 99.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .78, indicating that responses were faster when the target was 
presented at the location previously occupied by the self-representation than when the target 
was presented at the location previously occupied by the stranger-representation. 
Furthermore, a significant main effect of type of representation was observed, F(2, 58) = 
40.14, p < .001, ηp2 =.58. Follow-up analyses revealed that, irrespective of the target location, 
mean RTs were significantly slower for targets following the self- and other-associated stimuli 
as represented by labels than for targets following the self- and other-associated stimuli as 
represented by shapes, t(29) = 5.42, p <.001, d = 0.99; further, mean RTs were significantly 
slower for targets following cues represented by shapes than targets following cues 
represented by pairs, t(29) = 5.67, p <.001, d = 1.04. The interaction of target location × type 
of representation, F(2, 58) = 14.72, p < .001, ηp2 = .34, was also significant. To follow-up on 
this interaction, pairwise t-tests were conducted. In detail, these post-hoc analyses revealed 
that responses were significantly faster for targets following the self-representation than for 
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targets following the stranger-representation, irrespective of whether the instances were 
represented by labels, t(29) = 8.18, p < .001, d = 1.49, or by shape-label pairs, t(29) = 3.99, p 
< .001, d = 0.73. However, the size of the cuing effect was significantly larger for cues 
represented by labels than for cues represented by pairs, t(29) = 2.99, p = .006, d = 0.55. That 
is, the difference in response time favouring responses to targets following self-
representations over stranger-representations was greater when the self and stranger were 
represented by labels than when they were represented by shape-label pairs. Most 
importantly, however, no cuing effect was observed for the shape representation condition, 
t(29) = 0.97, p = .340, d = 0.18.  
 
Figure 2.3 Response times in the dot-probe task as a function of target location (self vs. 
stranger) and type of representation (familiar vs. new vs. pair). Error bars represent standard 
errors. *** p < .001.  
 
Error rates. Mean error rates (presented in Table 2.2) were submitted to a 2 (target 
location: self vs. stranger) × 3 (type of representation: familiar vs. new vs. pair) MANOVA. A 
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significant main effect of type of representation, F(2, 58) = 5.36, p = .007, ηp2 = .16, indicated 
that responses to the different types of representations differed significantly in accuracy. The 
main effect of target location was not significant, F(1, 29) = 0.04, p =.847, ηp2 = .001. The 
interaction of target location × type of representation, F(2, 58) = 1.61, p = .209, ηp2 = .05, was 
also non-significant.  
Table 2.2 Mean error rates as a function of target location and type of representation in the 
dot-probe task 
 
Target Location Type of Representation Error rates (%) 
Self Familiar 2.6 (2.1) 
 New 2.1 (1.6) 
 Pair 2.3 (1.8) 
Stranger Familiar 3.3 (2.5) 
 New 1.9 (1.6) 
 Pair 2.0 (2.1) 
Note. Standard deviation presented within parentheses. 
 
Discussion 
The current study aimed to shed light on the conditions under which self-relevance 
impacts the distribution of attention. Responses towards highly familiar self-associated 
stimuli like one’s own name or face have previously been demonstrated to be faster than 
responses towards stimuli strongly linked to other persons like other’s names or faces (Arnell 
et al., 1999; Brédart et al., 2006; Moray, 1959; Yang et al., 2013). Moreover, targets following 
familiar self-associated cues as opposed to other-associated cues also profit from the 
attentional prioritization induced by self-relevance (Alexopoulos et al., 2012; Wójcik et al., 
2018), suggesting after-effects of attentional capture in the sense of attention holding. Based 
on the results obtained in a paradigm introduced by Sui et al. (2012), it has been suggested 
that self-association can guide attention even when it has only recently been established. In 
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this paradigm, participants first associate different shapes to different persons, and then 
perform a matching task requiring the classification of shape-label pairs as matching or 
nonmatching with regards to the learned association. As has repeatedly been shown, 
participants are faster and more accurate in verifying self-associated shape-label pairs 
compared to other-associated pairs in this matching task (SPE; reviewed in Humphreys & Sui, 
2015 and Sui & Rotshtein, 2019). Though it has been concluded from this finding that an 
attentional mechanism might contribute to the SPE (e.g., Falbén et al., 2019; Humphreys & 
Sui, 2015), the implementation of paradigms that have specifically been designed to 
investigate attentional mechanisms is essential to test the assumption that stimuli that have 
only recently become associated to the self indeed hold the potential to impact the 
distribution of attention. Still, there are only few studies that have directly tested the 
assumption that recently established self-associations can elicit attentional capture (e.g., 
Siebold et al., 2015; Wade & Vickery, 2019). It thus remains an open research question 
whether recently established self-association also hold the potential to elicit attention 
holding. We present the first study – to the best of our knowledge – to use the matching 
paradigm introduced by Sui et al. (2012) together with the dot probe task (MacLeod et al., 
1986) in order to close this research gap. In detail, we compare (1) self- vs. stranger-associated 
cues and (2) highly familiar vs. recently self-vs. stranger-associated cues. We assess the cues’ 
efficiency in enhancing the identification of a subsequent probe target (attention holding). To 
this end, participants were first asked to associate two geometric shapes to the self and a 
stranger. In the dot-probe task, the self and a stranger were either represented by the 
corresponding shapes (recently established self-associations), by the labels “I” and “stranger” 
(highly familiar self-association), or by shape-label pairs. 
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As expected, participants were generally faster and more accurate in identifying the 
probe target when it occurred at the location that had previously been occupied by self-
associated stimuli than when it occurred at the location that had previously been occupied 
by stranger-associated stimuli. This indicates that self-associated stimuli captured attention, 
and that attention remained at the respective location for at least 100 ms (the duration of 
the SOA in our study). As a result, the identification of targets occurring shortly after self-
associated cues as compared to stranger-associated cues was facilitated, demonstrating an 
after effect of the attentional prioritization induced by self-association. We interpret this to 
reflect that self-association can elicit attention holding. Importantly, the effect of self-
association was modulated by the type of representation: It was more pronounced for the 
highly familiar cues than for recently established cues. Specifically, significant cuing effects 
were observed when the self and stranger were represented by the corresponding labels or 
by shape-label pairs but no significant cuing was observed when the instances were 
represented by the corresponding shapes (neither in RTs nor in error rates). This is in line with 
our hypotheses that highly familiar self- vs. other-associated cues are more efficient in 
eliciting attentional capture and attention holding than recently established cues. Note that 
shape-label pairs were no more efficient in eliciting cuing effects than labels only (i.e., we 
observed no significant differences regarding the size of the cuing effect in these conditions). 
Hence the presentation of the shape that has recently become associated to the self in 
addition to the familiar self-associated label did not increase the attentional prioritization of 
the self-associated compared to the other-associated stimuli under conditions of attentional 
competition. 
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Our finding that highly familiar self-associated stimuli elicit attentional capture and 
attention holding is well in line with previous studies showing attentional prioritization of 
one's own name, own personality traits (Alexopoulos et al., 2012; Bargh, 1982; Moray, 1959; 
Yang et al., 2013) or one’s own face (Brédart et al., 2006; Wójcik et al., 2018). Furthermore, it 
extends this research by demonstrating that such prioritization also holds when the labels 
used are general constructs such as “self” and “stranger” that are not exclusive to one person. 
Actually, the broadness of the term “stranger” in comparison to “self” might even have 
enhanced the effect. However, this also applies to many studies demonstrating the SPE by 
using the matching task because the usage of these labels is very common in this paradigm. 
Accordingly, the question of how the specificity of the instances impacts the prioritization of 
recently established self- and other-associations is a more general issue requiring further 
research. 
The current finding that recently self-associated as compared to stranger-associated 
shapes yielded no attentional advantage can also be related to some studies testing the 
efficiency of directional self- vs. stranger-associated cues in directing attention in endogenous 
cuing tasks (Sui et al., 2009; Zhao et al., 2015). In sum, these previous studies reported mixed 
results (Sui et al., 2009; Zhao et al., 2015). That is, from Sui et al. (2009), it can be concluded 
that in a Posner cuing task, self-associated arrows can serve to orient attention – but this 
effect seems to hold only under very specific conditions (see Zhao et al., 2015). Turning from 
the orientation of attention by directional cues to attentional capture and attention holding, 
Dalmaso et al. (2019) observed indicative evidence that saccades away from self-associated 
geometric shapes are initiated more slowly than saccades away from stranger-associated 
shapes – when the self/other distinction was task-relevant. Similarly, Wade and Vickery 
Attentional Capture of Self-Representations | 67 
(2018) observed faster detection of self- vs. stranger-associated geometric shapes in complex 
visual search tasks with displays including neutral and either self- or stranger-associated 
shapes. However, Siebold et al. (2015), who had presented neutral, self-, and stranger-
associated shapes on the same visual search display, did not observe faster detection of self- 
as compared to stranger-associated shapes. Interestingly, Posner’s cuing task and the 
oculomotor task used by Dalmaso et al. (2019) also include the presentation of only a self- or 
an other-associated cue on a given trial. In contrast, self- and stranger-associated cues are 
simultaneously presented in the paradigm we used (namely, the dot-probe task) – as in the 
visual task variant used by Siebold et al. (2015). That is, the latter variants test the potential 
of self-relevance to guide attention in contexts in which self- and stranger-associated stimuli 
have to be processed simultaneously –that is, to contexts in which self- and stranger-
associated stimuli compete for attentional resources. Specifically, in our paradigm, the self-
associated shape might reasonably be assumed to be more socially salient but still the 
manipulation also induces some degree of social salience to the stranger-associated shape 
(i.e., it does not remain a neutral stimulus). Taken together, the results from the current study 
are in line with the conclusion suggested by Siebold et al. (2015), namely that attentional self-
prioritization may not transfer to a biased competition task. 
In reference to Lockhead (1966) and Sui and Humphreys (2015), we had reasoned that 
attentional self-prioritization might be larger when the self and the stranger are represented 
by shape-labels pairs than when they are represented by labels (or shapes) only. However, 
we observed no cuing effect for the shapes and the size of the cuing effect did not differ for 
shape-label pairs and labels, indicating that attentional capture of the self-associated label 
did not increase by the addition of the self-associated shape. This is not in line with the 
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reasoning that redundancy gains (Lockhead, 1966) induced by the presentation of the shape-
label pair as opposed to only the shape or label alone, would enhance the effect of self-
relevance in the dot-probe task (see Sui & Humphreys, 2015). Given that we did not observe 
a cuing effect for the label alone, it is reasonable that we did not observe redundancy gains 
when pairing the label with the shape. Still, responses were generally faster for targets 
following shape-label pairs as compared to targets following shapes or labels. That is, we 
observed no evidence in support of the assumption that self-associated shape-label pairs 
might capture attention more efficiently than the self-associated shape or the self-associated 
label. However, it seems possible that the faster RTs for pairs compared to shapes or labels 
only reflect a beneficial effect of redundancy gains (in the sense of facilitated processing for 
both self- and stranger-related information when two cues referring to each instance are 
presented, instead of only one) that is independent from the prioritization of self-associated 
stimuli. Note that it remains an open issue whether redundancy gains might enhance cuing 
effects for pairs as compared to labels (or shapes) in endogenous cuing tasks requiring the 
processing of only either self- or other-associated stimuli at a time as in Sui et al. (2009). 
In the matching task, we found the expected pattern of results both in RTs and 
sensitivity measures (Schäfer et al., 2015; Schäfer, Wesslein, et al., 2016; Sui et al., 2012; Sui 
& Humphreys, 2015a, 2015b), indicating that we succeeded in inducing a significant SPE. Our 
findings from the dot-probe task can and should thus be interpreted against this background. 
In the matching task, each trial comprises both a newly associated shape and a highly familiar 
label. On some trials, only self- or other-associated information is present (matching trials), 
on others both self- and other-associated information is present (nonmatching trials). The 
latter also holds for the dot-probe task in which self- and stranger-related information 
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competes for attentional resources on each prime display. Yet, the SPE is usually measured 
on matching trials, where effects may – at least to some degree – hinge upon the presentation 
of shape-label pairs. Across studies, results on nonmatching trials are less systematic. In our 
study, we generally observe faster RTs on trials comprising the self-associated shape than on 
trials comprising the stranger-associated shape – both on matching and nonmatching trials 
(see Sui et al., 2012; though see Janczyk et al., 2019; Schäfer et al., 2016; Sui & Humphreys, 
2015c). This indicates that information processing of the self-associated shape as recently 
established, compared to the stranger-associated shape, is actually benefitted in the 
matching task: trials comprising the self-associated shape and stranger-associated label elicit 
faster responses than those comprising the self-associated label and the stranger-associated 
shape (nonmatching trials); trials comprising the self-associated shape and label elicit faster 
responses than those comprising the stranger-associated shape and label (matching trials). 
Though our results indicate that the presentation of shapes that have only recently become 
associated to the self vs. a stranger is not sufficient to elicit attentional self-prioritization in 
the dot-probe task, the current study does not allow to preclude whether an attentional 
effect may underpin the advantage of the self-associated shape compared to the stranger-
associated shape in the matching task. Since the shape and the label both need to be 
considered to enable classification of the pair in the matching task, whereas the shapes (i.e., 
the cues) are rather task-irrelevant in the dot-probe task, future research should investigate 
whether the relevance of the shapes determines whether or not their self-vs. other-
relatedness impacts the distribution of attention. 
In conclusion, our data yields insights into effects of self-relevance on attention 
holding in situations where self- and stranger-associated stimuli compete for attention. Our 
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results show that self-associated labels strongly capture and hold attention, thus facilitating 
responses to targets following self-associated labels as compared to targets following 
stranger-associated labels. Further, our study shows that this effect does not hold when – 
instead of the familiar labels – shapes that have only recently been associated to the self vs. 
a stranger are used as cues. That is, attentional prioritization of self-associated stimuli may 
be more limited when they are presented simultaneously with stranger-associated stimuli 
than when self- and stranger-associated stimuli are presented without any other stimuli 
competing for attention (e.g., Sui et al., 2009). Our study extends the body of literature 
showing that self-relevance elicits attentional capture (Arnell et al., 1999; Wade & Vickery, 
2018) and serves to orient attention (Zhao et al., 2015; Sui et al., 2009) by demonstrating 
further support for the assumption that it also enhances attention holding (see Alexopoulos 
et al., 2012; Dalmaso et al., 2019; Wòjcik et al., 2018). Summing up, our results provide 
evidence that established, familiar self-associated stimuli (such as the label “I” in our study) 
robustly elicit attention holding, whereas recently established self-associations may not be 
sufficient to induce such an attentional prioritization when the self-associated stimuli need 
to compete for attentional resources with other-associated stimuli.  
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 Self-Representations and the Temporal Dynamics of 
Attentional Capture  
Does self-associating a geometric shape immediately cause 
attentional prioritization? Comparing familiar vs. recently self-associated 
stimuli in the dot-probe task 
One of the major challenges faced by our cognitive system is having to select what is 
most relevant for further processing out of the huge amounts of constantly incoming stimuli. 
The degree to which a stimulus is associated to the self represents a good cue indicating 
“relevance” to our cognitive systems. That is, self-associated stimuli have been found to be 
preferentially processed at different stages of cognitive information processing. For example, 
one’s own name (Arnell et al., 1999; Moray, 1959; Yang et al., 2013) or face (Bortolon & 
Raffard, 2018; Brédart et al., 2006; Wójcik et al., 2018) tend to be quickly and accurately 
recognized – even in the absence of attention (e.g., Bargh, 1982; Moray, 1959). 
In order to measure effects on information processing at different stages, 
experimental psychologists use different computerized tasks. As such, spatial cuing tasks 
represent one established paradigm to measure effects of self-relevance in information 
processing (Alexopoulos et al., 2012; Dalmaso et al., 2019; Sui et al., 2009; Wójcik et al., 2018; 
Zhao et al., 2015). These tasks consist of responding to targets which are presented at 
locations that are either cued by a stimulus of interest (valid trials) presented shortly before 
the target (i.e., with a short stimulus-onset asynchrony, SOA, ≤ 200 ms) or not (invalid trials). 
Research using such spatial cuing tasks has shown that salient stimuli facilitate responses on 
valid trials compared to invalid trials – an effect known as spatial cuing (e.g., Alexopoulos et 
al., 2012; Falbén et al., 2019; Posner, 1980). In detail, responses have been demonstrated to 
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be faster towards targets presented on locations cued by one’s own name than to targets 
presented on locations cued by other names (Alexopoulos et al., 2012). Similarly, responses 
are generally faster towards targets presented on locations cued by a picture of one’s own 
face than to targets presented on locations cued by the picture of another face (Liu et al., 
2016; Wójcik et al., 2018). Such results have been interpreted as a prioritized cognitive 
processing of self-associated stimuli vs. other-associated stimuli in attention. That is, due to 
their association to one’s self, one's own name and face are highly salient and are 
preferentially processed in cognition, thus leading to faster responding to targets cued by 
self-representations vs. other-representations. 
Importantly, in the studies described so far, self-associated stimuli have always been 
represented by highly familiar items like one’s own name or face. Hence, the degree to which 
the observed effects are attributable to their relevance to the self or to their familiarity 
cannot be clearly established. In order to control for effects of familiarity, and thus attempting 
to measure the advantage of self-association more purely, Sui, He, and Humphreys (2012) 
introduced a matching-task paradigm which has become an established method to induce 
self-association. The procedure is as follows: First, participants are instructed to associate 
geometric shapes (e.g., a triangle, a circle, and a square) to the self, a close other, and an 
unknown or neutral other. This instruction is followed by a matching task comprising the 
presentation of random combinations of the geometric shapes and the word-labels 
representing the associated entities (i.e., “self”, “friend”, etc.; Sui et al., 2012). Participants 
must indicate whether each combination represents a matching or non-matching shape-label 
pair according to the initial instructions. Typically, results reflect an enhancement in 
performance towards the self: response times (RTs) are significantly faster when confirming 
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the correct combination of the self-associated shape and label than when responding to any 
other shape-label combination (self-prioritization effect, SPE; see Humphreys & Sui, 2015; Sui 
& Rotshtein, 2019). 
The SPE as observed in the matching task has been interpreted as evidence that a 
short association of some (previously arbitrary) stimulus to the self changes the way in which 
it is subsequently processed. That is, this stimulus, which had previously been neutral, is now 
prioritized due to its new association with the self (e.g., Humphreys & Sui, 2015; Janczyk et 
al., 2019; Sui et al., 2012). Crucially though, in the matching task, newly self- vs. other-
associated shapes are always presented in combination with word-labels referencing the self 
vs. the other instances – with these labels representing highly familiar self- vs. other-
associated items. Thus, in order to test the potential of recently established self- vs. other-
associated stimuli to individually yield prioritization effects, the matching task has been 
combined with other cognitive tasks. For example, using a similar experimental induction of 
self-association as Sui and colleagues (2012), Sui et al. (2009) presented the newly self vs. 
other-associated arrows as cues in a variant of Posner’s cuing task. In this task, the stimuli 
preceding the target were presented in the center of the screen pointing towards the target 
location, rather than appearing on the same location were the target would appear. 
Remarkably, they found that after the experimentally induced association of differently 
colored directional stimuli to the self vs. other instances, directional self-associated stimuli 
are more efficient in guiding attention than directional friend-associated stimuli (though see 
Zhao et al., 2015, for limitations of this effect). Likewise, in an oculomotor task, slower 
initiation of saccades towards a target positioned away from self- vs. other-associated shapes 
was observed (though only when the self/other distinction was task-relevant; Dalmaso et al., 
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(2019). Then again, in visual search, the cuing of target locations by newly self-associated 
stimuli has been observed to enhance target detection in some studies (Wade & Vickery, 
2018) but not in others (Siebold et al., 2015). That is, though it has been concluded from the 
SPE as observed in the matching task that the salience of a previously neutral geometric shape 
indeed increases through its association to the self, the specific evidence for this assumption 
is – to the best of our knowledge – quite scarce. Indeed, only few published studies have 
investigated whether the self-associated shape alone can elicit prioritization effects – and, to 
the best of our knowledge, evidence for a prioritization of the shape alone is quite scarce. A 
systematic comparison of the potential of familiar vs. new self-associated stimuli to impact 
information processing is lacking. In order to close this research gap, the current study aims 
to systematically compare how new and familiar self- vs. other-associated stimuli impact 
information processing. 
Building on previous research, in our study we will combine the matching task with a 
spatial cuing task, namely the dot-probe task (MacLeod et al., 1986). The dot-probe task is an 
established method to measure salience and information processing (Y. P. Chen et al., 2002; 
Ehrman et al., 2002; Le Pelley et al., 2013; MacMahon et al., 2006; Werthmann et al., 2011). 
In this task, two prime stimuli differing in salience are simultaneously presented on opposite 
sides of the screen, followed by a probe target which participants are asked to locate as fast 
as possible by pressing one of two keys (one for each side). Importantly, the target can occur 
at either of the locations that had been occupied by the preceding prime stimuli. As 
processing is guided by salience, responses are facilitated when the target occurs on the side 
of the more salient stimulus when SOAs are short (Wójcik et al., 2018). The dot-probe task 
has previously been used to investigate the attentional prioritization of one’s own face vs. 
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familiar and non-familiar others’ faces, revealing that responses are facilitated by one’s own 
face in comparison to other people’s faces – thus resulting in faster RTs for targets following 
one’s own vs. others’ faces (Wójcik et al., 2018). However, this has not yet been demonstrated 
for newly self-associated stimuli. It therefore remains an open issue whether newly self-
associated stimuli, as compared to newly other-associated stimuli, also speed responses if 
used as cues in a dot-probe task. In the current study, we will thus specifically compare the 
potential of both familiar and newly self- vs. stranger-associated stimuli to serve as cues in 
the dot-probe task. Specifically, self- and stranger-associated cues will be simultaneously 
presented to the participants, followed by the presentation of a to-be-located probe target 
randomly occurring either at the location previously occupied by the self- or stranger-
associated cue. 
As already mentioned, in the matching task, stimulus verification performance is 
enhanced for matching self-associated shape-label pairs compared to matching other-
associated shape-label pairs (reflecting the SPE). Often, the words “I”, “friend” and “stranger” 
have been used as labels here (Janczyk et al., 2019; Macrae et al., 2017; Reuther & 
Chakravarthi, 2017; Sui et al., 2012; Sui & Humphreys, 2015b). These labels are highly familiar 
and should thus be strongly associated to the respective instances. Indeed, it has been 
observed that the label “self” can enhance performance in a perceptual priming task vs. the 
label “stranger” (Tacikowski & Ehrsson, 2016). In comparison, shapes (e.g., a triangle, a circle) 
become only shortly associated to the instances in the course of the experiment. In the 
current study, participants will first associate geometric shapes to the labels “I” and 
“stranger”. We will then implement either the familiar labels, the recently associated shapes 
or shape-label pairs as cues in the dot-probe task in order to compare their effectiveness. If 
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newly established self-associations have the same potential to guide attention as highly 
familiar self-associations, then the size of the effectiveness of the cues should not differ as a 
function of their representation format (labels vs. shapes vs. pairs). If, however, familiarity 
plays a role for prioritization under conditions of attentional competition, then the size of the 
cuing effect should be larger for the labels/pairs compared to the shapes. We acknowledge 
that the evidence indicating an advantage for the information processing of highly familiar 
self-associated stimuli like one’s own face, one’s own name and own personality traits as 
opposed to corresponding other-associated stimuli is compelling (Alexopoulos et al., 2012; 
Bargh, 1982; Yang et al., 2013), whereas the evidence indicating a potential advantage for the 
information processing of recently self-associated shapes is mixed (Dalmaso et al., 2019; 
Siebold et al., 2015; Sui et al., 2009; Wade & Vickery, 2018; Zhao et al., 2015). Therefore, we 
assume that the attentional benefit of the self- compared to the stranger-associated cues in 
the dot-probe task is more pronounced when the labels (“I” and “stranger”) are presented 
compared to when the self and the stranger are represented by the shapes. 
Note that, in the  matching task, the size of the SPE increases when two self-associated 
shapes are presented on matching self-associated shape-label trials compared to when one 
self-associated shape is presented (Sui & Humphreys, 2015b). Similarly, in the current study, 
the simultaneous presentation of two self-associated stimuli – namely, the self-associated 
shape and the self-associated label – might lead to a greater processing advantage compared 
to the presentation of only the self-associated shape or only the self-associated label (see 
Lockhead, 1966, for the general concept of redundancy gains). That is, self-associated shape-
label pairs might thus serve as more efficient cues in the dot-probe task than the self-
associated shape or the self-associated label only. 
 | 78 
In summary, in the span of two experiments we will use the dot-probe task to 
investigate for the first time whether prioritization effects elicited by the association of a 
stimulus to the self, as previously reported to be reflected in spatial cuing effects (Alexopoulos 
et al., 2012; Wójcik et al., 2018), can be elicited by newly self-associated stimuli under 
conditions of attentional competition. That is, after using the typical SPE manipulation 
consisting of associating geometric shapes to the self and a stranger, we will present stimuli 
representing both instances as cues in a dot-probe task in order to measure the attentional 
capture of self-associated vs. stranger-associated stimuli. With a short SOA of 100 ms (Study 
1), we expect that responses to a target will be faster when it occurs at the location previously 
occupied by self-associated stimuli as opposed to that previously occupied by stranger-
associated stimuli. In addition, we will manipulate the way in which the self and stranger are 
represented (shape vs. label vs. shape-label pair), expecting the beneficial effect of self- vs. 
stranger-associated cues to be more pronounced when the familiar label is present than when 
it is not. Moreover, we will test (1) whether self-associated stimuli also influence responses 
to targets when only the self- vs. stranger-associated shapes (as established during the initial 
association phase of each experiment) are used as cues and (2) whether the effect of self-
association on responding is stronger for shape-label pairs than for the label only. As, to the 
best of our knowledge, the available body of research for both familiar and new self- vs. other-
associated stimuli is restricted to the investigation of the stimuli’s potential to modulate 
responses when SOAs are short, Study 2 will use a longer SOA (1000 ms). For longer SOAs in 
spatial cuing tasks, responses to targets at locations cued by salient stimuli are usually delayed 
vs. responses to targets at uncued locations (SOA ≥ 300 ms; Klein, 2000). This effect is known 
as inhibition of return (Posner et al., 1985; Posner & Cohen, 1984). In Study 2, we set out to 
test for the first time whether self-associated stimuli cause higher inhibition of return than 
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stranger-associated stimuli. Moreover, we will again compare three different representation 
formats (shapes vs. labels vs. pairs). We expect stronger inhibition of return for familiar 
stimuli than for new stimuli, and we expect stronger inhibition of return for the self- vs. 
stranger-associated stimuli, especially for familiar stimuli. The results of these studies will 
provide insights on the potential of recently established as compared to highly familiar self- 
vs. other-associations to impact responses to cued targets (in a context of attentional 
competition). 
Study 1 
In Study 1, we aimed to measure the effect of self-association on responses in the dot-
probe task as reflected by a cuing effect. We expected responses to the target to be faster 
when the target follows self- vs. stranger-associated stimuli. Furthermore, we expected such 
difference to be impacted by the familiarity of the type of representation used for the self 
and stranger (i.e., stronger cuing effects for familiar than for newly established self vs. other 
representations). 
Method 
Participants. A priori power calculations were made using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) 
to establish a minimum sample size. In previous studies, the SPE has been reported as 
medium to large in effect size (dz > 0.81 in Sui et al., 2012 and dz ≥ 0.58 in Schäfer et al., 2016) 
and previous studies using own face and other-face stimuli in a dot-probe task to measure 
attentional capture reported a large effect size for congruency between target location and 
self-associated stimuli (ηp2 = .19 in Wójcik et al., 2018). Based on this, we expected a medium 
effect size of f = .25 (Cohen, 1988) for the effect of self-prioritization in the dot-probe task. 
For a repeated-measures ANOVA of mean RTs with one group, 6 measurements (2 [target 
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location: self vs stranger] × 3 [type of representation: label vs. shape vs. pair]), α = .05, 
correlation among the measures = .50, and nonsphericity correction ε = 1, a minimum sample 
size of N = 28 is needed to detect an effect with a power effect of 1 – β = .95. A total of 38 
participants (29 female, Mage = 23, SDage = 4.53) were tested to allow for dropouts and 
exclusion of outlier responses. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and 
were able to complete the study in German. Data from four participants were excluded due 
to the average of their RTs falling within Tukey’s (1977) definition of an outlier when 
compared to the sample distribution of all participants. Data cleansing was carried out 
separately for the matching task and the dot-probe task. The study was carried out according 
to the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki, on the basis of informed consent. 
Design. The study consisted of a 2 (target location: self vs. stranger) × 3 (type of 
representation: label vs. shape vs. pair) within-participants design. The assignment of shapes 
to labels was randomized and counterbalanced throughout participants, and the target 
position was randomized and counterbalanced throughout trials. 
Apparatus and Materials. The experiment was conducted on Acer Aspire E15 35-
573G-54SK 15.6” laptops using standard computer mice, and it was run on E-Prime 2.0. All 
stimuli were presented in white colour against a black background and at a viewing distance 
of 50 cm. The visual geometric shapes were presented at a visual angle of approximately 5° × 
5°. All verbal stimuli were represented in Courier New font size 18 at a visual angle of about 
0.7°. 
Procedure. At the beginning of the experiment, participants were asked to associate 
geometric shapes (triangle and square) to the labels "I" and "stranger" (“Ich” and “Fremder” 
in German) with the following instructions presented on the computer screen: “You are a 
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[shape 1] and a stranger will be represented by a [shape 2]”. The images of the shapes were 
not presented during this association phase. Participants were to press any key to continue 
with the experiment after familiarizing themselves with the instructions. 
Following, participants completed 84 trials of the dot-probe task (see Figure 3.1). Each 
trial began with a fixation cross in the centre of the screen (500 ms), followed by the stimuli 
representing the self and a stranger on opposite sides of the screen (left and right, located on 
25% and 75% of the horizontal line of the screen and on 50% of the vertical line of the screen, 
100 ms). Representations were either a label, a geometric shape, or a matching shape-label 
pair – with the order of presentation being randomized. Then, a target consisting of an 
asterisk (*) was presented on either the left or right side of the screen (on 25% or 75% of the 
horizontal line of the screen, respectively, and on 50% of the vertical line of the screen) until 
participants responded “d” or “k” to indicate whether the target was located on the left or 
right side of the screen, respectively. The location of the target (left or right) was randomized 
between trials. On half of the trials, the target occurred at the location of the self-associated 
cue (these are “valid” trials in our paradigm), on the other half, it occurred at the location 
previously occupied by the stranger-associated cue (“invalid” trials). A 1000 ms pause, 
consisting of a black screen, proceeded before the next trial started. 
Finally, the matching task was presented in order to test whether the self- and 
stranger-association of geometric shapes as introduced at the beginning of the experiment 
caused the SPE as established in the literature (Sui et al., 2012). Each trial began with a black 
screen (500 ms) followed by a fixation cross (500 ms). A pair consisting of a shape with a label 
underneath it was then presented and remained on the screen until the participant 
responded, or for a maximum of 1,500 ms. There were two possible responses: Participants 
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had to press “d” to indicate that the shape-label pair matched the mapping learned during 
the association phase and “k” to indicate that it did not match the learned mapping. 
Participants received feedback if their response was incorrect or exceeded 1,500 ms 
(“incorrect”, “please respond faster”). Initially, four trials were administered as a practice 
phase, followed by 128 experimental trials of the matching task.  
 
Figure 3.1 Schematic depiction of one trial of the dot-probe task (upper graph) and example 
displays demonstrating how the display differed as a function of the type of representation 
(label vs. shape vs. pair; lower graph) 
 
Participants were then thanked, debriefed, and compensated with 4 euros. Students 
of the Department of Psychology at the University of Tübingen could opt to receive class 
credit.  
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Results 
For all statistical analyses, a significance level of α = .05 was specified. For RT analyses, 
only correct responses with RTs above 100 ms and below one and a half interquartile ranges 
above the third quartile of the overall individual RT distribution were used (see Tukey, 1977). 
Exclusions of trials were performed separately for the matching task and the dot-probe task. 
Matching Task 
As a manipulation check, we first analysed performance in the matching task 
considering either RTs or the signal detection index d’ as a measure of accuracy. 
 Average RTs. The RT data (see Figure 3.2 for a summary depiction) were subjected to 
a 2 (shape: self-associated vs. stranger-associated) × 2 (trial type: matching vs. non-matching) 
within-participants MANOVA (see O'Brien and Kaiser, 1985, for the use of MANOVA to 
analyse repeated-measure designs). The main effects of shape, F(1, 33) = 52.48, p < .001, ηp2 
= .61, and trial type, F(1, 33) = 15.00, p < .001, ηp2 = .31, were both significant. The interaction 
of shape and trial type, F(1, 33) = 18.99, p < .001, ηp2 = .37, was also significant. To follow up 
on this interaction effect, RTs from matching trials were submitted to a one-factorial (shape: 
self-associated vs. stranger-associated) within-participants MANOVA to specifically analyse 
the SPE. The analysis revealed a significant main effect, F(1, 33) = 50.73, p < .001, ηp2 = .61, 
indicating a significant SPE in the RT data. That is, responses were faster for matching self-
associated shape-label pairs (M = 685.82, SD = 170.73) than for matching stranger-associated 
shape-label pairs (M = 874.00, SD = 218.46). The RTs from non-matching trials were submitted 
to the same analysis, also revealing a significant main effect, F(1, 33) = 7.68, p = .009, ηp2 = 
.19. This indicates that responses were faster for non-matching trials comprising the self-
associated shape (and other-associated label), (M = 806.88, SD = 157.98), compared to those 
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comprising the stranger-associated shape (and self-associated label), (M = 858.12, SD = 
215.27). Hence, the significant interaction effect is attributable to a larger RT-benefit for self- 
as compared to other-associated shapes on matching trials compared to non-matching trials. 
 
Figure 3.2  Mean response time in the matching task in Study 1 as a function of shape (self-
associated vs. stranger-associated) and trial type (matching vs. non-matching). Error bars 
represent standard errors. *** p < .001, ** p <.01 
 
Sensitivity measure d’. Signal detection sensitivity indices for each shape condition 
were used to analyse error rates ( Schäfer et al., 2015, 2016; Sui et al., 2012). To this end, we 
defined responses in the following way: in matching trials, correct responses were considered 
hits and incorrect responses were considered misses; in non-matching trials, correct 
responses were considered correct rejections, and incorrect responses were considered false 
alarms. The loglinear approach was used to account for cases with 100% hits or 0% false 
alarms, meaning that 0.5 was added to the number of hits and the number of false alarms, 
and 1 was added to the number of signal trials and the number of noise trials before 
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calculating the rates for hits and false alarms (see Hautus, 1995; Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). 
We then computed d', the measure of sensitivity, and submitted it to a one-factorial (shape: 
self-associated vs. stranger-associated) MANOVA. A significant main effect of shape was 
observed, F(1, 33) = 28.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .47, indicating a higher sensitivity for self- than for 
stranger-associated shapes (i.e., a significant SPE in the sensitivity measure; see Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1 Mean sensitivity measure d’ as a function of shape (self-associated vs. stranger-
associated) in the matching task in study 1 
 
Shape d’ 
Self-associated 2.95 (1.13) 
Stranger-associated 2.22 (1.13) 
Note. Standard deviation presented within parentheses 
 
In sum, the analyses regarding the matching task revealed that, at the end of the 
experiment – after performing the dot-probe task – participants showed a significant SPE, 
showing that our manipulation to induce a self- and other-association of simple geometric 
shapes was successful. 
Dot-probe task 
Average RTs. Average RTs in the dot-probe task were subjected to a 2 (target location: 
self vs. stranger) × 3 (type of representation: label vs. shape vs. pair) within-participants 
MANOVA. A significant main effect of target location was observed, F(1, 33) = 16.97, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .34, indicating that responses were faster when the target was presented at the location 
previously occupied by the self-representation (M = 347.73, SD = 36.18) than when the target 
was presented at the location previously occupied by the stranger-representation (M = 
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363.11, SD = 38.01). Furthermore, a significant main effect of type of representation was 
observed, F(2, 66) = 97.86, p < .001, ηp2 =.75. Follow-up analyses revealed that mean RTs were 
significantly slower for targets following the self- and other-associated stimuli as represented 
by labels (M = 377.49, SD = 34.63) than for targets following the self- and other-associated 
stimuli as represented by shapes (M = 348.63, SD = 36.18) , t(33) = 10.21, p <.001, d = 0.81. 
Further, mean RTs were significantly slower for targets following cues represented by shapes 
(M = 348.63, SD = 36.18) than targets following cues represented by pairs (M = 340.15, SD = 
39.17), t(33) = 2.837, p =.008, d = 0.49. The interaction of target location × type of 
representation, F(2, 66) = 4.45, p = .015, ηp2 = .12, was also significant. To follow-up on this 
interaction, pairwise t-tests were conducted. These post-hoc analyses revealed that 
responses were significantly faster for targets following the self-representation than for 
targets following the stranger-representation, irrespective of whether the instances were 
represented by labels, t(33) = 4.49, p < .001, d = 0.52, or by shape-label pairs, t(33) = 3.01, p 
= .005, d = 0.77 (see Figure 3.3). However, the size of the cuing effect did not differ 
significantly for cues represented by labels and pairs, t(33) = 0.55, p = .584, d = 0.14 . Crucially, 
no significant cuing effect was observed for the shape representation condition, t(33) = 1.71, 
p = .098, d = 0.29.That is, in comparison to the shape representation condition, the cuing 
effect was significantly larger when the self and the stranger were represented by labels, t(33) 
= 3.02, p = .005, d = 0.64, or by shape-label pairs, t(33) = 1.99, p = .055, d = 0.44. 
Self-Representations and the Temporal Dynamics of Attentional Capture |  87 
 
Figure 3.3  Mean response times in the dot-probe task in Study 1 as a function of target 
location (self vs. stranger) and type of representation (label vs. shape vs. pair). Error bars 
represent standard errors. *** p < .001, ** p <.01. 
 
Error rates. Mean error rates were submitted to a 2 (target location: self vs. stranger) 
× 3 (type of representation: label vs. shape vs. pair) MANOVA (for descriptive statistics, see 
Table 3.2). A significant main effect of target location, F(1, 33) = 11.38, p =.002, ηp2 = .26, was 
observed, indicating that responses were more accurate when responding to targets 
presented on the position previously occupied by the self-representation (M = 0.44, SD = 1.19) 
than when responding to targets presented on the position previously occupied by the 
stranger-representation (M = 0.87, SD = 1.13). Additionally, a significant main effect of type 
of representation, F(2, 66) = 12.42, p < .001, ηp2 = .27, indicated that responses to the different 
types of representations differed significantly in accuracy. The interaction of target location 
× type of representation, F(2, 66) = 8.41, p = .001, ηp2 = .20, was also significant. Post-hoc 
analyses revealed that responses were significantly more accurate for targets occurring at the 
location previously occupied by the self-representation (M = 0.59, SD = 1.28) than for targets 
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occurring at the location previously occupied by the stranger-representation (M = 1.47, SD = 
1.76) when they were represented by labels, t(33) = 3.23, p = .003, d = 0.56, or by shape-label 
pairs (M = 0.29, SD = 1.06 for self-representations and M = 0.88, SD = 1.43 for stranger 
representations), t(33) = 4.00, p < .001, d = 0.70. Yet, no such cuing effect was observed when 
the self and stranger had been represented by the corresponding shapes, t(33) = -1.14, p = 
.263, d = 0.20 (M = 0.44, SD = 1.44 for self-representations and M = 0.26, SD = 0.75 for stranger 
representations). The cuing effect in error rates did not differ significantly for targets 
following the self- and stranger-stimuli as represented by labels and those following self-and 
strangers stimuli as represented by pairs, t(33) = 1.09, p = .282, d = 0.17. Yet, the cuing effect 
was smaller when the self and the stranger were represented by shapes than when labels, 
t(33) = 1.76, p = .001, d = 0.23, or shape-label pairs were used, t(33) = 3.42, p = .002, d = 0.95. 
Table 3.2 Mean error rates as a function of target location (self vs. stranger) and type of 
representation (label vs. shape vs. pair) in the dot-probe task in Study 1 
Target Location Type of Representation Error rates (%) 
Self Label 0.6 (1.2) 
 Shape 0.4 (1.4) 
 Pair 0.3 (1.0) 
Stranger Label 1.5 (1.7) 
 Shape 0.3 (0.8) 
 Pair 0.8 (2.4) 
Note. Standard deviation presented within parentheses 
Discussion 
Study 1 aimed at a direct comparison of the effect of new self-representations vs. 
familiar self-representations vs. pair self-representations on the distribution of attention. To 
this end, participants performed a version of the dot-probe task: They were first 
simultaneously presented with self- and stranger-related information on opposite sides of the 
screen (represented by newly self-/other-associated geometric shapes, by the familiar labels 
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“I” and “stranger” or by shape-label pairs). Then an asterisk occurred following either the self- 
or the stranger-representations and the participant’s task was to identify the location of this 
target. After the dot-probe task, participants performed a shape-label matching task to test 
whether participants indeed associated the geometric shapes to the self vs. a stranger as they 
had learned at the beginning of the experiment. Regarding this matching task, we replicated 
the effects observed in former studies both RTs and sensitivity measures (Humphreys & Sui, 
2015; Schäfer et al., 2015; Schäfer, Wesslein, et al., 2016; Sui et al., 2012), indicating that we 
succeeded in inducing a significant SPE. In the dot-probe task, responses towards targets 
following self-representations were faster than those towards targets following stranger-
representations when these instances were represented by labels or shape-label pairs. That 
is, we observed a significant cuing effect for self-associated labels and pairs. The size of the 
effect did not differ between these two representation conditions. Importantly though, no 
such cuing effect was observed for self-associated shape representations. In other words, the 
newly self-associated shapes did not suffice to impact the distribution of attention in the dot-
probe task in a similar way as the familiar self-label. 
In order to test whether this finding generalizes from cuing to inhibition of return, 
Study 2 tests the effect in a second dot-probe task experiment. 
Study 2 
In Study 2, we aimed to extend the results from Study 1 by measuring the effect of 
self-association on responses in the dot-probe task as reflected by inhibition of return. 
Inhibition of return describes the finding that responses are typically delayed in spatial cuing 
tasks when the target occurs on the side of the more salient cue when SOAs are long 
(Theeuwes & Van der Stigchel, 2006; D. G. Watson & Humphreys, 2000). Hence, with long 
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SOAs of 1000 ms, we expect faster responses to a target when it occurs on the location 
previously occupied by stranger-associated stimuli (i.e., reduced inhibition of return) as 
opposed to the previously occupied by self-associated stimuli. This difference should be more 
pronounced for familiar self- vs. stranger-representations than for newly self- vs. stranger-
associated representations. Still, generally, we also expect stronger inhibition of return for 
familiar than for newly associated representations. 
Method 
Study 2 followed the exact procedure of Study 1, with the exception that the SOA 
between the cue stimuli and the target was 1000 ms in the dot-probe task (instead of 100 
ms). 
A priori power calculations were made to establish a minimum sample size. Based on 
Study 1, we moderately chose an expected medium effect size of f = .25 (Cohen, 1988) for the 
effect of attentional self-prioritization in the dot-probe task. For a repeated-measures ANOVA 
of mean RTs with one group, 6 measurements (2 [target location: self vs stranger] × 3 [type 
of representation: label vs. shape vs. pair]), α = .05, correlation among the measures = .50, 
and nonsphericity correction ε = 1, a minimum sample size of N = 28 is needed to detect an 
effect with a power effect of 1 – β = .95 (Faul et al., 2007). A total of 33 participants (26 female, 
Mage = 23, SDage = 4.85) completed the study. Data from two participants were excluded 
because their mean RTs in the dot-probe task were categorized within Tukey’s (1977) 
definition of an extreme outlier when compared to the sample distribution. 
Results 
For all statistical analyses, a significance level of α = .05 was specified. Data cleansing 
was done as in Study 1. 
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Matching Task 
Average RTs. The RT data (see Figure 3.4 for a summary depiction) were subjected to 
a 2 (shape: self-associated vs. stranger-associated) × 2 (trial type: matching vs. non-matching) 
within-participants MANOVA (O’Brien & Kaiser, 1985, for the use of MANOVA to analyze 
repeated-measure designs). The main effects of shape, F(1, 30) = 40.58, p < .001, ηp2= .58, 
and matching condition, F(1, 30) = 6.02, p = .020, ηp2 = .17, were both significant. The 
interaction of shape × matching condition, F(1, 30) = 6.42, p = .017, ηp2 = .18, was also 
significant. As a follow up to said interaction effect, we submitted RTs from matching trials to 
a one-factorial (shape: self-associated vs. stranger-associated) within-participants MANOVA. 
The within-participant factor of shape revealed a significant effect, F(1, 30) = 29.72, p < .001, 
ηp2= .50, indicating a significant SPE in the RT data. That is, responses were faster for matching 
self-associated shape-label pairs (M = 765.45, SD = 211.50) than for matching stranger-
associated shape-label pairs (M = 934.10, SD = 256.74). Submitting RTs from non-matching 
trials to the same analysis revealed a non-statistically-significant result, F(1, 30) = 2.67, p = 
.113, ηp2 = .08, indicating that responses in non-matching trials did not significantly differ 
between trials in which the self-associated shape was presented (simultaneously with the 
stranger-associated label) and trials in which the stranger-associated shape was presented 
(simultaneously with the self-associated label). 
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Figure 3.4 Mean response time in the matching task in Study 2 as a function of shape (self-
associated vs. stranger-associated) and trial type (matching vs. non-matching). Error bars 
represent standard errors. *** p < .001, * p < .05 
 
Sensitivity measure d’. Measures of sensitivity d’ were computed as described in Study 
1 and submitted to a one-factorial (shape: self-associated vs. stranger-associated) MANOVA. 
A significant main effect of shape was observed, F(1, 30) = 13.95, p = .001, ηp2 = .32, indicating 
a higher sensitivity for self- than for stranger-associated shapes (i.e., a significant SPE in the 
sensitivity measure; see Table 3.3). 
To summarize, the analyses regarding the matching task revealed that, at the end of 
the experiment – after performing the dot-probe task – participants showed a significant SPE, 
showing that our manipulation to induce a self- and other-association of simple geometric 
shapes was successful. 
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Table 3.3 Mean sensitivity measure d’ as a function of shape (self-associated vs. stranger-
associated) in the matching task in Study 2 
Shape d’ 
Self-associated 3.03 (1.87) 
Stranger-associated 2.41 (1.75) 
Note. Standard deviation presented within parentheses 
 
Dot-probe task 
Average RTs. Average RTs from the dot-probe task were analyzed by means of a 2 
(target location: self vs. stranger) × 3 (type of representation: label vs. shape vs. pair) within-
participants MANOVA (see Figure 3.5). The main effect of target location, F(1, 30) = 1.93, p = 
.175, ηp2 = .06, was nonsignificant. However, the analysis revealed a significant main effect of 
type of representation, F(2, 60) = 51.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .63. In detail, Helmert contrasts 
revealed that mean RTs were slower (M = 416.27, SD = 44.17) when the self/stranger were 
represented by labels than the mean of both other representation types (M = 388.50, SD = 
53.23 for shapes, M = 385.82, SD = 54.57 for shape-label pairs), p < .001, reflecting that label 
representations generally yielded higher inhibition of return (for both self- and stranger-
associated stimuli) than shapes and shape-label pairs. Mean RTs did not differ significantly for 
targets following cues represented by shapes or shape-label pairs, p = .401. The interaction 
between the factors of type of representation and target location was again statistically 
nonsignificant, F(2, 60) = 1.42, p = .249, ηp2 = .05. 
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Figure 3.5 Mean response times in the dot-probe task in Study 2 as a function of target 
location (self vs. stranger) and type of representation (label vs. shape vs. pair). Error bars 
represent standard errors. *** p < .001, * p <.05. 
 
Still, following the analysis of Study 1, we tested – separately for each type of 
representation – whether the target detection speed differed as a function of its location 
(following the self-associated stimuli vs. following the stranger-associated stimuli). When 
labels were used, responses were significantly faster for targets occurring at the previous 
“stranger”-position (M = 411.10, SD = 44.99) than for those occurring at the position 
previously occupied by the label “self” (M = 421.45, SD = 47.38), t(30) = 2.13, p = .042, d = 
0.38. No such difference was observed for shapes (M = 388.61, SD = 53.62 for targets 
following self-representations and M = 388.39, SD = 54.94 for targets following stranger-
representations), t(30) = .06, p = .953, d = 0.02, or shape-label pairs (M = 386.00, SD = 61.89 
for targets following self-representations and M = 385.65, SD = 50.86 for targets following 
stranger representations), t(30) = .07, p = .949, d = 0.01. Hence, in line with the pattern of 
results observed in Study 1, we again observed evidence that the distribution of attention is 
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only impacted by familiar self-related stimuli, not by recently established self-associated 
stimuli (or pair representations). 
Error rates. Mean error rates were submitted to a 2 (target location: self vs. stranger) 
× 3 (type of representation: label vs. shape vs. pair) MANOVA. No significant effects of target 
location, F(1, 30) = 1.00, p = .325, ηp2 = .03, or type of representation, F(2, 60) = 2.44, p = .096, 
ηp2 = .08, were observed. The target location × type of representation interaction was also not 
significant, F(2, 60) = 3.21, p = .097, ηp2 = .10. Table 3.4 represents mean error rates as a 
function of the target location and type of representation. 
Table 3.4 Mean error rates as a function of target location (self vs. stranger) and type of 
representation (label vs. shape vs. pair) in the dot-probe task in Study 2 
Target Location Type of Representation Error rates (%) 
Self Label 0.0 (0.2) 
 Shape 0.1 (0.3) 
 Pair 0.0 (0.0) 
Stranger Label 0.2 (0.4) 
 Shape 0.0 (0.0) 
 Pair 0.0 (0.2) 
Note. Standard deviation presented within parentheses 
 
Discussion 
Building on Study 1, in Study 2 we set out to test whether newly self- vs. other-
associated stimuli are less likely to impact the distribution of attention as measured in a dot-
probe task than familiar self- vs. other-representations. Importantly, we increased the SOA 
between the presentation of the cue (i.e., self- and stranger-related information presented 
simultaneously on opposite sides of the screen) and the to-be-located target (an asterisk 
following either the self- or the stranger-related information). Thus, if self-associated stimuli 
impact attention, this would now delay responding in the sense of inhibition of return. First, 
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we checked whether participants had associated specific geometric shapes to themselves and 
a stranger as instructed at the beginning of our study. Showing support that our manipulation 
was indeed successful, a significant SPE was observed both in RTs and sensitivity measures. 
Turning to the dot-probe task, as expected, we observed slower responses for targets cued 
by self-representation than for targets cued by stranger-representation when the self and the 
stranger were represented by familiar stimuli. That is, we observed significant inhibition of 
return for familiar self-representations. However, again as in Study 1, no such slowing of 
responses was observed for targets following recently self- vs. stranger-associated stimuli. 
This demonstrates that despite the observation of a significant SPE in the matching task, the 
presentation of the self- and stranger-associated shapes in the dot-probe task did not impact 
the distribution of attention in the same way as the presentation of self- and stranger-
associated familiar stimuli. Surprisingly, in view of the findings in Study 1, the shape-label 
pairs did not produce significant inhibition of return, either. 
General discussion 
One’s own name or other self-associated stimuli are likely to capture our attention 
(e.g., Moray, 1959). Even a recently self-associated stimulus that had previously been neutral 
can serve as a more efficient cue to direct attention than a recently other-associated stimulus 
(e.g., Dalmaso et al., 2019; Sui et al., 2009; Wade & Vickery, 2018). Relatedly, pairs of familiar 
and recently established self-representations are verified as “matching” more quickly and 
more accurately than pairs of familiar and recently established other-representations (e.g., 
Sui et al., 2012). Still, a systematic comparison of the potential of familiar vs. recently 
established self- vs. other-representations to impact attention is lacking. In the current study, 
our first aim was thus to investigate attentional prioritization as elicited by familiar vs. new 
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self-representations vs. pairs of familiar and new self-representations, in comparison to 
familiar vs. new other-representations, under conditions of attentional competition. To this 
end, we compared the size of cuing effects elicited by highly familiar self-associated stimuli 
(i.e., the label “I”), newly self-associated geometric shapes, and shape-label pairs in a dot-
probe task. Our second aim was to investigate whether attentional prioritization effects as 
elicited by highly familiar as compared to newly self-associated stimuli would follow 
established temporal patterns – in which case the beneficial effect of self-associated cues on 
RTs for targets following these cues at short SOAs (100 ms) would flip at longer SOAs (1000 
ms). In order to check whether they had indeed associated the geometric shapes to 
themselves, we asked participants to complete the matching task as established by Sui et al. 
(2012) after having completed the dot-probe task. 
As expected, when using a short SOA in the dot-probe task (Study 1), participants were 
faster and more accurate in locating the probe target when it occurred at the location that 
had previously been occupied by the self-representation than when it occurred at the location 
that had previously been occupied by the stranger-representation. Again as expected, this RT 
difference in detecting targets following self- vs. stranger-associated cues was significant 
when the familiar labels were present. This might indicate that in a situation of attentional 
competition between familiar self- and stranger-related stimuli, the self-associated stimulus 
captures attention and holds attention to its location. As a result, the detection of targets 
occurring at this location shortly after the familiar self-associated cues (as compared to 
targets occurring at the location of the familiar stranger-associated cues) is facilitated. In 
other words: For highly familiar stimuli, self-association elicits a spatial cuing effect. In line 
with this conclusion, significant cuing effects were also observed when the self and stranger 
 | 98 
were represented by the corresponding shape-label pairs. Yet, intriguingly, no significant 
spatial cuing effect was observed when the self and the stranger were represented by the 
corresponding shapes (neither in RTs nor in error rates). Nonetheless, we observed the typical 
pattern of results for RTs and sensitivity measures in the matching task (Humphreys & Sui, 
2015), indicating a significant SPE, so it can be assumed that the geometric shapes were 
adequate stimuli to use as newly established representations for the self and a stranger in the 
dot-probe task. The observed pattern of results is in line with our hypotheses that highly 
familiar self--associated cues are more efficient in eliciting attentional prioritization than 
recently established self-associated cues. Note that shape-label pairs were no more efficient 
in eliciting cuing effects than labels only. Hence the presentation of the shape that has 
recently become associated to the self in addition to the familiar self-associated label did not 
increase the prioritization of the self-associated compared to the other-associated stimuli. 
When using a long SOA in the dot-probe task (Study 2), as expected, participants’ 
responses were slower when responding to targets following familiar self- and stranger 
representations than for targets following recently learned self- and stranger-
representations. Still, we observed no general RT difference in detecting targets following 
self- vs. stranger-associated cues. Neither for new self- vs. other-representations nor for 
combinations of new and familiar representations did RTs differ as a function of whether the 
target followed the self- or the stranger-representation. Nonetheless, responses towards 
those targets presented at the location previously occupied by the familiar self-associated 
cue were faster than those towards targets presented at the location previously occupied by 
the familiar stranger-associated cue, reflecting inhibition of return (Lupiáñez et al., 2006). 
Thus, in line with our expectation, the beneficial effect of self- vs. other-associated stimuli on 
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the distribution of attention (Study 1) turned into a disadvantage for a large SOA (Study 2). 
We conclude from this finding that, upon the simultaneous presentation of familiar self- and 
stranger-associated stimuli, the self-associated stimulus is prioritized in information 
processing. In other words, we provide original evidence that familiar self-associated stimuli 
hold a stronger potential to modulate early information processing under conditions of 
attentional competition than recently self-associated stimuli, as reflected by both spatial 
cuing and inhibition of return. 
Our findings regarding familiar self-associated stimuli extend prior research 
demonstrating the attentional capture of familiar self-relevant information (Arnell et al., 
1999; Bargh, 1982; Brédart et al., 2006; Wójcik et al., 2018; Yang et al., 2013), highlighting 
that such effects also transfer into other early information processing phenomena such as 
inhibition of return (see Klein, 2000). Further, they are well in line with previous studies 
showing that one's own name, own personality traits (Alexopoulos et al., 2012; Bargh, 1982; 
Moray 1959; Yang et al., 2013) and one’s own face (Brédart et al., 2006; Wójcik et al., 2018) 
capture attention more easily than corresponding other-related stimuli. Still, noticeably, the 
current studies extend this research by demonstrating that such prioritization also holds 
when the labels used are general constructs such as “self” and “stranger” that are not 
exclusive to one person (as suggested by Tacikowski & Ehrsson, 2016). Actually, the broadness 
of the term “stranger” in comparison to “self” might even have enhanced the effect. 
However, this also applies to many studies demonstrating the SPE by using the matching task 
because the usage of these labels is very common in this paradigm. Accordingly, the question 
of how the specificity of the instances impacts the prioritization of recently established self- 
and other-associations is a more general issue requiring further research. 
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The current finding that newly self-associated shapes as compared to stranger-
associated shapes yielded no benefit in responding when SOA is short, nor inhibition of return 
when the SOA is long, can be related to some studies testing the efficiency of directional self- 
vs. stranger-associated cues in directing attention in endogenous cuing tasks (Sui et al., 2009; 
Zhao et al., 2015). However, these previous studies indeed reported mixed results (Sui et al., 
2009; Zhao et al., 2015). That is, from Sui et al. (2009), it can be concluded that in a Posner 
cuing task, self-associated arrows can serve to orient attention (though see Zhao et al., 2015). 
Turning from the orientation of attention by directional cues to attentional capture and 
attention holding, Dalmaso et al. (2019) observed indicative evidence that saccades away 
from self-associated geometric shapes were initiated more slowly than saccades away from 
stranger-associated shapes. Similarly, Wade and Vickery (2018) observed faster detection of 
self- vs. stranger-associated geometric shapes in complex visual search tasks with displays 
including neutral and either self- or stranger-associated shapes. However, Siebold et al. 
(2015), who had presented neutral, self-, and stranger-associated shapes on the same visual 
search display, did not observe faster detection of self- as compared to stranger-associated 
shapes. Interestingly, Posner’s cuing task and the oculomotor task used by Dalmaso et al. 
(2019) also include the presentation of only a self- or an other-associated cue on a given trial. 
In contrast, self- and stranger-associated cues are simultaneously presented in the paradigm 
we used (namely, the dot-probe task). Considering that the cognitive processes underpinning 
the SPE are not yet been completely clear, it is important to consider these methodological 
differences when interpreting the data. Our study extends previous research on the potential 
of self-relevance to guide information processing in endogenous cuing tasks to contexts in 
which self- and stranger-associated stimuli have to be processed simultaneously (as in the 
study by Siebold et al., 2015)  –that is, to contexts in which self- and stranger-associated 
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stimuli compete for cognitive resources. Although the self-associated shape is assumed to be 
more socially salient, the manipulation also induces some degree of social salience to the 
stranger-associated shape (i.e., it does not remain a neutral stimulus). Taken together our 
results and those observed by Siebold et al. (2015) suggest that – though attentional effects 
of recently established self- vs. stranger-associated stimuli have been observed when self-
associated stimuli were presented among neutral stimuli (see Dalmaso et al., 2019; Sui et al., 
2009; Wade & Vickery, 2018) – they don’t yield attentional prioritization in a biased 
competition task. 
Referring to Lockhead (1966) and Sui and Humphreys (2015), we had reasoned that 
attentional self-prioritization might be larger when the self and the stranger are represented 
by shape-labels pairs than when they are represented by labels (or shapes) only due to the 
simultaneous presentation of two self-/stranger-associated cues. However, the size of the 
cuing effect did not differ for shape-label pairs and labels in Study 1, indicating that 
attentional capture of the self-associated label did not increase by the addition of the self-
associated shape. This is not in line with the reasoning that redundancy gains (Lockhead, 
1966) induced by the presentation of the shape-label pair as opposed to only the shape or 
label alone, would enhance the effect of self-relevance in the dot-probe task (see Sui & 
Humphreys, 2015a). Still, responses were generally faster for targets following shape-label 
pairs as compared to targets following shapes or labels with a short SOA. That is, we observed 
no evidence in support of the assumption that self-associated shape-label pairs might be 
more highly benefitted in information processing than the self-associated shape or the self-
associated label. However, it seems possible that the faster RTs for the pairs compared to the 
shapes or labels reflect a beneficial effect of redundancy gains (in the sense of facilitated 
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processing for both self- and stranger-related information when two cues referring to each 
instance are presented, instead of only one) that is independent from the prioritization of 
self-associated stimuli. Note that it remains an open issue whether redundancy gains might 
enhance cuing effects for pairs as compared to labels (or shapes) in endogenous cuing tasks 
requiring the processing of only either self- or other-associated stimuli at a time as in Sui et 
al. (2009). Nevertheless, our data do not reflect an enhancement of the benefit towards the 
self in information processing when presenting two self-associated cues in conditions of 
attentional competition. 
In Study 2, we found no difference in RTs towards targets following self-associated 
shape-label pairs than stranger-associated pairs with a long SOA, although an RT difference 
was observed for familiar self- and stranger-representations. This might, however, be 
attributable to our experimental set-up: Whereas the possible location of targets was exactly 
the same as the location of the preceding cues when the self and the stranger were 
represented by shapes or labels only (i.e., centered at 25% / 75% of the horizontal and at 50% 
of the vertical line of the screen), the target was presented in between the locations of both 
components of the cue in the pair-condition. It remains an open question whether inhibition 
of return hinges more strongly upon the repetition of the exact location from the cue to the 
target than spatial cuing effects. At least, this might be why RTs towards targets following 
self-associated pairs did not differ significantly from those following other-associated pairs. 
Moreover, the larger size of the shape in comparison to the label and the set-up of presenting 
the shape above the label may have led to a larger impact of the shape as a cue in the pair 
condition, thus diminishing the potential of the familiar self-representation to elicit inhibition 
of return. In general, further research is needed to clarify the degree to which these features 
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of our experimental set-up impacted on the observed results for the potential of shape-label 
combinations to induce cuing and inhibition of return. 
In the matching task, we found the expected pattern of results both in RTs and 
sensitivity measures (Schäfer et al., 2015; Schäfer, Wesslein, et al., 2016; Sui et al., 2012; Sui 
& Humphreys, 2015b, 2015c), indicating that we succeeded in inducing a significant SPE. In 
the matching task, each trial comprises both a newly associated shape and a highly familiar 
label. On some trials, only self- or other-associated information is present (matching trials), 
on others both self- and other-associated information is present (non-matching trials). The 
latter also holds for the dot-probe task in which self- and stranger-related information 
competes for attentional resources on each prime display. Yet, the SPE is usually measured 
on matching trials, where effects may – at least to some degree – hinge upon the presentation 
of shape-label pairs. Across studies, results on non-matching trials are less systematic. In 
Study 1, we generally observe faster RTs on trials comprising the self-associated shape than 
on trials comprising the stranger-associated shape – both on matching and non-matching 
trials (see Sui et al., 2012; though see Janczyk et al., 2019; Schäfer et al., 2016; Sui & 
Humphreys, 2015a). This indicates that information processing of the self-associated shape 
as recently established, compared to the stranger-associated shape, is actually benefitted in 
the matching task: trials comprising the self-associated shape and stranger-associated label 
elicit faster responses than those comprising the self-associated label and the stranger-
associated shape (non-matching trials); trials comprising the self-associated shape and label 
elicit faster responses than those comprising the stranger-associated shape and label 
(matching trials). Though our results indicate that the presentation of shapes that have only 
recently become associated to the self vs. a stranger is not sufficient to elicit attentional self-
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prioritization in the dot-probe task, the current study does not allow to preclude whether an 
attentional effect may underpin the advantage of the self-associated shape compared to the 
stranger-associated shape in the matching task. Yet, we can conclude that there is no 
advantage of the self-associated shape compared to the stranger-associated shape when it 
comes to attention. Since the shape and the label both need to be considered to enable 
classification of the pair in the matching task, whereas the shapes (i.e., the cues) are rather 
task-irrelevant in the dot-probe task, future research should investigate whether the 
relevance of the shapes determines whether or not their self-vs. other-relatedness impacts 
the distribution of attention. 
It may be criticized that our use of the dot-probe task as a target-location task does 
not allow us to conclude the level at which responses are being affected. We acknowledge 
that the differential speed of responses towards targets following self- as opposed to those 
following stranger-associated familiar cues might either represent an attentional benefit or 
some kind of response priming by self-relevance. Still, jointly our Studies 1 and 2 show that 
the observed effect follows the temporal dynamics of attention as established – namely that 
cuing is observed at a short SOA whereas inhibition of return is observed at a long SOA. 
Nonetheless, further research is needed to clarify whether there might be a difference in the 
potential of familiar vs. recently established self-associated cues to elicit response priming 
which could contribute to our results. 
In conclusion, our data yields insights into effects of self-relevance on information 
processing. That is, familiar self-associated stimuli have the potential to influence early 
information processing and produce both a cuing effect and inhibition of return. For newly 
self- vs. other-associated stimuli, we observed no such effects. Summing up, our results 
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provide evidence that established, familiar self-associated stimuli robustly elicit effects in 
early attentional processing, whereas recently established self-associations may not be 
sufficient to induce such an attentional prioritization effect when self-associated stimuli need 
to compete for attentional resources with other-associated stimuli.
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 Disentangling the Roles of Familiarity and Self-
Association   
Does the impact of self-association on attention depend on the 
familiarity of stimuli? A comparison of familiar vs. new letter 
combinations 
In aid of filtering the overwhelming amount of environmental stimulation, self-
relevance plays a role in deciding which information to prioritize. However, there is no clear 
definition yet of what type of information can become associated to the self and thus benefit 
from such preferential processing. Research has found that self-associated words can easily 
capture attention in comparison to words associated to others, or neutral words (Alexopoulos 
et al., 2012; Tacikowski & Ehrsson, 2016; Yang et al., 2013). Although there is some evidence 
suggesting that this effect may also hold in absence of familiarity, measures of the impact of 
new self-associated stimuli on attention have yielded mixed results (Dalmaso et al., 2019; 
Siebold et al., 2015; Sui et al., 2009; Wade & Vickery, 2018; Zhao et al., 2015). Furthermore, 
the direct comparison of the potential of familiar vs. new self-associated stimuli to impact the 
distribution of attention indicates that new self- vs. stranger associated stimuli do not guide 
attention with similar effectivity as familiar self- vs. stranger-associated stimuli (Orellana-
Corrales et al., 2020a; Orellana-Corrales et al., 2020b; Siebold, et al., 2015; though see 
Dalmaso et al., 2019 and Wade & Vickery, 2018). Notably, however, research so far has 
exclusively compared newly self-associated shapes to familiar self-associated words. Thus, 
the use of different types of stimuli for each condition may hinder this comparison. In order 
to rule out this potential confound, the purpose of the current study is to investigate for the 
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first time whether neutral letter combinations can be associated to the self and consequently 
impact attention. 
As previously mentioned, familiar self-associated words impact attention. For 
example, one’s own name captures attention more easily than other names (Alexopoulos et 
al., 2012; Yang et al., 2013). Even generic words referring to one’s self (e.g. “I”) can impact 
visual information processing with greater ease than generic words referring to others (e.g. 
“other”), even though these are not personalized to one as an individual (Tacikowski & 
Ehrsson, 2016). However, such self-associated words are also highly familiar. Thus, it is not 
possible to conclude that their impact on attention is due solely to their association to the 
self without any influence of the high level of prior exposure to it. 
In the last decade, researchers have attempted to test whether formerly neutral 
stimuli can also impact attention after becoming associated to the self regardless of not 
having any prior history of representing the self. Such studies have been based on the 
following paradigm: After participants associate three geometric shapes to the self, a close 
other, and a stranger, they are presented with random combinations of (1) a word referring 
to one these persons and (2) a geometric shape associated to one of them (Sui et al., 2012). 
Typically, studies following this paradigm observe the self-prioritization effect (SPE): An 
advantage in confirming matching combinations of self-associated shape-word pairs in 
comparison to the confirmation of matching shape-word pairs associated to a close other or 
stranger (Dalmaso et al., 2019; Schäfer, Wesslein, et al., 2016; Sui et al., 2012; Wade & 
Vickery, 2018). The SPE has been interpreted to reflect that new stimuli can be tagged to the 
self and impact attention due to their association to the self (Humphreys & Sui, 2015; Sui & 
Rotshtein, 2019). Related studies replicated the SPE using other pictorial stimuli such as 
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coloured arrows (Sui et al., 2009), faces (S. Payne et al., 2017; Zhao et al., 2015), and diagonal 
lines (Wade & Vickery, 2018). Thus, the SPE appears to be a robust effect. However, its 
combination with cuing tasks in order to directly measure the impact of newly self-associated 
stimuli on the distribution of attention has produced mixed results (Dalmaso et al., 2019; 
Siebold et al., 2015; Sui et al., 2009; Wade & Vickery, 2018; Zhao et al., 2015). 
Direct comparisons of the attentional impact of familiar self-association and newly 
established self-association show that newly self- vs. stranger-associated stimuli do not 
impact the distribution of attention as differentially as familiar self- vs. stranger-associated 
stimuli. When comparing the potential of familiar self-associated words vs. new self-
associated shapes to impact attention in a dot-probe task, an effect of attentional 
prioritization of self-associated stimuli was observed only when such stimuli were familiar 
words (Orellana-Corrales, Matschke, & Wesslein, 2020b, 2020a). Specifically, self- vs. 
stranger-associated familiar words yielded an advantage in responding towards familiar self-
associated words when stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) was short (200 ms; Orellana-
Corrales et al., 2020b; see Orellana-Corrales et al., 2020a for a reversion of this effect with a 
long SOA). Such effects are typical of salient stimuli which capture attention (see Klein, 2000). 
When compared to familiar words, however, new self- vs. stranger-associated pictorial stimuli 
did not yield such effects. 
Importantly, studies testing the effects of new self- vs. other-associated stimuli on 
visual information processing have only used shapes – that is, pictorial stimuli – and have 
compared them to familiar self- vs. stranger-associated words. However, pictorial stimuli and 
words are intrinsically different. These two types of stimuli are processed at different speeds 
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(Shor, 1971) and differ in their cognitive impact even when used to represent the same 
concept (see Jenkins et al., 1967; Sperber et al., 1979). Thus, it can be criticized that the 
evidence available so far presents a confound in its comparisons in regard to the attentional 
impact of familiar and new self-associated stimuli. 
In this study, we aim to address this potential confound by comparing familiar and 
newly self-associated letter combinations (i.e. words vs. non-words) with each other. We 
investigate whether newly established self- vs. stranger-association of letter combinations 
impacts attention in a way that mirrors the attentional impact of familiar self- vs. stranger-
associated letter combinations. In line with prior research on the SPE reflecting a robust effect 
that is observable with a wide variety of stimuli (S. Payne et al., 2017; Schäfer, Wesslein, et 
al., 2016; Sui et al., 2012; Wade & Vickery, 2018), we expect that new letter strings will 
become associated to the self, and will therefore yield a significant SPE. Additionally, in line 
with prior research directly comparing the attentional capture of familiar and new self-
representations (Orellana-Corrales, Matschke, & Wesslein, 2020b, 2020a), we expect to 
observe an attentional benefit towards self-associated letter combinations in comparison to 
stranger-associated letter combinations only when such stimuli are familiar (i.e., for words), 
but not when stimuli are newly associated (i.e., for non-words). 
Method 
The study was carried out according to the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki, on 
the basis of informed consent, and pre-registered in the Open Science Framework, 
https://osf.io/s68pm. 
Participants. The minimum sample size required was established by performing a 
priori power calculations using G*Power software (Faul et al., 2007). The SPE has been 
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reported as a medium to large effect in size in previous studies (dz = 0.81 in Sui et al., 2012 
and dz ≥ 0.58 in Schäfer et al., 2016). Furthermore, previous studies using familiar and new 
self- vs. other-associated stimuli in a dot-probe task measuring attentional capture reported 
a medium to large effect size of the interaction between target location and type of 
representation (ƒ = .37 in Orellana-Corrales et al., 2020a and ƒ = .72 in Orellana-Corrales et al., 
2020b). Based on these reports, we expected a medium effect size of ƒ = .25 (Cohen, 1988) 
for the interaction between target location and letter string in a dot-probe task. Thus, for a 
repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with one group, 4 measurements (2 [target 
location: self vs. stranger] × 2 [letter string: word vs. non-word]), α = .05, correlation among 
measures = .50, and non-sphericity correction ε = 1, a minimum sample size of N = 28 is 
needed to detect an effect with a power of 1 − β = .99. 
The study was completed by a total of 33 participants (23 female; Mage = 21, SDage = 
2.8) to allow for dropouts and exclusion of outlier responses. All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and were able to complete the study in German. Before analysing 
the data, each participant’s mean response time (RT) and error rate were compared to the 
sample distribution of mean RTs and error rates, respectively, separately for the dot-probe 
task and the matching task. In the matching task, the average RT of two participants fell within 
Tukey’s definition of an outlier (Tukey, 1977), so their data was excluded from all analyses. 
Procedure. Upon arrival to the laboratory, participants were greeted by an 
experimenter who shortly provided an overview of the study structure. All specific 
instructions that followed were presented on the computer screen. 
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At the beginning of the experiment, participants were asked to associate non-words 
to the words “I” and “stranger”. To this end, a non-word was presented above the word to 
which it should be associated. Each combination was presented four times for a duration of 
3000 ms, alternating between the self-associated and stranger-associated pair. 
Following, participants completed the dot-probe task (see Figure 4.1). The task began 
with 24 practice trials in which participants received feedback if their response was incorrect 
or exceeded 1, 500 ms (“incorrect”, “please respond faster”). The practice trials were 
followed by 240 experimental trials in which participants did not receive feedback on their 
performance. Each trial began with a fixation cross in the centre of the screen (500 ms), 
followed by two cues – one representing the self and one representing a stranger – positioned 
on opposite sides of the screen (left and right, located on 25% and 75% of the horizontal line 
of the screen, and on 50% of the vertical line of the screen). The cues were presented for 200 
ms and they either consisted of the words “self” and “stranger”, or the associated non-words. 
The letter combinations varied from trial to trial in a randomized order. Following the 
presentation of the cues, a target consisting of either a “q” or a “p” was presented on either 
the left or right side of the screen (on 25% or 75 of the horizontal line of the screen, 
respectively, and on 50% of the vertical line of the screen). The target remained on the screen 
until participants responded by pressing either of the response keys “Q” or “P” to indicate 
which target was presented. The target (q or p) and its location (left or right) were randomized 
between trials. A 1000 ms pause which consisted of a black screen proceeded before the 
beginning of the next trial. Faster responses to targets following self-associated letter 
combinations indicate a greater potential for self-associated stimuli to capture attention than 
stranger-associated stimuli. 
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Finally, the matching task was presented. Each trial began with a black screen (500 
ms) followed by a central fixation cross (500 ms). A pair consisting of a non-word and a word 
underneath was then presented and remained on the screen until the participant responded, 
or for a maximum duration of 1,500 ms. Participants were asked to indicate whether or not 
the presented pair matched the mapping learned during the association phase (i.e. they both 
represented the self or they both represented the stranger): Pressing “D” indicated that the 
presented pair was a matching pair and pressing “K” indicated that the presented pair was a 
non-matching pair. Participants received feedback if their response was incorrect or if it 
exceeded 1,500 ms (“incorrect”, “please respond faster”.) A practice phase consisting of four 
trials was administered at first, followed by 128 experimental trials to measure the SPE as 
established in the literature (Sui et al., 2012). Faster responses to matching self-associated 
pairs than stranger-associated pairs indicate a significant SPE. 
After finalizing the matching task, participants were thanked and compensated with 
four euros. Students of the Department of Psychology at the University of Tübingen could 
alternatively opt to receive class credit for their participation. 
Apparatus and Materials. The experiment was conducted on Acer Aspire E15 35-
573G-54SK 15.6” laptops using standard computer mice, and it was run on E-Prime 2.0 
(Schneider et al., 2002).  
All stimuli as well as the instructions were presented in white colour against a black 
background and at a viewing distance of 50 cm. The stimuli and instructions were represented 
in Courier New font size 18 at a visual angle of about 0.7°. 
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Familiar representations consisted of the labels “I” and “stranger” (i.e., the 
corresponding German words “Ich” and “Fremder” were used). Non-words were associated 
to both these instances at the beginning of the experiment. The non-words used were letter 
combinations that phonologically resemble real German words but have no semantic 
meaning. They were based on materials used by Landkammer et al. (2019) and consisted of 
the following: sfartku, ambelde, teirnen, kes, muf, lor. Considering the difference in 
character-length of the German words used (three characters for “Ich” and seven characters 
for “Fremder”), we also used non-words consisting of three and seven characters. That is, for 
every participant, one of the words was assigned to a three-character non-word, while the 
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other was assigned to a seven-character non-word. The assignment of non-words to words 
was randomized and counter-balanced across participants. 
Design. Data regarding the SPE matching task consisted of a 2 (association: self vs. 
stranger) × 2 (trial type: matching vs. non-matching) within-participants design. 
Figure 4.1  Schematic depiction of one trial of the dot-probe task (upper graph) and example 
displays demonstrating how the display differed as a function of the type of representation 
(familiar vs. new; lower graph). 
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Data regarding attentional prioritization in the dot-probe task consisted of a 2 (target 
location: self vs. stranger) × 3 (letter combination: word vs. non-word) within-participants 
design. The target location was randomized and counter-balanced throughout trials. 
Results 
For all statistical analyses, a significance level of α = .05 was specified. For RT analyses, 
only correct responses with RTs above 100 ms and below three interquartile ranges above 
the third quartile of the overall individual RT distribution were used (see Tukey, 1977). 
Exclusions of trials were performed separately for the matching task and the dot-probe task. 
The datasets generated and analysed during the current study are available in the 
Open Science Framework, https://osf.io/4cwrv/. 
Matching Task 
Average RTs. The RT data (see Figure 4.2) were subjected to a 2 (association: self-
associated vs. stranger-associated) × 2 (trial type: matching vs. non-matching) within-
participants multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA; see O’Brien and Kaiser, 1985, for the 
use of the MANOVA to analyse repeated-measures designs1). A significant main effect of 
association was observed, F(1, 30) = 26.65, p < .001, ηp2 = .47, indicating that responses were 
faster on trials comprising self-associated non-words than on trials comprising stranger-
associated non-words. The effect of trial type was non-significant, F(1, 30) = 0.53, p = .473, 
ηp2 = .02. However, a significant interaction between association and trial type was observed, 
 
1 Due to our power calculations being made for an ANOVA analysis, a parallel ANOVA analysis was run 
for all MANOVA analyses followingly reported. Both analyses yielded the same results. 
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F(1, 30) = 15.42, p < .001, ηp2 = .34. To follow up on this interaction effect, RTs from matching 
trials were submitted to a one-factorial (association: self-associated vs. stranger-associated) 
within-participants MANOVA. The analysis revealed a significant effect of association, F(1, 30) 
= 33.89, p < .001, ηp2 = .53, indicating a significant SPE. That is, responses were faster for 
matching self-associated combinations (M = 615 ms, SD = 101 ms) than for matching stranger-
associated combinations (M = 701 ms, SD = 149 ms). The RTs from non-matching trials were 
submitted to the same analysis, revealing a non-significant effect of association, F(1, 30) = 
1.11, p = .301, ηp2 = .04. 
 
Figure 4.2 Mean response time in the matching task as a function of association (self-
associated vs. stranger-associated) and trial type (matching vs. non-matching). Error bars 
represent standard errors. *** p < .001.   
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Sensitivity measure d’. Mean error rates are presented in Table 4.1. Signal detection 
sensitivity measures (d’) for each association condition were used to analyse error rates 
(Schäfer et al., 2016; Sui et al., 2012). To this end, we defined responses in the following way: 
Hits were correct responses in matching trials, misses were incorrect responses in matching 
trials, rejections were correct responses in non-matching trials, and false alarms were 
incorrect responses in non-matching trials. The loglinear approach was used to account for 
cases with 100% hits or 0% false alarms, meaning that 0.5 was added to the number of hits 
and the number of false alarms, and 1 was added to the number of signal trials and the 
number of noise trials before calculating the rates for hits and false alarms (see Hautus, 1995; 
Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). The sensitivity measures were submitted to a one-factorial 
(association: self-associated vs. stranger-associated) MANOVA. A significant main effect of 
association was observed, F(1, 30) = 20.27, p < .001, ηp2 = .40, indicating a higher sensitivity 
for self-associated non-words than for stranger-associated non-words. In summary, the data 
reflects a significant SPE in measures of d’. 
Table 4.1 Mean error rates as a function of trial type and shape in the matching task 
Trial type Shape Error rates (%) 
Matching Self-associated 1.1 (1.5) 
 Stranger-associated 3.1 (2.5) 
Non-matching Self-associated 1.0 (1.6) 
 Stranger-associated 1.0 (1.2) 
Note. Standard deviation presented within parentheses. 
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Figure 4.3 Response times in the dot-probe task as a function of target location (self vs. 
stranger) and letter combination (word vs. non-word). Error bars represent standard errors. 
*** p < .001. 
 
Dot-probe task 
Average RTs. Average RTs in the dot-probe task (see Figure 4.3) were submitted to a 
2 (target location: self vs. stranger) × 2 (letter combination: word vs. non-word) within-
participants MANOVA. A significant main effect of target location was observed, F(1, 30) = 
17.49, p < .001, ηp2 = .37, indicating that responses were faster when the target was presented 
at the location previously occupied by a self-associated stimulus (M = 542 ms, SD = 63 ms) 
than when the target was presented at the location previously occupied by a stranger-
associated stimulus (M = 557 ms, SD = 65 ms). The effect of letter combination was not 
significant, F(1, 30) = 0.12, p = .731, ηp2 = .004. However, a significant interaction between 
target location and letter combination was observed, F(1, 30) = 8.75, p = .006, ηp2 = .22. To 
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follow-up on this interaction, post-hoc analyses were conducted. Pairwise t-tests revealed 
that, when the self and stranger were represented by words, responses were significantly 
faster for targets following the self-associated word (M = 537 ms, SD = 63 ms) than for targets 
following the stranger-associated word (M = 563 ms, SD = 67 ms), t(30) = 6.23, p < .001, dz = 
1.12. However, as expected, no such cuing effect was observed for the non-word condition, 
t(30) = 0.36, p = .720, dz = 0.06. 
Error rates. Mean error rates (Table 4.2) were submitted to a 2 (target location: self 
vs. stranger) × 2 (letter combination: word vs. non-word) MANOVA. Neither the effects of 
target location, F(1, 30) = 1.01, p = .324, ηp2 = .03, and letter combination, F(1, 30) = 0.23, p = 
.634, ηp2 = .01, nor the interaction effect, F(1, 30) = 0.32, p = .579, ηp2 = .01, were significant. 
Table 4.2 Mean error rates as a function of target location and type of representation in the 
dot-probe task 
Discussion 
The aim of this study was to investigate whether newly self vs. stranger-associated 
stimuli impact attention differently when both newly and familiar self-associated stimuli use 
the same representation modality (i.e., letter combinations). Prior research demonstrated 
that attention is held and captured by self-associated stimuli when familiar self- vs. stranger-
Target Location Letter combination Error rates (%) 
Self Word 2.5 (1.9) 
 Non-word 2.4 (2.1) 
Stranger Word 2.6 (2.3) 
 Non-word 2.9 (2.1) 
Note. Standard deviation presented within parentheses. 
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associated letter strings are simultaneously presented (Orellana-Corrales et al., 2020a; 
Orellana-Corrales et al., 2020b). In comparison, no such effect of attentional capture and 
holding by self-associated stimuli was observed when new self- and stranger-associated 
geometric shapes are used (Orellana-Corrales et al., 2020a; Orellana-Corrales et al., 2020b). 
However, the exclusive use of pictorial stimuli instead of letter combinations in prior studies 
so far presents a potential confound that interferes with the comparison between these 
effects. Therefore, we aimed at ruling out this potential confound by investigating whether 
newly established self- vs. stranger-association of non-words impacts attention in a way that 
mirrors the attentional impact of familiar self- vs. stranger-associated words. To do so, we 
measured the distribution of attention to self- vs. stranger-associated words and non-words 
by using a dot-probe task in which participants had to identify a target which was randomly 
presented on either one side of the screen (left or right) after the simultaneous presentation 
of either words or non-words associated to self and stranger on opposite ends of the screen. 
Finally, participants performed a matching task in which they had to indicate whether random 
pairs of the words and non-words matched the initial association or not (i.e., measurement 
of the SPE). We expected to observe faster responses towards matching self-associated pairs 
of letter combinations than stranger-associated pairs (a significant SPE), thus confirming that 
the non-words were associated to the self and stranger. Furthermore, we expected to 
observe an attentional benefit towards self-associated letter combinations in comparison to 
stranger-associated letter combinations when these were familiar words. Based on previous 
research, however, we did not expect to find this effect for the non-words when comparing 
self-associated stimuli to stranger-associated stimuli. 
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In regard to the matching task, we observed that participants were faster and more 
accurate at confirming the matching combination of self-associated non-words and labels in 
comparison to any other combination of non-words and labels. This reflects a significant SPE, 
as established in the literature (Sui et al., 2012; Schäfer et al., 2016). In other words, our study 
successfully replicated the findings of the SPE literature and therefore demonstrates that non-
words can become associated to the self and immediately impact performance in a matching 
task presenting combinations of non-words associated to the self and others, and the words 
referring to these persons. Importantly, this allows for the results in the dot-probe task to be 
interpreted within the framework of the SPE. 
As expected, we observed that participants were faster at identifying the target when 
it was presented on the location previously occupied by self-associated words than when it 
was presented on the location previously occupied by stranger-associated words. This 
indicates that, under conditions of attentional competition (i.e., when self- and stranger-
associated stimuli are presented simultaneously), self-associated letter combinations are 
prioritized in attention in comparison to stranger-associated letter combinations. That is, 
after the presentation of the word “I” (vs. “stranger”), attention was held at its location, 
enhancing responses towards the following target. However, no such difference was 
observed when non-words were used: Self-associated letter combinations did not yield an 
advantage in identifying targets in comparison to stranger-associated letter combinations 
when such letter combinations had been newly associated to the self and stranger. Taken 
together, our results indicate that the effect of attentional prioritization of the self is 
modulated by the type of representation used. In other words, the data shows that familiarity 
plays a role in the attentional impact of self- vs. stranger-associated stimuli. 
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The data replicates the results observed in previous studies comparing the attentional 
prioritization of familiar self- vs. stranger-associated word-stimuli and newly self- vs. stranger-
associated pictorial stimuli. Specifically, both Orellana-Corrales et al. (2020a) and Orellana-
Corrales et al. (2020b) observed an impact on responses towards self-associated stimuli over 
stranger-associated stimuli in a dot-probe task only using familiar word-stimuli, yet not when 
presenting newly self- and stranger-associated shapes alone. However, as studies had used 
words as familiar representations of “self” and “stranger”, and geometric shapes as new 
representations, the role of the stimulus modality remained unclear. The current study 
extends these results by avoiding this potential confound and using the same modality of 
stimuli as both familiar and new representations. Namely, this study demonstrates that the 
difference observed in prior research between the attentional impact of familiar and new 
self-association are due to familiarity playing a role in yielding such impact, rather than 
because stimuli of a different modality were used. 
Notably, some of the literature exploring the attentional impact of newly established 
self-association does report having observed an attentional benefit towards self-associated 
stimuli in comparison to other-associated stimuli (Dalmaso et al., 2019; Sui et al., 2009; Wade 
& Vickery, 2018; Zhao et al., 2015). However, these studies used different attentional tasks 
and thus the lack of systematization makes it difficult to compare the results observed in 
these studies. Considering the differences in methodology, it is interesting to note that our 
results are in line with those observed by Siebold et al. (2015), as it is the only study which, 
like ours, simultaneously presented the self- and other-associated stimuli. This may suggest 
that the attentional impact of self- vs. stranger-associated stimuli may depend on the visual 
context in which it is presented. 
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By building on previous research that has used the same task, this study stands on a 
solid base that allows for more precise inferences to be drawn from its results. However, it is 
necessary to further test the confound of different stimuli modalities in other cuing paradigms 
that have been previously used, such as variations Posner’s cuing task (Dalmaso et al., 2019; 
Sui et al., 2009; Zhao et al., 2015). 
In conclusion, our data shows that findings on the different impact of self- vs. stranger-
associated familiar words vs new pictorial stimuli cannot be attributed to the use of different 
stimuli modalities. Rather, such findings also replicate when letter combinations are 
consistently used as both familiar and new representations of self and stranger. Thus, we 
extend the literature by testing the effect of familiar and new self-association by using the 
same stimulus modality (i.e. letter combinations) for the first time. Taken together, the results 
of this study highlight that familiarity constitutes an important boundary condition in the 
attentional impact of newly self-associated stimuli. 
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 General Discussion 
 
The aim of this dissertation was to directly compare the impact of new self-
representations to that of familiar self-representations (as opposed to the impact of new and 
familiar representations of a stranger). Stimuli that are associated to the self can capture 
attention (Alexopoulos et al., 2012; Bortolon & Raffard, 2018; Brédart et al., 2006), enhance 
cognitive processing (Bower & Gilligan, 1979; Brédart, 2016; Kim et al., 2018), and they can 
even impact attitudes (Boucher et al., 2009; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000) and behavior 
(Burkley et al., 2015; Tajfel, 1970). However, the conditions required for a stimulus to become 
associated to the self and yield such effects are still unclear. This is highly relevant in the 
context of today’s ubiquitous use of the internet and digital media, as we interact with 
different environments in which we are represented in multiple ways. Such representations 
vary from the concrete and familiar, such as photographs of ourselves and our real name, to 
the very new and abstract, such as avatars or symbols. Understanding their impact on 
cognition, affect, and behavior, can shed light on the dynamics behind our use of technology 
and online behavior. 
So far, many of the self-associated stimuli that have been demonstrated to produce 
such effects also have a long history of representing the self and are thus highly familiar – 
such as one’s own name and face. In order to study self-association in absence of familiarity, 
a recent line of research has been studying the effects elicited by recently established self-
association (Macrae et al., 2017; Schäfer, Wesslein, et al., 2016; Sui et al., 2012). Nevertheless, 
the evidence that has been collected so far regarding the impact of newly self-associated 
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stimuli on information processing is limited and mixed. Furthermore, there are no direct 
comparisons of the effects yielded by newly self-associated stimuli and familiar self-
associated stimuli. Thus, the three manuscripts included in this dissertation build on one 
another to detail the attentional impact of familiar and new self-association. In this chapter, 
I will discuss how the presented evidence relates to the existing literature, and its theoretical 
and practical implications, as well as strengths and limitations of the reported studies, and 
possible directions for future research. 
General summary of findings 
In order to facilitate a seamless integration of the empirical results, all of the studies 
in Chapters 2 - 4 used the same task to measure attentional effects of self- and stranger-
representations in different familiarity conditions. Specifically, a dot-probe task was used in 
which self- and stranger-representations were simultaneously presented as cues on opposite 
ends of the screen (left and right), followed by a target which was randomly presented on 
either one side of the screen (i.e., left or right) and required a response. The attentional 
impact of each type of representation was measured by RTs to targets when they were 
preceded by a self-representation in comparison to when they were preceded by a stranger-
representation. The use of this task across all experiments thus minimized the possible 
confounds between the observed results. 
Throughout the studies reported, the attentional prioritization of self-representations 
over stranger-representations was compared when the familiarity of such representations 
varied. In detail, Chapter 2 aimed to measure whether a representation of the self can capture 
attention with greater ease than the representation of a stranger. Further, the type of 
representation used (familiar, new, or paired) was manipulated. Results indicated that self-
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associated representations yielded faster RTs towards targets than stranger-associated 
representations only when familiar representations were used. That is, when familiar 
representations were presented, self-representations captured attention and enhanced RTs 
to targets presented on the same location in comparison to stranger-representations. This 
difference between RTs to targets preceded by self- and stranger-representations was not 
observed when new representations were used. Notably, paired representations did yield a 
significant difference between RTs to targets preceded by a self- and stranger-representation. 
However, this attentional effect was interpreted to be caused solely by the familiar 
representation that was included within the paired representations – with no impact from 
the new representation – as will be discussed further in this section. Thus, Chapter 2 provided 
evidence that familiar self-representations impact attention as observed by a cuing effect, 
while new self-representations do not.  
Followingly, Chapter 3 aimed to replicate and extend the results from Chapter 2 by 
manipulating the SOA. Namely, the aim was to compare whether the pattern in attentional 
capture of familiar, new, and mixed self- vs. stranger-representations – observed as a cuing 
effect with an SOA of 100 ms – was mirrored by a pattern of attentional impact observed as 
inhibition of return with an SOA of 1000 ms. By extending the length of the SOA, it was 
observed that only familiar representations yield a difference in RTs towards targets preceded 
by self vs. stranger-representations. In this case, RTs towards targets preceded by self-
representations were slower than those preceded by stranger-representations. This was 
interpreted as a greater potential for self-representations to capture attention, which 
subsequently impaired RTs to stimuli presented on the same location after attention had 
drifted away from the cue due to the extended SOA. Notably, paired representations did not 
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yield a significant difference between RTs to targets preceded by a self- and stranger-
representation when the SOA was 1000 ms long. Taken together, Chapter 3 provided 
evidence that self-representations impact attention when such representations are familiar 
– as observed by a cuing effect and an effect of inhibition of return. 
Finally, Chapter 4 again replicated the results from Chapter 2 regarding the effects of 
familiar and new self- and stranger-representations, yet this time by using the same stimulus 
modality for both familiar and new representations. That is, following prior literature, 
Chapters 2 and 3 had used words as familiar representations and shapes as new 
representations. However, the use of different stimuli modalities for the different types of 
representation entailed a potential confound which could possibly account for the different 
effects yielded by the different types of representations (i.e., verbal and pictorial). Thus, 
Chapter 4 used only verbal stimuli (words and nonwords) as familiar and new representations 
in order to control for this potential confound. This chapter provided evidence to support the 
claim that the difference in the effects yielded by familiar and new representations in the 
prior chapters were not due to the use of stimuli of different modalities for each type of 
representation. That is, it demonstrated that familiar self-representations impact attention 
as observed by a cuing effect while new self-representations do not – even when both 
representations use stimuli of the same modality. 
Remarkably, a significant SPE was consistently observed in the matching task in all of 
the studies reported. Namely, the confirmation of matching self-associated pairings 
(composed either by a newly self-associated shape and a familiar label, or a newly self-
associated non-word and a familiar label) was faster and more accurate than the confirmation 
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of matching pairings that were associated to a stranger in the matching task. That is, the self-
association of previously neutral stimuli impacted performance in the matching task. 
Overall, this dissertation provides new specific insights regarding the conditions in 
which new stimuli are integrated into the self-concept as representations of the self. 
Specifically, it presents evidence that self-association alone may have a limited and temporary 
impact on certain stages of information processing but is insufficient to actually change the 
self-concept by integrating the recently self-associated element.  
Attentional prioritization of self (vs. other) modulated by familiarity 
As a whole, the evidence presented in this dissertation strongly supports that 
familiarity is a precondition for self-representations to impact attention. In all studies, a 
significant difference in the impact of self- vs. stranger-representations was observed when 
familiar representations were used, but not when new representations were used. 
Furthermore, the use of paired representations yielded mixed results.  
The observed impact of familiar self-representations on attention across all chapters 
of this dissertation is congruent with prior research which has clearly established that familiar 
self-associated stimuli can easily capture attention (Alexopoulos et al., 2012; Tacikowski & 
Ehrsson, 2016). Specifically, words that represent one’s self – such as one’s name (Cherry, 
1953; Moray, 1959; Tacikowski et al., 2011) and nationality (Tacikowski & Ehrsson, 2016) – 
can capture attention with greater ease than words referring to others. The word “self” in 
particular has not been used before in studies testing attention of self-associated stimuli, as 
was done in this dissertation. However, it has been used successfully in studies researching 
the impact of self-association in other dimensions such as implicit attitudes (Greenwald & 
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Farnham, 2000), because it is indeed a familiar word that semantically refers to the self. Thus, 
this dissertation provides further support to the claim that familiar words which represent 
the self can capture attention with greater ease that words referring to others. 
Conversely, there may not be such a straight-forward interpretation regarding the lack 
of an observable effect of new self-representations. Research on the topic so far does not yet 
provide a clear distinction of the role which self-association plays in prioritizing attention. 
Generally, the attentional dynamics behind newly established self-association have so far 
demonstrated to be less robust than familiar self-association. For example, Sui et al. (2009) 
demonstrated that arrows presented in a self-associated color can orient attention towards 
targets with greater ease than arrows presented in a color associated to a friend. 
Furthermore, they observed that arrows presented in a self-associated color facilitated the 
localization of a target even if the location of the target was not cued by the arrow. The 
authors proposed that self-associated cues facilitate disengaging attention from the cued 
location which does not contain the target towards the uncued location containing the target. 
However, Zhao et al. (2015) replicated the results reported by Sui et al. (2009) with a 
“marginally significant” effect (p = 0.07) and they observed limitations in the degree to which 
self-association impacted attention due to the type of cues used and the type of target 
presented. 
Relatedly, Dalmaso et al. (2018) demonstrated that newly self-associated shapes can 
capture and hold attention in comparison to stranger-associated shapes, consequently 
delaying anti-saccades away from them. Their results demonstrate that a newly self-
associated stimulus can itself capture attention with greater ease than stimuli newly 
associated to others. Further adding to this claim, Wade and Vickery (2018) demonstrated 
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that self-associated shapes can also capture attention from within a set of neutral shapes 
more efficiently than other-associated shapes presented within a set of neutral shapes. Taken 
together, these studies seem to suggest that newly self-associated stimuli can capture 
attention. However, both of these studies presented either only the self-associated stimulus 
or only the other-associated stimulus in each trial. In contrast, when presenting both a self- 
and stranger-associated diagonal line within a set of vertical lines, Siebold et al. (2015) 
observed no attentional advantage for the self-associated line. Hence, evidence from prior 
studies regarding the attentional impact of newly self-associated stimuli is mixed, even when 
using the same task with slight variations such as Wade and Vickery (2018) and Siebold et al. 
(2015) did in their studies. It is therefore important to consider the particularities of the task 
used in the studies of this dissertation and how they may influence the observed results. 
One possible explanation for the difference between the results observed in this 
dissertation and those observed by Dalmaso et al. (2018) and Wade and Vickery (2018) 
regarding the attentional impact of newly established self-association is the setup in which 
the self- and other-associated stimuli are presented. Namely, the studies presented here 
measure the impact of attention when both stimuli are presented simultaneously rather than 
individually. It is important to consider that the manipulation used in studies researching 
newly established self-association entails that, in addition to making a previously neutral 
stimulus become salient by providing it with a new meaning and making it represent the self, 
the other-associated stimuli also become salient by being provided with a new meaning and 
making them represent an other (e.g. a friend or stranger). Thus, both the self-associated and 
other-associated stimuli differ in relevance between each other, but neither are exactly 
neutral. Hence, presenting both stimuli simultaneously is intrinsically different than 
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presenting only one of them at a time (either alone or within sets of neutral stimuli) because 
it implies the processing of multiple salient stimuli at one time – albeit, multiple salient stimuli 
that differ in their degree of relevance – and can possibly yield different results. Indeed, 
Siebold et al. (2015) presented both stimuli simultaneously within a set of neutral stimuli and 
did not observe an advantage for the localization of self-associated stimuli vs. stranger-
associated stimuli. Thus, it remains an open issue whether the context in which newly self-
associated stimuli are presented has any influence on its attentional impact.  
Indeed, there is currently no evidence on whether the attentional impact of newly 
self-associated stimuli is susceptible to the environment in which it is presented. However, 
research testing the influence of other stimuli in the environment could shed light on the 
relevance and attentional impact of newly self-associated stimuli. Furthermore, it would 
provide further insight into how it compares to the relevance and attentional impact of 
familiar stimuli. As a reference, familiar self-associated stimuli can robustly capture attention 
even when presented amongst other salient stimuli (e.g., Brédart et al., 2006; Moray, 1959). 
Such research could use the attentional tasks that have previously used, such as the dot-probe 
task or the visual-search task, and manipulate whether the self- and other-associated 
representations are presented as the sole salient stimulus (either alone or amongst neutral 
stimuli) or simultaneously. Results from such studies could clarify whether environmental 
stimuli represent a confound that affects the attentional impact of newly established self-
association which may explain the mixed results observed in the literature. Beyond this 
clarification, such research would be important in demonstrating the impact of recently 
established self-association in a natural environment which typically includes multiple stimuli 
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of varying relevance that compete for the allocation of cognitive resources – such as is the 
case in digital environments which simultaneously present multiple users.  
One other particularity of the methodology used in the studies comprising this 
dissertation refers to the order in which the tasks were presented. Specifically, it may be 
criticized that the studies included in this dissertation divert from previous literature by 
separating the SPE methodology – measuring attention in between the manipulation and the 
matching task – which may have influenced the observed results. The reason why the 
methodology was used in this way was based on prior interpretations of the SPE presuming 
that the initial instruction asking participants to neutral stimuli to themselves and others is 
sufficient to yield the SPE as followingly measured in the matching task (Sui et al., 2012). 
According to this interpretation, the instruction should thus be sufficient to observe an effect 
of self-association on an attentional task which follows it. Therefore, the matching task was 
applied at the end of the study as a manipulation check in order to confirm that the 
associations were still active at that point and had thus been active throughout the entirety 
of the study. If the practice trials in the matching task were in fact necessary to observe the 
SPE, this would imply that indeed one must be more familiarized with self-associated stimuli 
in order for such stimuli to impact information processing. However, the evidence currently 
available is insufficient to support such claims. Indeed, the studies which have observed an 
attentional impact of newly established self-association did present the matching task before 
measuring the attentional impact of new self- and other-associated stimuli (Dalmaso et al., 
2019; Sui et al., 2009; Wade & Vickery, 2018; Zhao et al., 2015). Nonetheless, a study 
observing no attentional impact of newly established self-association also presented the 
matching task before measuring the attentional impact of new self- and other-associated 
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stimuli (Siebold et al., 2015). Thus, it seems unlikely that the order of the tasks had an impact 
on the effect (or lack thereof) of newly self-associated stimuli. Additional studies shifting the 
order in which the tasks are presented (that is, presenting the matching task before the 
attentional task) could provide further support to the results observed in this dissertation. 
However, there is currently no theoretical basis to substantiate the supposition of its 
interference.  
To summarize, the results demonstrate that familiarity is a prerequisite for self-
representations to impact attention. A particularity of the studies in this dissertation is that 
the task used presented both self- and stranger-representations at the same time. 
Importantly, this a characteristic which is shared with prior research that also observed no 
prioritization of newly self-associated stimuli in comparison to newly stranger-associated 
stimuli. In contrast, studies that have observed attentional prioritization of newly self-
associated stimuli when compared to stranger-associated stimuli measured attentional 
capture when the self- and stranger-associated stimuli were presented with no other stimuli 
of relevance. This suggests that newly established self-association can yield a limited impact 
on information that does not hold when competing with other relevant stimuli for attentional 
resources and is thus not as strong as the impact yielded by familiar self-association. 
Furthermore, it is important that future research considers the relevance of the tasks used 
and the specifications of the experimental setting. Choosing tools that are specific for 
measuring precise stages of information processing and the susceptibilities of the effect to 
the specifications of tasks (e.g., timings, visual setting, and task order) are important to 
consider in the interpretation of results in order to define the conditions of the effects of self-
association. 
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The role of newly self-associated stimuli in paired representations 
The use of paired representations – which combine familiar and new representations 
– in Chapters 2 and 3 provides further insight into the role that familiarity plays in the 
attentional impact of self-association. Self-associated paired representations were observed 
to yield a cuing effect. Namely, participants responded faster towards targets preceded by a 
self-associated shape-label pair than towards targets preceded by a stranger-associated 
shape-label pair when the SOA was short (100 ms). However, when the SOA was long (1000 
ms), self-associated paired representations did not yield an effect of inhibition of return as 
would be expected of salient stimuli, and as did familiar representations. Thus, it is not 
immediately clear what the impact is of combining familiar and new self-associated stimuli.  
The way in which the paired representation is perceived is one consideration that may 
play a part in the observed effects. Namely, the literature suggests two possibilities: the 
pairing may be perceived either as two individual representations presented simultaneously 
(Sui & Humphreys, 2015), or as the conjunction of two representations forming one single 
representation (Schäfer, Frings, et al., 2016). In regard to the former, the studies by Sui and 
Humphreys (2015) and Sui et al. (2015) demonstrated that the presentation of multiple self-
referential stimuli had a “redundancy effect” which enhanced the SPE. That is, presenting two 
self-referential stimuli yielded a higher SPE than presenting only one self-referential stimulus. 
Following this, it could be expected that paired representations could have a higher 
attentional impact because they consist of two self-associated representations (namely, the 
label and shape). However, the size of the attentional effect of paired representations did not 
differ from that of familiar representations. In other words, combining a familiar self-
associated label with a newly self-associated shape did not cause a change in the impact 
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yielded by the familiar self-associated label alone. Thus, the presentation of two self-
representations (one familiar and one new) did not yield redundancy gains, reflecting that the 
shape and label may not have been perceived as two individual representations of the self. 
It could therefore be alternatively considered that the paired representation was 
integrated and perceived as one single stimulus, as described by Schäfer, Frings, et al (2016) 
when using stimuli defined by two characteristics in the matching task. Specifically, by asking 
participants to associate stimuli to themselves which were defined by their shape and color 
(rather than shape only), Schäfer and her colleagues observed that the SPE was observable 
only for those stimuli which complied with both characteristics. That is, partial matches 
(shape only or color only) were not prioritized in responding in a matching task. Their results 
demonstrated that stimuli are associated to the self as a whole, rather than its features being 
associated to the self. Thus, as a single, integrated stimulus, paired representations should 
not yield redundancy effects. However, in the context of the studies in this dissertation, this 
should also mean that partial representations – that is, the shape alone or label alone – should 
not yield an advantage to the self and this is not the case. Although the paired representations 
indeed did not yield redundancy effects, it is not the case that partial representations didn’t 
yield an effect. Namely, familiar labels did reflect an advantage for the self vs. a stranger. 
Therefore, it also seems like paired representations were not perceived as a single, conjunct 
representation. 
It rather seems as though the lack of redundancy effects – that is, the paired 
representation not being perceived as two individual self-representations presented 
simultaneously – is due to the shape not being perceived as a self-representation in the first 
place. After all, newly self- and stranger-associated shapes did not yield an advantage in RTs 
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towards targets preceded by self-representations vs. stranger-representations. Therefore, it 
seems like the effect of attentional prioritization of self vs. stranger when represented by the 
pairing of a newly associated shape and a familiar label was caused solely by the familiar label. 
For this reason, the size of the effect of paired representations did not differ from the size of 
the effect of familiar representations.   
Relatedly, prior research regarding the impact of the size of stimuli on the SPE may 
further substantiate that newly established self-representations do not play a role on the 
impact of paired representations. Namely, by manipulating the size of stimuli associated to 
the self, a friend, and a stranger in the matching task, Sui and Humphreys (2015) 
demonstrated that increasing the size of self-associated stimuli increases the SPE. That is, 
larger self-associated shapes yielded faster RTs towards self-associated shape-label pairs in 
the matching task. In the dot-probe task used in this dissertation, shape stimuli where of a 
larger size than verbal stimuli, yet they did not yield a greater impact. Although they were 
both of the same length, shape stimuli were of a greater height than verbal stimuli and thus 
occupied a larger area. Furthermore, paired representations occupied the greatest area 
because of their combination of both the label and shape. Thus, it would be expected that 
shapes would have a greater attentional impact than labels, and that paired representations 
would have the greatest attentional impact out of all three types of representations. It could 
be assumed that this is a suggestion that newly self-associated shapes are not integrated into 
the self-concept and therefore do not impact attention. However, it remains possible that the 
larger shape size did not yield an effect simply because it is an effect that is strictly limited to 
the SPE and does not transfer to attentional processes. 
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In sum, paired representations entail diverse dynamics that may make them too 
complex to use as a stimulus representing some degree of familiarity. However, the results 
observed regarding the paired representation generally provide supporting evidence that, 
indeed, familiarity is a precondition for the attentional impact of self-representations. 
Self-representations of different modalities 
In order to follow the methodology of prior research, Chapters 2 and 3 used labels as 
familiar representations and geometric shapes as new representations of the self and a 
stranger. However, this inherited the potential confound that the different types of 
representation consisted of stimuli of different modalities – namely, verbal and pictorial. The 
use of stimuli of different modalities for the different types of representations thus makes it 
unclear whether the difference in the effect yielded by each type of representation is due 
solely to their familiarity, or whether the stimulus modality also played a part. This confound 
was eliminated in Chapter 4 by using verbal stimuli as both familiar and new representations. 
The results replicated those observed in Chapters 2 and 3: a cuing effect benefitting self-
representations was observed when familiar stimuli were used, but not when new stimuli 
were used. Hence, Chapter 4 demonstrates that the different effects observed for each type 
of representation (familiar and new) are not due to the types of stimuli being of a different 
modality – namely, verbal and pictorial.  
Prior literature relating to the use of different stimuli modalities to is limited. The only 
studies that had previously induced self- and other-association to neutral stimuli of the same 
modality as familiar self- and other-associated stimuli are those using arbitrary faces (S. Payne 
et al., 2017). Namely, both studies by S. Payne et al., (2017) and Wózniak et al. (2018) 
demonstrated that arbitrary faces which have just become associated to the self can impact 
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performance in cognitive tasks, just as one’s own face also impacts performance in cognitive 
tasks (Bola et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2016; Tacikowski & Nowicka, 2010). However, there is not 
yet any direct comparison of the effects yielded by familiar and newly self- vs. other-
associated faces. Additionally, the results observed in Chapter 4 are congruent with the 
results observed by Zhao et al. (2015) when inducing self- and other-association of colored 
arrows and illustrated faces that gazed to the left or right and presented them as cues for 
neighboring targets. In detail, the authors observed that both stimulus modalities 
demonstrated an advantage for self-associated stimuli to orient attention towards targets 
(with the type of target presenting a limitation to their effects). That is, both this dissertation 
and the studies by Zhao et al. (2015) demonstrate that different stimulus modalities do not 
change the effect of self-association.  
Still, further research focusing on both the use of familiar and new stimuli of the same 
modality and the effects of different stimuli modalities on the impact of self-association is 
needed. For example, it would be interesting to compare the effects of using familiar and new 
shapes to represent the self and stranger. While the studies included in this dissertation 
controlled for the effect of different stimulus modalities by using verbal stimuli as both new 
and familiar representations, such comparisons would be interesting to explore with stimuli 
of other modalities.  
Nevertheless, there is one visible effect in the data pattern in this dissertation that 
may be due to the difference in stimulus modality. Even though the new representations do 
not impact the attentional prioritization of self-associated stimuli, they do lead to generally 
faster RTs. That is, new representations led to faster RTs towards targets than familiar 
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representations, and paired representations led to faster RTs than familiar and new 
representations alone (with no impact regarding the difference between self- and stranger-
representations). This effect is in line with prior research demonstrating that different stimuli 
modalities are processed differently. In detail, Shor (1971) observed that pictorial stimuli are 
processed at a faster speed than verbal stimuli. Thus, the results observed across the studies 
in this dissertation suggest that different stimuli modalities may generally influence RTs, but 
do not impact the size of the effect of self-association. In other words, the use of stimuli of 
different modalities do not seem to influence the impact of self-association. 
To summarize, the use of the same stimulus modality for both familiar and 
representations confirmed that familiarity is relevant in the attentional impact of self-
association. Namely, the difference in the effects yielded by familiar and new representations 
does not seem to be due to previously having used verbal stimuli as familiar representations 
and pictorial stimuli as new representations. Although the different type of stimuli did impact 
overall speed, they had no influence over the effect of self-association. 
Other stages of information processing in newly established self-association 
Remarkably, all studies included in this dissertation replicated the SPE. Research has 
demonstrated that the SPE is a highly robust effect which can be observed with a wide variety 
of stimuli (Macrae et al., 2017; S. Payne et al., 2017; Schäfer, Wesslein, et al., 2016; Sui et al., 
2012). In addition to providing further evidence sustaining the SPE, this dissertation 
demonstrates that neutral verbal stimuli (nonwords) can also yield an SPE. However, this 
result also raises questions about what the matching task measures, and the underlying 
mechanisms of the SPE. 
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Importantly, as mentioned earlier, the matching task used to measure the SPE 
presents a limitation in its methodology that may limit the interpretation of its results. 
Namely, the newly self-associated stimuli are always presented alongside familiar labels 
referring to the self or others. Results do typically show that RTs are enhanced when 
responding to matching combinations of the self-associated shape and the “self” label, but 
not when responding to the self-associated shape paired with a different label, or the “self” 
label paired with a different shape. Thus, the results reflect that the shape has somewhat 
acquired self-relevance, but they thwart interpretations of the effect being generated by the 
newly self-associated stimulus itself.  
Recently, Wózniak and Knoblich (2019) ran a study controlling for this confound by 
having participants associate avatars consisting of faces to themselves and others as well as 
symbols that would represent the labels referring to the self and others. Thus, they presented 
a matching task which consisted solely of neutral, newly self- and other-associated stimuli 
and still observed a significant SPE. Thus, the robustness of the SPE seems to still hold and it 
reflects some sort of tagging of the new stimuli to the self. This seems to call back reports 
about redundancy effects – yielded by the presentation of two newly self-associated stimuli 
– enhancing the SPE. Namely, it seems curious that two newly self-associated stimuli (with no 
familiar self-representations) can induce the SPE, yet none of the studies in this dissertation 
observed an attentional impact of newly self-associated stimuli. As stated before, more 
research is clearly needed in order to define what exactly is measured by the SPE and the 
stage of information processing that it impacts. However, the discrepancy between results in 
the SPE literature and the studies in this dissertation seem to highlight that the matching task 
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and the dot-probe task measure different cognitive processes and that the SPE is limited to 
impacting a particular stage of processing that is not captured by the dot-probe task. 
Varying interpretations of the SPE have pinpointed the involvement of different stages 
in information processing in this effect. However, recent research has suggested that the SPE 
occurs at a conceptual level and that it implicates later stages of information processing 
(Schäfer et al., 2015). In particular, evidence from a process refractory period paradigm 
excluded that the SPE occurs at an early or late stage of information processing, thus 
excluding attention and narrowing down that it occurs in memory (Janczyk et al., 2019). 
Furthermore, Yin et al. (2019) demonstrated that the self-association of colors enhanced 
responses to probes in a match-to-sample working memory task, suggesting that newly 
established self-association consists of internal representations sustained in working 
memory. Such evidence may provide some insight as to why the SPE was observed, but not 
an attentional effect. Namely, it reflects that the dot-probe task and matching task measure 
distinct cognitive processes. Thus, further research using multiple tasks that measure the 
same cognitive process would be useful to assertively define the stages of information 
processing that are impacted by newly established self-association. 
However, considering that familiar self-associated stimuli can impact cognition at 
multiple stages of information processing (Alexopoulos et al., 2012; Bower & Gilligan, 1979; 
Brédart, 2016), such results may already hint at general differences between familiar and 
newly established self-association. Namely, they suggest that self-association has a limited 
impact when it has recently been established, and that the increase of its impact may relate 
to processes that occur later on, based on the exposure to the newly self-associated element 
and the overall experience of the relationship with that element. 
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Affective and behavioral impact of self-association 
Beyond impacting cognition, it has been demonstrated that self-associated stimuli can 
also impact affect and behavior (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Oeberst & Matschke, 2017; 
Tajfel, 1970). Generally, the self and self-associated elements are evaluated more positively 
and yield positive behaviors that benefit the self-associated element. For example, self-
associated stimuli such as one’s own name and nationality are categorized as positive with 
greater ease than other-associated stimuli in an IAT (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). Similarly, 
the self and self-associated others are preferentially benefitted when allocating resources 
between the self (or self-associated) and an other (Aron et al., 1991; Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel et al., 
1971). However, the research studying these dynamics has typically used stimuli that are 
highly familiar such as one’s own name, one’s own community, and possessions. One 
exception is the use of the minimal group paradigm in which participants are arbitrarily 
assigned to arbitrary groups, after which they immediately reflect attitudinal and behavioral 
biases favoring the group they were assigned to (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel et al., 1971). 
Nevertheless, it may be argued that while the specific group is indeed new, participants are 
familiar with the concept of a group and its dynamics. Hence, it is not entirely an unfamiliar 
stimulus. Testing these effects with neutral stimuli would allow to better understand the 
process by which new stimuli are integrated into the self-concept and the role played by mere 
initial self-association.  
Namely, considering that the self-concept is susceptible to the influence of multiple 
dimensions that range from the internal to the external, extending the research in this 
dissertation from the cognitive towards the affective and behavioral seems necessary to 
define the interplay of bottom-up and top-down dynamics that are at play in the construction 
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of the self-concept. That is, the study of the affective and behavioral impact of newly 
established self-association is relevant to understand the conditions through which a simple 
association to the self develops into a new integrated element of the self-concept that 
impacts judgements and behavior.  
Preliminary testing of the affective and behavioral impact of newly established self-
association 
In order to explore the affective and behavioral impact of newly established self-
association, Orellana-Corrales, Matschke, Schäfer, et al. (2020) ran two pilot studies testing 
the affective and behavioral effects of newly established self-association. In detail, the first 
study consisted of associating geometric shapes to the self and the category “furniture” and 
followingly performing a Self-Esteem IAT (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). The task presented 
familiar and new representations of the self and furniture. It was expected that valence 
measures for self-representations would be higher than for furniture-representations, and 
that this difference would be greater for familiar representations than for new 
representations.  
The RT data from the Self-Esteem IAT were subjected to a 2 (association: self vs. 
furniture) x 2 (mapping: congruent vs. incongruent) x 2 (representation: familiar vs. new) 
within-participants MANOVA. A significant interaction effect of association x representation 
was observed, F = (1, 56) = 13.86, p < .001, ηp2 = .198, while all other effects were non-
significant. To follow up on this effect, mean RTs from target trials (those presenting self and 
furniture stimuli to be categorized, rather than affective stimuli) were submitted to a one-
factorial (representations: familiar vs. new) within-participants MANOVA. The analysis 
revealed a non-significant main effect of association, F = (1, 57) = 1.14, p = .291, ηp2 = .020, 
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and a significant interaction effect of association x representation, F = (1, 57) = 6.35, p = .015, 
ηp2 = .100. That is, RTs were generally faster when categorizing self-associated stimuli (M = 
944.22 ms, SD = 329.03) than furniture-associated stimuli (M = 912.85, SD = 312.81) when 
familiar representations were presented. In other words, the type of representation 
modulated the prioritization of responses yielded by self-associated stimuli vs. furniture-
associated stimuli.  Thus, the data from the Self-Esteem IAT reflect that familiar self-
representations benefit from a positive attitudinal bias while new self-representations do not. 
In the second study, a resource allocation task was applied after associating geometric 
shapes to the self and a stranger. The task represented the self and a stranger as matching or 
non-matching pairs of a familiar label and recently associated shape (as usually presented in 
the matching task) and asked participants to allocate a total of 100 points between both 
representations. It was expected that results would elucidate the role of familiarity in yielding 
affective effects. Specifically, we expected that matching pairs would yield the greatest 
difference in point allocation benefitting the self-associated shape-label pair due to its clear 
signaling of self-relevance. In regard to the non-matching representations, three possible 
outcomes were considered which would reflect the role of familiarity in yielding behavioral 
effects. The first possibility is that allocation would benefit the representation including the 
self-associated label because the label “self” is an explicit reference to the self and, as a 
familiar representation, is more closely associated to the self. This would reflect that the 
behavioral effect is produced by the label alone and is thus dependent on familiarity. The 
second possibility is that allocation would be closer to equivalence between the two 
representations because they both include self-associated stimuli (namely, one would include 
the self-associated label while the other would include the self-associated shape).  
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A between-participant comparison of the relative benefit in resource allocation to the 
self vs. a stranger when the self and stranger were represented by matching (M = 1.5, SD = 
2.41) and non-matching (M = 1.46, SD = 2.46) shape-label pairs indicated a non-significant 
difference, t(54) = .06, p = .954, dz = 0.02. That is, neither matching nor non-matching 
representations produced a benefit in point allocation towards self-associated stimuli. In 
other words, there was no behavioral benefit towards the self regardless of the familiarity of 
representations. 
Importantly, the studies were under-powered and thus the data do not allow for in-
depth analysis of the results. However, they may signal that there is still more to uncover 
regarding the impact of newly established self-association. Thus, further research regarding 
the affective and behavioral impact of newly established self-association is necessary to have 
a cohesive understanding of how new stimuli are integrated into the self-concept and 
consequently impact behavior, and attention.  
The studies in Chapters 2 – 4 can highlight some possible future directions for research 
in this area. The empirical results in the reported studies suggest that simply associating a 
neutral stimulus to the self has a limited impact (at most) in information processing – as 
reflected by the SPE – but is insufficient to integrate the stimulus into the self-concept. 
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the consideration of these results within the body of 
literature suggest that the environment in which stimuli are presented may play a significant 
role on whether these limited effects can be observed or not. While some studies have 
observed an attentional impact of newly self-associated stimuli, Siebold et al. (2015) and the 
studies in this dissertation did not observe an effect of attentional prioritization of self- vs. 
other-associated stimuli. An important difference between these studies is that those which 
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observed an attentional impact of newly self-associated stimuli in comparison to other-
associated stimuli measured attention to each type of stimuli by presenting them individually. 
In contrast, Siebold at al. (2015) and the studies in this dissertation presented both self- and 
other-associated stimuli at the same time. That is, they are presented in a context in which 
they compete for attentional resources. Relatedly, Orellana-Corrales, Matschke, Schäfer et al. 
(2020) also presented self- and stranger-associated stimuli simultaneously in the resource 
allocation task. Furthermore, this task is inherently a context of competition of resources. 
Thus, future studies may test behavioral bias towards the self and an other individually, in a 
context in which these do not compete for resources. These results may confirm whether 
merely associating a stimulus to the self can indeed have a (limited) impact which is not 
observable in more complex environments.  
Importantly, Chapters 2 and 3 establish that paired representations may implicate 
more complex dynamics that are not so easily interpretable in terms of 
familiarity/unfamiliarity. Thus, future studies may also be better off using other types of 
representations that more clearly establish familiarity. Extending research in this direction is 
important to further elucidate the impact of recent self-association and the role that 
familiarity plays in the integration of stimuli into the self-concept.  
To summarize, there is limited research regarding the affective and behavioral impact 
of recently established self-association. So far, it seems as though familiarity is necessary in 
order for self-associated stimuli to yield affective and behavioral bias. This suggests that new 
self-representations presented in digital media may not immediately impact evaluations and 
online behavior, though they hold the potential to do so with increased use and interaction. 
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Familiarity generally plays a role in our attitudes and behavior which results in biases favoring 
the familiar. Such is the case, for example, in brand loyalty and habits, in which individuals 
tend to seek out the familiar and may even feel uncomfortable with the unfamiliar. Further 
research is thus necessary and important in order to establish the conditions in which self-
association impacts affect and behavior as well as to specify the role of familiarity in this 
process. 
Integration of new stimuli into the self-concept 
According to Deaux (1996), simply associating an element to the self is the initial 
requirement to integrate an element into the self/concept and that, in some cases, this self-
association may suffice to integrate an element into the self-concept. As mentioned earlier, 
this can be exemplified by the automatic identification with a group to which a person is 
randomly assigned and its immediate activation of related behaviors favoring the in-group. 
The second requirement entails a process of consciously analyzing and accepting the element, 
and its characteristics, as part of the self. This would entail having deeper knowledge about 
the group and understanding, for example, its norms and how its perceived by others, and 
willingly accepting one’s membership to the group. Although the first requirement may 
already induce short-term changes, the second requirement is necessary in order for the self-
concept to be restructured as to incorporate the new element and remain stable in the long 
term.  
The SPE can indeed be interpreted as a reflection that a simple and arbitrary stimulus 
has been tagged to the self. However, it is debatable whether this is equivalent to having 
integrated said stimulus into the self-concept. Indeed, being assigned to a group or playing a 
particular role in a video game can immediately yield cognitive (Enock et al., 2018; Klimmt et 
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al., 2009, 2010), attitudinal (Oeberst & Matschke, 2017), and behavioral effects (Oeberst & 
Matschke, 2017; Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel et al., 1971) reflecting the integration of the group or role 
into the self-concept. However, no matter how “new” a group or role may be, we already 
have an understanding of what a group or role is and what it entails. Furthermore, we 
understand them as elements that have the potential to have a long-term impact. In contrast, 
simple stimuli such as geometric shapes lack the depth that would demand further processing 
and that would require a restructuring of the self-concept and yield a long-term change. 
Simple stimuli also lack contextual cues that would make it salient elsewhere outside of the 
experimental task. Ultimately, they do not refer to the elements conforming the self-concept; 
namely, individual traits, relational roles, or social identities (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). Thus, 
it seems unlikely that the self-associations induced by the manipulation used in the SPE (and 
related) literature are integrated into the self-concept. Of course, the purpose of using such 
simple stimuli is to observe self-association more purely and in absence of familiarity or other 
confounding factors. Hence, this may reflect the complex dynamics that conform the self-
concept and, more specifically, that although associating an element to the self may be an 
initial step towards integrating it into the self-concept, it may not always be sufficient for it 
to actually be integrated into the self-concept. 
Indeed, the self-concept is a complex and multidimensional structure. As Deaux (1996) 
further theorized, it must remain flexible in order to adapt to environmental changes. While 
this does entail that it is vulnerable to environmental influences, the self-concept is also 
guided by internal motivations. Thus, the environment ascribes roles, defines role categories, 
and strengthens associations through repetitive behavior patterns. However, an individual 
may also voluntarily choose to integrate or eliminate and element into their self-concept and 
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decide whether or not to endorse the roles ascribed by the environment.  Hence, assigning a 
new self-representation is not necessarily sufficient for it to be integrated into the self-
concept. Particularly because there are multiple sources that can influence the self-concept, 
it must also remain somewhat stable (Tajfel, 1981). Thus, the self-concept will not be re-
structured to integrate every element that is merely associated to it. Rather, it relies on 
multiple dynamics in order to process the integration of a new element into the self-concept.  
When considering the experimental context of the studies in this dissertation, there 
are two environmental influences present influencing the potential integration of the 
geometric shape into the self-concept which may account for the observed results. Namely, 
the experimental environment ascribes the association of the shape to the self through the 
association instruction at the beginning of the experiment, and then provides repetitive 
behavior patterns in regard to the association of the shape to the self by implementing a 
practice phase in the matching task, as well as providing feedback in the experimental phase 
of the matching task when errors are made. Importantly, an impact of newly established self-
association was not observed in the dot-probe task – which included only ascribing the 
association as an environmental influence. In contrast, an impact of newly established self-
association was observed in the matching task (the SPE) – which also included repetitive 
behavior patterns. Thus, the environmental influences that are present in each task 
supporting self-association may account for the difference in observed results. In other 
words, it reflects that increasing the environmental sources supporting the association of an 
element to the self can increase the impact of self-association.  
Still, the individual motivation to integrate an element into the self-concept is also 
necessary (Deaux, 1996). These motivations include the need for consistency and social 
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integrity (Becker & Tausch, 2014; Tajfel, 1981), a need for social inclusion and individuation 
(Brewer, 1991, 1993), and a desire to integrate the resources associated to an element (Aron 
et al., 1991). The experimental context of the dot-probe task is too simple to tap into 
dynamics (although this was, indeed, the reason why it was used), and may provide an 
explanation as to why no attentional impact of newly established self-association was 
observed. Namely, participants lacked reasons to want to integrate a geometric shape into 
the self-concept, as it did not present any particular benefit to them even within the 
experimental task outside of performance in the task. This recalls the research demonstrating 
that reward may increase the size of the SPE (Sui & Humphreys, 2015a, 2015b), which may 
support the idea that providing reasons that increase an individual’s motivation to integrate 
an element to the self-concept is important for it to actually be integrated. 
Furthermore, the effects of self-association are also dependent on context (Turner & 
Onorato, 1999). That is, identifications are expressed in environments in which they are 
relevant. When considering the experimental tasks used in the studies in this dissertation, 
they represent a very particular environment that offers limited conditions in which the self-
association of a geometric shape is relevant. In other words, the association of the geometric 
shape has little relevance in other contexts outside of the experimental environment. Thus, 
while the association of the geometric shape to the self may remain active during the 
matching task measuring the SPE, this association will not be triggered by other scenarios in 
daily life. Further considering that such experimental tasks are unlikely to be performed 
numerous times – if even performed more than once – the possibility of the shape being 
integrated into the self-concept and causing a permanent shape in this cognitive structure is 
eliminated.  
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Clearly, the data presented in this dissertation is limited to the interpretation of 
specific aspects of the cognitive impact of self-association and refer only to the very initial 
process of establishing self-association. Thus, further research is necessary in order to bridge 
the gap between these aspects and the way in which self-association is established and 
developed in our everyday use of technology. In this regard, multiple possibilities are open 
for future directions of research in this area. For example, the impact of newly established 
self-association could be tested when new representations are chosen as opposed to 
assigned, as is usually the case in digital environments. Furthermore, the impact of newly 
established self-association could be tested when new representations are designed by 
participants – reflecting, for example, how usernames or handles (which may, but do not 
necessarily have to, be one’s own name) are chosen. Also, considering that positive valence 
and reward are closely linked to the SPE (Stolte et al., 2017; Sui & Humphreys, 2015a, 2015b; 
Yankouskaya et al., 2018), it may be interesting to compare whether environments designed 
for different types of interactions (consider your user in online banking and your user in a 
videogame) have an effect on the impact of self-association. Overall, many elements that are 
involved in the integration of stimuli into the self-concept remain to be tested and offer 
interesting possibilities for future research. 
Practical implications 
Interpreting the results presented in this dissertation within the context of the 
literature, important suggestions for the design of user representations in digital 
environments – and the digital environments in which they are presented – can be derived. 
Namely, the initial presentation of a particular image as a new representation of the self is 
surely a necessary initial step towards it being integrated into the self-concept, yet it is 
General Discussion |  
 
153 
insufficient to actually lead to the integration of it into the self-concept and produce a long-
term association that can impact users’ information processing and behaviors. This does not 
mean, however, that it lacks the potential to be integrated into the self. Providing elements 
of reward, and possibilities of social inclusion and individuation increase users’ internal 
motivation to integrate self-representations into the self-concept. Furthermore, the digital 
environment must can influence the process of integrating the self-representation into the 
self-concept by providing clear definitions of the users’ roles and provide consistency through 
repetitive (positive) behaviors and interactions. In other words, the design of digital self-
representations and digital environments must cater to the multiple needs of users. 
Considering the relevant role of familiarity, becoming familiar to users is an important 
tool to be used. The self-concept is a complex construct and, while conditions that enable 
internal motivations for the integration of elements into the self-concept can be offered, self-
association cannot be simply induced. Designers have significantly more control over the 
environmental influences over self-association and thus a focus on increasing interactions 
with the user and becoming familiar can be an efficient approach to facilitate self-association.  
Ultimately, the appropriate design of user representations will be dependent on the 
end goal of the digital service or environment. An obvious, easy solution that eliminates the 
process of inducing self-association representing users with their real name or a photograph 
of themselves. However, this may not be suitable for every digital environment, such as a 
videogame which aims to immerse a user into a specific universe, or platforms with open 
discussion forums where some users may want to maintain some degree of anonymity.  
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Limitations and future directions 
Taking into account the multiple dynamics that come into play in the process of self-
association, it is clear that its study requires the scientific efforts of many researchers from 
different fields. While this dissertation may represent a contribution to the body of research 
on self-association, its results are limited to a specific area of it. However, the limitations of 
this work can provide some orientation for future research in this topic. 
While the use of the dot-probe task across studies in this dissertation facilitates the 
seamless integration and interpretation of its results, it does mean that the empirical results 
are bound to the constrictions of this specific task and the particular way in which it is used 
in these studies. As previously discussed, the research shows that even small adaptations of 
the same task seem to influence the observed effects of newly established self-association. 
Thus, it is important for future research to use tasks that can specifically measure a defined 
stage of information processing and, furthermore, that different tasks targeting the same 
stage of information processing are used. Diversifying the tasks that are used can enable the 
derivation of generalized conclusions. 
This empirical focus of this dissertation builds on prior literature and focuses on the 
cognitive impact of newly established self-association, specifically on attention. However, a 
large body of research shows that self-association impacts cognition at different stages of 
information processing. Furthermore, the effects of self-association are not only cognitive – 
they extend to affect and behavior. Further research on other stages of cognitive information 
processing as well as the affective and behavioral dimensions are important in order to 
develop and integrative understanding of the conditions that foster self-association. 
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Conclusion 
Self-association is a complex process involving multiple dynamics between the 
environment and the individual and cannot easily be induced. Thus, the numerous and varied 
self-representations that we regularly encounter in digital environments may be sustained in 
working memory while they are used (i.e., they remain active during the time in which an 
application is being used) but are not necessarily integrated into the self-concept. Rather, 
their potential to be integrated into the self-concept in the long-term and consequently 
impact information processing, attitudes, and behavior, will depend on their relevance, as 
well as the dynamics and experiences that follow the initial tagging to the self. Nevertheless, 
familiarity seems to play an important role in the potential for self-representations to impact 
information processing. Thus, due to the long history of exposure to our own name and face, 
familiar representations such as one’s own name as a username and profile photos may 
generally remain the most efficient self-representations par excellence. Still, elements that 
foster self-association can be used and included in the design of digital representations of the 
self and digital environment in order to guide users in their manipulation of the environment 
and enhance their overall satisfaction with their experience in the digital environment. 
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